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SUMMARY
Health care is an unusual issue for collective bargaining. It was forced onto 
the bargaining agendas of some unions in South Africa by a combination of failing and 
racially discriminatory public sector health care and inflationary private sector health 
care. Sick Funds arc industry-specific health insurance schemes in South Africa, which 
give their members access to specific and limited private sector medical benefits, sick 
pay and sometimes maternity pay. They arc jointly funded and managed by employer 
and trade union representatives, through the collective bargaining structures of 
Industrial Councils. This research, a case study of three Sick Funds for clothing and 
leather workers, and a more elaborate health insurance scheme for workers in the 
public transport sector, examines the process of restructuring the content and delivery 
of medical services, and the management of the schemes. This is done in the context 
of dramatic political developments on the national stage from 1992, through the period 
of South Africa’s first democratic election in 1994, to 1996. The membership of the 
Sick Funds was highly homogeneous, comprising low-paid black workers, 
predominantly women. Recommendations for reform and expansion of the Sick Funds 
focused particularly on a shift from reliance on contracted doctors to the establishment 
of a network of neighbourhood-based worker health centres, with medical staff 
employed directly by the Funds. The other major recommendation was (he extension 
of benefits to dependants for the first time. The fourth case highlights the difficult 
process of transforming a much more elaborate scheme in a complex multi-union 
situation in a large publicly owned company facing privatisation. Membership of the 
transport scheme was much more heterogeneous: overwhelmingly male and 
predominantly black, there was a substantial minority of white members and a far 
greater range of income. The argument is that under certain conditions, trade unions 
can transform existing arrangements for health care for their members, imprinting a 
trade union character on both the services and their management. The projects 
achieved their aims to varying degrees. The thesis explores the conditions for success 
and failure. The studies do not produce a model, which can be extracted from its 
context and applied generally. The argument is that struggle is part of the model. 
Nevertheless, these projects raise crucial questions about proposals for mandatory 
social health insurance and have important implications for the national project of 
restructuring the health system for equity.
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IChapter 1. Trade unionism in South Africa
1. Introduction
This thesis is about trade unions entering the domain of health care on behalf of 
their members. It opens up a series of questions about trade union practice, which in 
turn highlight the more fundamental issue of union purpose and specifically the 
relationship of trade unions to politics. The familiar territory of trade union activity is 
bargaining with employers over wages and conditions for members. Health care is not 
a standard bargaining issue, but dependent on country-specific organisation of the 
health sector. Only in certain countries are health care arrangements linked to work. 
At the time of these studies, South Africa had neither a comprehensive national health 
service nor a national health insurance system. Instead, it had a mixed system of 
public and private health care. Health insurance was a voluntary matter, left to 
agreement between employers and employees, by collective bargaining or otherwise. 
When health care was added to the agenda of union bargaining, the issue was usually 
dealt with as part of the social wage and limited to bargaining with employers over the 
division of the cost of health insurance.
A fundamentally different trade union intervention is explored in this thesis. Faced 
with existing health care schemes, judged unsatisfactory by its members, a trade union 
undertook interventions which extended both the scope and the location of its core
activity of bargaining. It did not restrict itself to bargaining over costs, but 
precipitated and actively participated in a process of re-structuring the content, 
delivery and management of health services for its membership. Union leaders 
challenged the instrumentalism of medical schemes which covered only workers and 
not their families, and which combined medical benefits with punitive sick leave and 
sick pay arrangements. In doing so, they engaged with new parties, most notably 
health care providers in both the private and the public sectors, and challenged 
professional control of the process of defining health needs and designing health 
services, by opening up a way to feed the experience of members into that process. 
The relationship between union leaders and members was a crucial determinant of the 
outcome and the success of projects.
The focus of the thesis is the process of negotiating and implementing change in 
four medical schemes in South Africa between 1992 and 1996. From analysis of the 
implications and consequences for the unions involved and for their members, I argue 
that models for health care delivery and financing cannot simply be transplanted from 
one situation to another. Struggle is part of the model and the bargaining process is 
crucial in determining the outcome, as is the political context. The survival of the 
schemes depends on their appropriateness for changing times. The approach is 
assessed in the light of the development of health services and health policy in post­
apartheid South Africa, in order to explore its usefulness in informing decisions about 
working class health service provision in the current period.
3Emerging democracies, especially those with struggling economies, are subject to 
conflicting pressures. On the one hand, they face expectations of social justice and 
consequent demands for improved services from their citizens, services which they 
must fund from restricted budgets. The issue of restructuring health care systems in 
developing countries has been addressed by a number of authors, including Lee and 
Mills (1985), Hoare and Mills (1986), Green (1992), Mills and Lee (1993), Mogedal 
et al. (1995), Cassels (1995), Ugalde and Jackson (1995), andZwi and Mills (1995). 
One response is to relieve the pressure by requiring the employed to fund their own 
care. State funds can then be devoted to the unemployed and indigent, improving 
services without increasing the overall health budget. On the other hand, this transfer 
of costs to employed people will meet resistance: organised workers will clearly not 
accept sole responsibility for funding their own health care and employers will resist 
the imposition of compulsory social welfare commitments, arguing that they need 
maximum ‘flexibility’ in order to hold down increases in the cost of labour and 
strengthen competitiveness in world markets. In this context, the new South African 
government can neither fund a national health service nor impose National Health 
Insurance (or Social Health Insurance) on all employed people in the short term. I 
argue that union-led initiatives in the restructuring of health care for their members arc 
not contradictory to the longer term aim of redressing the inequity of the South 
African health system: rather, they have a powerful contribution to make towards 
achieving that aim.
42. Unions and politics
The thesis connects with a number of key debates and developments in the 
independent trade union movement in South Africa, particularly in the last decade. 
These debates have drawn on international debates and developments, and developed 
arguments about the role of trade unions in relation to the state, more explicitly since 
restrictions on open political discussion (and, especially, publication) eased, less 
explicitly during the years of repression (for example, Nicol 1980; Fine, De Clercq and 
Innes 1981; Foster 1982; Friedman 1987; Baskin 1991;Mboweni 1992; 
Godongwanaet al. 1993; Murphy 1994; Torres 1994; September 1996; Ronnie 1996; 
Von Holdt 1996; Buhlungu 1997; Shilowa 1997). The work in this thesis connects 
with two areas of intellectual concern: the politics of trade unionism and the politics of 
health (Doyal 1983; Bond et al. 1997). There is very little literature which draws the 
two together, examining health care as a trade union issue, either in South Africa or 
internationally (exceptions include Pillay and Bond 1995; and London 1993). I have 
attempted to relate key elements of a sprawling debate on union purpose and politics 
on the one hand and an equally wide-ranging body of literature on health care on the 
other. Dramatic political changes resulting in and flowing from a change of 
government shifted the scope of the analysis, rendering inadequate retrospective 
analysis of the projects in the context in which they took place. They had to be 
subjected to a new test, of their appropriateness for a new dispensation in the process
5of development. The immediacy of this task concentrated the analysis on South 
Africa.
Current debates about trade unions and politics are rooted in a long history. In 
one sense, trade unions were politicised simply by their location in South Africa. 
Workers in many countries suffer from discriminatory and unfair laws. South Africa is 
unique only in the systematic oppression of workers on the basis of colour: 
‘Restrictions on their freedom of movement, employment and organisation as workers 
were bound up with the national oppression of the black majority by the white 
minority.’(Kraak 1993, xxv) During the 1970s. the independent black trade unions 
revived after a period of intense state repression.1 A number of young students moved 
into worker advice bureaux and worker education organisations as part of a deliberate 
strategy of rebuilding the movement. A conscious choice was made to avoid overtly 
political activity, which would have attracted state attention and repression, and to 
concentrate on building strong shop floor structures. This approach was informed by 
an analysis of the fate of the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), 
which saw it as weakened by its alliance with the nationalist movement in the 1950s, a 
‘captive of the nationalists', having neglected factory organisation to support the 
campaigns called by the Congress Alliance and lost a vital cadre of union officials to 
the armed struggle (Friedman 1987). The new unions concentrated on organising a 
factory base and developed their structures on the fundamental principle of worker
1 The term ‘black’ is used inclusively throughout the thesis (for all those other than whites), and 
‘coloured’, ’Asian' (or ‘Indian’) or African only where this is necessary to highlight some pertinent 
point, arising from apartheid state differentiation between these groups.
6control. At this stage, black unions were technically illegal and were excluded from the 
legal industrial relations system, so their first battle was for recognition from 
employers, in order to bargain on behalf of their members. Recognition battles in the 
1970s were often bitter and extended, involving mass dismissals, violent police action 
and banning orders for prominent unionists (Baskin 1991, chapter 1). In this sense, 
even the issue of wage bargaining, a standard function of even the most economistic 
form of unionism, took on political overtones.
The late 1970s was a watershed period for the unions. The government finally 
opened up the industrial relations system to black unions, but conditional on 
registration. This gave rise to a stormy debate, dividing roughly between those who 
argued for registration on strategic grounds, on the basis of exploiting all avenues to 
advance workers interests, and those who argued that registration essentially 
amounted to incorporation and emasculation (De Clercq 1980; Nicol 1980; WPGWU 
1980; FOSATU 1980; Fine, Dc Clercq and Innes 1981; Fine 1982; Inncs 1982a; 
1982b). The unions of the Federation of South African Unions (FOSATU) argued for 
strategic registration, while several Cape-based independent unions and a new group 
of ‘community’ unions, which organised on the basis of mass mobilisation, held the 
opposing view. These ‘community’ unions were the most overtly political of the 
emerging unions, openly aligning themselves with the then illegal African National 
Congress (ANC) and affiliating to the United Democratic Front (UDF) after its 1983 
launch. FOSATU, on the other hand, acknowledged the role of the nationalist groups 
but emphasised the primacy of creating ‘an independent working class movement’ built
7on strength in the factories and argued that this was ‘a fundamental political task’ in 
itself (Foster 1982; Friedman 1987, 437), This position came under attack for its 
ahstcntionism and was characterised as ‘a hallmark of trade union syndicalism... 
because it did not accord a sufficient leadership role to the vanguard party’ (Copelyn 
1997, 76). Nevertheless, despite divisions on the key issues of registration and political 
involvement, organisational tactics and the structures for worker control, the first hall 
of the 1980s saw a scries of unity talks between the different groupings, which 
culminated in the launch of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (CQSATU) 
in November 1985.
The launch did not dissolve political differences among the affiliates, which 
emerged clearly at the first Central Executive Committee (CEC) meeting in February 
1986 (Baskin 1991, chapters 5 and 6). The four political proposals put to this meeting 
outline the different tendencies within the new federation. They also reveal something 
of the background to the two main unions with which the thesis is concerned. The 
motion from the South African Railways and Harbour Workers’ Union (SARIIWIJ) 
proposed that COSATU ‘promote working-class leadership in the struggle’ and 
commit itself to co-operate with ‘other democratic forces’. The metal union similarly 
proposed including ‘other organisations of the working class, especially the students 
and unemployed workers’ in the discussions of union role. At the other extreme, the 
National Union of Textile Workers (NUTW), one of the unions which later merged 
into the South African Clothing and Textile Workers’ Union (SACTWIJ), stressed 
that the unions should remain independent and should not affiliate ‘to any political
tendency or organisation’, but called for ‘consultation and co-operation’ with other 
democratic organisations which included worker members or took up issues which 
affected workers,. Another resolution, from the food unions, proposed ‘disciplined
8
alliances with progressive community and political organisations’. A sub-committee 
was given the unenviable task of creating a composite resolution from these four, a 
compromise which did not create unanimity beyond the obvious: that COSATU would 
be active politically and would work with other organisations.
3. COS A TU and the new government
COSATU was an active participant in the extended process of political 
negotiation which led up to South Africa’s first democratic election in 1994 (Buhlungu 
1992; 1994a; Collins 1994a).2 *The ANC went into the election in alliance with the 
major trade union federation, COSATU, and the South African Communist Party 
(SACP), winning an overwhelming majority. Well before the change of government, 
trade union leaders had extended their engagement beyond immediate shop floor 
issues to the broader sphere of industrial restructuring (Godongwana 1992; Smith 
1997).' Involvement in a broad range of bipartisan and tripartite structures put serious 
strains on union organisational capacity, created a tension between efficiency and 
participation and opened the potential for a distancing between union leaderships and
2 The extent of COSATU’s involvement is clear in the head office structure, which included four 
negotiation task forces (political, economic, social development, labour market) (Zikulala 1992b).
'  Godongwana, General Secretary of the metal union, argued that both mass struggle and 
negotiations were necessary tactics for fundamental economic transformation.
ytheir memberships (Marie 1992; Vavi 1992; Mkhosana 1992; Von Holdt 1993a; 
Buhlungu 1994b; Isaacs 1995; SALB1996; NEDLAC 1997). Participants in the debate 
argued variously for strategic unionism (Von Holdt 1992), bargained corporatism 
(Baskin 1993), new ‘social unionism’ (Waterman 1995), and a programme of radical 
reform using the space created by democratic conditions (Gostner 1996). The 
movement was hit by a serious brain drain in the 1990s, particularly around the time of 
the election, as new opportunities opened up: leaders went to Parliament and 
government and management started to recruit actively among union officials 
(Buhlungu 1994b; Schreiner 1994).4
The change of government resulted in a fundamental shift in COSATU’s 
relationship with government, highlighting the problems of alliance with a political 
party, especially when that party is in government. COSATU was faced with shifting 
identities: at times their erstwhile partner was the party (accountable to its members 
and alliance partners); at times it was the government (accountable to the electorate, 
balancing relationships with other parties, subject to demands from a broad range of 
interest groups); and sometimes it was the state (caught in the machinery of 
administration run by professional bureaucrats sometimes hostile to the new 
government). This situation required of the trade union movement a subtle and
4 The role of intellectuals inside and outside trade unions has been debated over the years, for 
example in Gwala and Murphy (1994), an account of a discussion between Murphy, a while 
intellectual, then an official in SACTWU, and Gwala, then General Secretary of SACTWU, a black 
working class leader who rose from the ranks, having started his working life as a gardener. Adler 
(1997) disputes the ‘brain drain' theory, pointing out that the September Commission was constituted 
entirely of black working class intellectuals.
strategic approach, using the different avenues available but never neglecting its 
fundamental power base of direct bargaining with employers.
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The debate in the South Africa labour movement about unions and politics 
centred on social democracy and democratic socialism. Some contributions to the 
debate came from international participants. Higgins (1993), an Australian left social 
democrat, proposed the Swedish social democratic route to socialism. In response, 
South African socialists (some from the labour movement, others from the ANC and 
the SACP) raised concerns about reformism, the development of industrial policy to 
support a socialist position and the appropriateness of imported models for the South 
African situation (Godongwana et al. 1993). Underlying all these responses was a 
concern about the prospects for the socialist project after the decisive moment in the 
national liberation project, the first democratic election. Another series of responses 
included Torres’ (1994) caution against uncritical adoption of ‘the Swedish model’, 
which raised the question whether social democracy worked in Scandinavia because 
the country could afford it, in comparison with poorer countries like South Africa.
She warned also that 'the ANC may make policies on the basis of national interest 
rather than labour’s priority. Labour would also have to take the “national interest” 
into account in a transitional reconstruction period, maybe even at the expense of their 
own members’ (Torres 1994, 66). Stilwell (1994), another Australian, examined the 
appropriateness for South Africa of an Australian-style social contract, highlighting in 
particular the depoliticisation of the trade union movement and disempowerment of 
the rank and file membership which may result from a social contract, with its ‘high
price in terms of the internal processes of union decision making’ as negotiations take 
place at the highest level between a small number of top union leaders and government 
decision makers (Stilwell 1994, 84).
Murphy (1994) was sceptical about claims that South Africa was on a social 
democratic path, re-emphasising the importance of 'democracy on the ground’ as the 
essential feature to secure socialism in the future as follows:
The most “socialist” bit of our experience to date was not the illusion of a 
worker-friendly, powerful central state, but our own involvement in 
democratising our own immediate lives through our own grassroots 
organisations in our factories and in our communities. (Murphy 1994, 61)
One of the underlying ironies of the old regime was that a politically repressive
state was, in economic terms, protective. Along with political liberation went
economic liberalisation, with serious implications for labour as the rhetoric of
competitiveness took hold. The ANC manifesto economic policy had been developed
in consultation with the alliance partners, the title (Reconstruction and Development
Programme - RDP) revealing the major thrust towards job creation, growth and
redistribution (Von Holdt 1993b). Nevertheless, there was unease in the trade union
movement about the broadness of the programme and its lack of detail about
implementation (Cargill 1993; Etkind and Harvey 1993). Murphy (1994) argued that
the RDP could be seen as a social democratic programme only by the ‘lowest common
denominator standard'. The uncase proved well founded. The RDP office, which had
been headed by Minister Jay Naidoo (ex-Gcneral Secretary of COS ATU) and with
many cx-umonists among its key personnel, was closed in 1996 and its functions
12
brought under the control of the Deputy President, Thabo Mbeki, a move widely 
interpreted as weakening labour’s influence (Gotz 1996). The economic framework 
shifted towards economic neo-liberalism and the RDP was replaced by a policy of 
Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR), a set of neo-liberal economic- 
policies, developed without labour involvement, which aim to reinsert South Africa 
into the world economy through competitive exports, which in return require labour 
flexibility, moderate wage increases and the removal of tariff barriers, all policies with 
serious implications for labour (African National Congress 1994b; Pillay 1997; Clark 
and Isaacs 1996; Bond 1996).’ GEAR was developed without consultation with 
COSATU and was resoundingly rejected by COSATU’s national congress in 
September 1997, despite a direct appeal from President Mandela (Clark and Isaacs 
1996; Bond 1996; Pillay 1997; kaNkosi 1997). COSATU’s president expressed the 
overwhelming response of delegates by accusing the government of ‘putting the 
country into reverse GEAR’ (ka’Nkosi 1997).h This rejection was an expression of 
the strains that had appeared in the working relationship with government over the 
first four years (Shilowa 1997; Buhlungu 1997).
There has been continuing debate in trade union circles about the future of the 
tripartite alliance: on the one hand, there is a view that COSATU is ‘Hogging a dying
'  Por an analysis of the impact on health sector restructuring of the change in policy from the RDI’ 
to GEAR, see Bond et al. (1997).
6 The engagement between trade unions and government on trade policy highlights one of the effects 
of the political transformation. The current Minister of Trade and Industry, Alec Erwin, is one of the 
union veterans sent to parliament on the ‘COSATU list’ (Webster and Von Hold! 199b). The same 
pattern is seen in the Department of Labour, whose Director-General is an ex-unionist, along with 
many of the Minister’s advisers (SALB 1995).
horse’ (Buhlungu 1997), on (he other, COSATU’s general secretary argues that it is 
possible to ‘revitalise and galvanise the alliance and the people behind transformation' 
(Shilowa 1997, 71). Some unionists argued that social contracts and co-determination 
were insufficient weapons to change the nature of capitalism and that the union 
movement needed to develop militant strategics to support workers’ demands (Ronnie 
1996; Alexander 1995).
The federation recognised the seriousness of the problems and established the 
September Commission to investigate the future role of trade unions and formulate 
proposals on a range of issues, including political alliances and economic policy, as 
well as internal questions such as organising new members and democratising the 
workplace (Von Hold! 1996; September Commission 1996). The September 
Commission spelled out a redistributive economic strategy and a political commitment 
to extend democracy and revitalise the alliance, as part of an explicitly political project 
(Adler 1997).
4. The trade unions in this thesis
In the period covered by this thesis, there were three trade union federations in 
South Africa, organising less than a third of the working population. Union density 
for the country as a whole was 3 1.3% in 1994, after dramatic growth in the 19X0s 
(Macun 199.3; Filita 1997). The largest and most powerful of the federations was 
COSATU, whose membership was 1.9 million in 1994 (Filita 1997, 36). Non-
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racialism is one of COSATU’s fundamental principles, but its membership remains 
overwhelmingly black, and its affiliates have had little suceess in recruiting and 
organising white workers. Stumbling blocks include closed shop agreements, white 
racism and black suspicion (Zikalala 1993a). Where while workers have joined 
COSATU unions, there have been problems of assimilation (ibid.). There have also 
been divisions between Indian and African workers, and between coloured and African 
workers, to some extent related to divide and rule tactics on the part of government 
and employers (Amra 1993; Coetzee 1993; Valodia 1993). Although it was the 
dominant federation, COSATU could not claim to represent the working class as a 
whole. Most COSATU affiliates were industrial unions, their membership 
predominantly African blue-collar workers below the level of artisans (Von Hold! 
1993b).
In October 1986, the Council of Unions of South Africa (CUSA) and the 
A/.anian Congress of Trade Unions (AZACTU), merged to form another federation of 
black unions, the National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU), which had 23 affiliates 
and 170,000 members (Kraak 1993, 180). NACTU placed strong emphasis on the 
development of black leadership and had strong links to the political traditions of black 
consciousness. CUSA and AZACTU withdrew from the unity talks between the 
independent unions which had preceded the formation of COSATU because of their 
opposition to the principle of non-racialism. In the process, CUSA lost its most 
powerful affiliate, the National Union of Mincworkcrs, which decided to join 
COSATU. The high point of NACTU membership was 327,(KK) in 1994, dropping to
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230,000 in 1996 (Filita 1997). NACTU did not recruit white members, but otherwise 
its unions, membership and operating style were similar to COSATU’s and despite 
ideological differences the two federations co-operated on some of the mass protests 
of the apartheid era.7 Since the change of government, the two federations have been 
involved together in a range of tripartite institutions. However, repeated attempts to 
unify them during the late 1980s and into the 1990s have not yet succeeded.
The third federation was the Federation of Unions of South Africa (FEDUSA), 
whose members were predominantly white. In 1996, FEDUSA had 255,000 members 
(Filita 1997; Von Holdt and Zikalala 1993; Von Holdt 1993d).* Though the federation 
had black members (claiming some 30% in 1993), it experienced problems of 
assimilation equivalent to those which COSATU faced with white members (Von 
Holdt and Zikalala 1993). FEDUSA organised predominantly white-collar workers 
and artisans in craft unions, presented itself as ‘the moderate voice of labour’ and 
pursued an cconomistic form of unionism:
Our particular image ... stems from the fact that we restrict ourselves to purely 
economic, labour and consumer issues.... Our style is one of negotiation rather 
than one of mass action...(Von Holdt and Zikalala 1993: 58).
The thesis focuses on two unions which arc affiliated to COSATU, but come 
from very different political and organisational traditions. The studies which follow 
trace the influence of these different traditions and practices on the unions’ practices
7 In 1988, for example, the two federations called a national stay-away, which involved 2.5 It) 3 
million workers and lasted three days (Kraak 1993, 245).
* FEDUSA was previously named the Federation of South African Eahour (FEDSAL).
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and approaches to the issue of health care. Other unions arc involved in two of the 
studies: they are cither unaffiliated or affiliated to FEDUSA.
SACTWU
The first three studies involved SACTWU, a union which was the product of a 
number of mergers of unions with very different memberships and traditions. The first 
study was undertaken with the Western Cape branch, whose precursor was the 
Garment Workers’ Union - Western Province (GWU-WP), a union with a history of 
close alliance with employers (Nicol 1983; 1984b).'' The second study was with 
SACTWU’s leather sector and the third with SACTWU’s clothing sector, this time in 
Natal.1" This last branch came from a very different tradition of unionism, being 
dominated by leaders who had come from the old textile union which was part of the 
new wave of radical, largely African, unionism of the 1970s (Friedman 1987, 37-68; 
Baskin 1991, 18-17-18; Kraak 1993, 127-129; Khwela 1993).
The GWU-WP was a much older union, established in 1927. However, it was 
a paper union from the start, the impetus for its establishment having come from the 
employers’ association (Nicol 1983). The employers sought to pre-empt government 
regulation of wages in their industry by establishing an alternative mechanism for wage 
agreement by negotiation with a trade union. The only problem was that in order to 
establish an Industrial Council (IC), they needed a union and clothing workers were 
unorganised. After unsuccessful attempts to organise a union themselves, employers
<l Unionisation in the Western Cape is close to the national average rate, at 29,7% (Filita 1997, 38). 
111 Unionisation in Kwa/.ulu-Nalal is 30,6% (ibid.).
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approached the Cape Federation of Labour Unions (CFLIJ) for assistance and in 1927 
the GWU-WP was registered under the Industrial Conciliation Act. The first 
Industrial Council collapsed as a result of rank and file opposition, and the industry 
was regulated by the Wage Board rather than an 1C for the next 10 years. The union 
effectively collapsed, though it retained its paper registration and its secretary, who 
continued to attempt to draw employers into an 1C. Meanwhile, garment workers 
elsewhere had been organised by very different trade unions, most notably by the 
Garment Workers’ Union (GWU) in the Transvaal, led by the radical Solly Sachs." 
The paper leadership in the Cape rebuffed the Transvaal proposal to form a national 
union, which was followed by several robust attempts in 1930-1 and 1935-7 to 
establish a rival union in the Cape (Nicol 19X3, Lewis 1976b). The CFLU leadership 
were firmly opposed to both party political affiliation and trade union militancy and 
fought off the challenges from the north and a take-over bid in 1937 from supporters 
of the idea of a national union, with the assistance and encouragement of employers 
(Nicol 1983). By the time the Industrial Council was registered by the Minister of 
Labour in 1937, the battle to develop an alternative organisation for garment workers 
in the Cape was effectively over. In the end, the union ‘entered its first industrial 
council agreement already structured as a compliant bosses’ union, which the 
manufacturers had “organised” by arranging the enrolment of their workers’ (Nicol 
1983, 255). Thereafter the union settled down to five decades of ‘sweetheart’ style
"  Solly Sachs, an immigrant from Russia, was reviled hy the South African government and 
employers us 'the Jew Communist'. He was in lact expelled hy the South African Communist Party 
in 1931, a fact which did not stop the SA government from ‘listing’ him under the Suppression of 
Communism Act of 1950 (I-ewis I976h, 73).
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unionism, disturbed only briefly by several campaigns by the Transvaal union in the 
1940s and 1950s which failed, despite support from shopfloor workers, another 
frustrated bid to ‘clean up the union’ from the inside by ousting the executive and the 
General Secretary in the mid-1970s (Maree 1976) and a short-lived attempt to 
organise a rival union, the Clothing Workers’ Union (CLOWU) in the early 1980s 
(Nicol 1984a; Gool 1985).
The union was unaffected by the repression of the 1960s and 1970s, indicative 
of its incorporated position. As Lewis (1976a, 58) points out, it was significant ‘that 
this supposedly powerful union... [did not attract] the hostility of the state, but nor has 
it attracted the support of an articulate element of its rank and file’. As the largest 
union in the Western Cape, the GWU-WP was a challenge to political activists, a 
number of whom took jobs in the union from the mid-1980s and began quietly to 
transform it from within. In 1987, this transformation of the union was manifested in 
the launch of a new union, the result of a merger with another union with a 
conservative history, the Garment Workers Industrial Union (Natal) (Labour Study 
Group 1985; Bernickow 1988; GAWU 1988a; GAWU 1988b).'2 The new Garment 
and Allied Workers’ Union (GAWU):
committed itself to align the new union to the progressive labour movement in 
South Africa and to unity with other unions in the industry. Our doors have 
been open and remain open and we hope to see faithful unity talks taking place 
between unions in the industry over the coming months. (Bernickow 1988, 76) 12
12 Both unions had been affiliates of the Trade Union Congress of South Africa, which dissolved in 
1986.
SACTWU was a relative newcomer to the leather sector, the subject of the 
second study. Recruiting in this new sector began under ACTWUSA and accelerated 
after the formation of SACTWU. The union had had to fight a legal battle for 
representation on the National Industrial Council for the Leather Industry, where it 
competed with the two established unions, a small regionally based union, the 
Transvaal Leather and Allied Trades Union (TLATIIJ) and a national union, the 
National Union of Leathcrworkcrs (NIJLW). SACTWU took recruitment into new 
areas to extend its base and wanted, like the NULW, to absorb the TLATIU.
The Natal branch of SACTWU, the subject of the third study, was rooted in a 
very different tradition of unionism from the Cape, A separate series of mergers 
resulted in the formation of the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union of 
South Africa (ACTWUSA) in November 1987, just a month before the launch of 
GAWIJ. ” The COSATU-affiliated National Union of Textile Workers (NUTW) 
merged with two smaller unions (formerly affiliated to the Trade Union Congress of 
South Africa - TUCSA), the National Union of Garment Workers (NIJGW-SA) and 
the Textile Workers Industrial Union (TWIU) (NUGW 1987; NUTW 1987; TWIU 
1987; Markham 1987). Though a national union, ACTWUSA’s base was in Natal, the 
centre of the 1970s wave of worker militancy (Friedman 1987, 37-68; Baskin 1991, 
17-18). The NUTW was a founder member of COSATU, and leaders from NUTW 
were highly influential in the new union, ACTWUSA.
1' AC'TWlJSA's membership (71’lMM)) was predominantly in the textile industry in Natal and the 
clothing industry in the Transvaal. CiAWlt's membership (9K’0(H)) was in the Cape and Natal 
clothing industries.
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Attempts to bring the constituent unions of GAWU and ACTWIJSA together 
in one merger had failed and, despite positive public statements about ‘unity’, there 
was considerable tension between GAWU and ACTWUSA, especially in Natal 
(Baskin 1991, 304-7). ACTWUSA felt strongly that the COSATU general secretary 
should not accept an invitation to address the launch of GAWU, because of the 
GAWU unions’ history of collaboration with employers and their ‘bureaucratic style’. 
The COSATU Central Executive Committee overruled these complaints, judging that 
‘progressive and militant individuals had gained the upper hand within both GWIU 
(Natal) and WPGWU [sic]’ (Baskin 1991). There was also apprehension among Cape 
workers, as expressed by a prominent worker leader:
The workers were beginning to feel comfortable with the idea that they had a 
union called GAWU. But a lot of fears emerged amongst us: will we still be 
the same union, arc we being taken over, benefits, leadership etc. It was a 
painful period, because there were two big unions each with its own way of 
operating and traditions. (Gabriels 1991,94) [emphasis mine]
GAWU and ACTWUSA finally merged in September 1989 (SALB 1989; 
Kraak 1993; Baskin 1991 ).14 The new union was the third largest affiliate of 
COSATU and was notable for bringing a substantial group of coloured and Indian 
workers into the federation for the first time, as well as for dramatically increasing the 
number of women in COSATU (Baskin 1991,304-307; 393-395). The post of 
General Secretary of the new union went first to Lionel October (cx-GAWU) and the 
head office was based in Cape Town for the first year. Subsequently, the position was
, 't Despite large-scale retrenchments, SACTWU (with 160'OOt) members in 1996) remains the third 
largest affiliate of COSATU, behind the mining and metal unions (I'ilita 19*17).
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resumed by John Copelyn, the powerful ex-Cieneral Secretary of ACT W US A (and 
previously of NUTW), and the head office moved hack to Natal, where it has 
remained since.15 The Durban building, owned by the union, houses both the national 
and the regional offices.1''
SAKHWU
The last study developed from a relationship with the South African Railways 
and Harbour Workers Union (SARHWU), but entered the complex ground of multi­
unionism in a multi-layered workforce, in comparison with the relatively homogeneous 
workforces of the clothing and leather industries. SARIIWIJ was launched in 1936 by 
African railway workers in Cape Town, in response to moves by Afrikaner nationalists 
to expel black workers from the railway union. South African Communist Party 
(SAC’Pj militants were active in the organising campaign (Lewis 1976a), which 
resulted in a national membership of 20,(XX) by the early 1940s (Luckhardt and Wall 
1980, 53). In the early 1960s it ceased to function, along with many other unions, in 
the wake of severe state repression. In October 1986, several months into the second 
state of emergency, it was re-launched. The new union was strongly political, aligned 
to the ANC, and formed part of the United Democratic Front (UDF) bloc within 
COSATU.
1 John Copelyn remained (ieneral Secretary until he left the union to enter Parliament as one of the 
official COSATU nominees for the ANC parliamentary list. He subsequently left Parliament to join a 
very large investment company (Copelyn 1997).
The majority of union head offices are in Johannesburg, with a few exceptions, notably SA( TWII 
in Durban, and the food and municipal unions in Cape Town. SACTWU also lets space in its Durban 
building to the Industrial Council, the central Sick f  und clinic, a clothing co-operative formed in the 
wake of widespread sackings alter a strike wave, and the Nalal branch of the Workers’ College.
The South African Transport Services (SATS) was a massively powerful state 
corporation, incorporating a substantial proportion of the entire transport sector.17 As 
a state corporation, it was exempt from general labour legislation. The Condition of 
Services (SATS) Act of 1983 banned all strikes, defining transport as an ‘essential 
service’. Nevertheless, the early years of the re-launched union were overshadowed 
by two massive and violent strikes, in 1987 and 1989/9(1.111 The union was faced with 
an intransigent management, but had an equally intransigent membership: ‘SARHWU 
members were renowned for their militancy, SATS for its conservatism and 
inllexibility’(Baskin 1991,418). SATS management refused to negotiate with 
SARHWU, declaring that black workers were represented by the Black Trade Union 
(BLATU) a management-founded union which was one of the eleven in-house unions 
then recognised for negotiating purposes (Baskin 1991, 172). The escalating strike 
was finally settled when management caved in and reinstated strikers without loss of 
benefit and extended the right to permanent status after two years employment to 
black workers, who had previously remained temporary, however long their service. 
However, the company still refused to recognise SARHWU. It was only after the 
second strike that the company finally bowed to the inevitable and extended interim 
recognition to the union, pending registration. SARHWU attended its first wage
17 In I9K4, transport amounted to 7.2% of South Africa's GDI’. 77%  of which was contributed by 
SATS, which employed 240,000 out of the sector total of 339,000 (Green 19X6, 27). Since this time, 
and especially since commercialisation in 1991, there has been considerable downsizing (Macun 
1993).
11 In the 19X7 strike, more than 10 people (strikers and scabs) were killed, more than h(X) detained, 
the police twice laid siege to C'OSATU House, subsequently destroyed by a right-wing bomh attack, a 
SARHWU office was destroyed in an arson attack , at least SO railway coaches were torched anil there 
were bomb blasts on railway properly. In the 19X9/90 strike, more than 30 strikers and scabs were 
killed (Baskin 1992, I7I-IXI, 417-X; Matiko 19X7).
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negotiations in April 1990. Between the two strikes, SAKIIWIJ struggled to 
eonsolidatc its membership, hugely swollen by mass enrolments during the first 
national strike. It also suffered from convulsions in leadership, which compounded the 
difficulties of creating a smooth administration (Zikalala 1992a).1'1
I bis was the background to the fourth study: a militant black union and a 
company with a conservative history as one of the bastions of protected white labour, 
and very poorly developed industrial relations. The scars of bitter disputes were barely 
healed and memories of violence and repression had entrenched black workers’ 
distrust of the management. The nine other unions in the company hail a very different 
background: they had well-established relationships with management and were 
recognised parties in negotiations with Transnet (the company name since 
commercialisation), which was still the largest transport company and fourth largest 
company in the country in 1995 (Macuñ 1995, 13).
5. Trade unions at work
Unions develop a range of practices to pursue their purposes. These include 
recruiling, organising, educating and representing members. Recruitment may lie 
passive (with the closed shop the most extreme example) or active (member by 
member, or campaign style recruiting). Trade union mergers like those described
r' At the I9XX congress, all office bearers except the president were replaced. This precipitated a 
series of resignations of key officials, and the removal ot die general secretary and another office 
hearer (Haskin 1991, .310-11).
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above are a form of relatively passive mass recruitment. Closed shops pose the danger 
of lack of engagement by leaders, who have a captive membership. This had been the 
case in the Cape clothing industry, where some members did not know the name of 
their union and others did not even know that they were union members, though union 
dues were deducted weekly from their wages.
Campaigning
Campaign style recruiting poses its own problems, especially when associated 
with strikes or other industrial action, as union growth can be too rapid for 
organisational stability, as in SARlIWU’s case. This kind of recruiting was a feature of 
South African unionism, particularly in the early to mid-1980s, when general unions 
were common and functioned as organisations of community political mobilisation as 
much as (and in some cases more than) workplace based organisations (liaskin 1991, 
28-29).2" The campaign style may extend to broader organisational practices. During 
the 1980s and into the 1990s, there was a constant call to South African unions to join 
in solidarity campaigns with community and political organisations on a range of issues 
from opposition to value added tax, to support for school, transport and rent boycotts 
(Kraak 1993, chapter 8). Solidarity appeals went both ways, as striking unions often 
appealed to community organisations for support in terms of product boycotts and 
fundraising (Kraak 1993, chapter 7). Populist solidarity work is demanding of a union.
211 The general secretary of SAKIIWtJ, Derrick Simoko, is a veteran of the best known of the 
'community' unions, the South African Allied Workers' Union (SAAWtlj, based in hast London 
SAAWIJ was extremely active in mass mobilisation in the early 1980s and was consequently the 
target for particularly intense state repression.
25
tying up scarce organisational resources and potentially distracting from less 
glamorous organisational groundwork. When it takes on an overtly political line, it 
may alienate non-activists and even endanger union members, in polarised situations, 
by identifying them with one particular political tendency. This danger was 
particularly acute in Natal, the stronghold of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), as 
SACTWU was aware from its experience in the province. Public attacks on the IFP 
by COSATU leaders intensified the organisational difficulties of unions in Natal 
(Baskin 1991, chapter 4). Engagement by the trade union movement in party politics 
reached its height in the pre-election period of the 1990s, when COSATU entered a 
formal alliance with the ANC and SACP to fight the election on a common ticket. The 
strains on this alliance in the post-election period have been referred to earlier, 
especially in terms of shifts in economic policy and their impact on the labour 
movement. At an immediate level, inside the unions, the alliance also absorbed 
leadership energy and contributed to an increasing distance between leaders, engaged 
in multiple tripartite policy making bodies, and members, whose working lives were 
not significantly altered by the new political order.
Bargaining structures
South Africa does not have a uniform system of collective bargaining for the 
country as a whole. In some sectors (including clothing and leather), there is 
centralised bargaining, sometimes on a regional basis and sometimes on a national 
basis. Some sectors, like mining, have elements of centralised oargaining; others
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bargain at enterprise level and some (most notably domestic service and agriculture) 
have little or no bargaining.21 The first three studies take place in Industrial Councils 
(ICs), voluntary institutions for centralised collective bargaining established under the 
Industrial Conciliation Act (No. 11 of 1924, as amended). ICs have jurisdiction over a 
defined industrial scope and geographical area, which may be local, regional, 
provincial or national (Godfrey 1992).22 Employers and trade unions have equal 
representation and the Act allows for the extension of the agreements made to all 
employers and workers within the Council’s jurisdiction, provided that the Minister 
judges the parties to the Council to be sufficiently representative. The Act does not 
regulate trade union participation, or specify majoritarianism or proportional 
representation. The only explicit regulation restricts representation on the 1C to 
registered trade unions. The parties to the IC negotiate minimum wages for job 
categories and working conditions, establish benefit funds and negotiate procedures 
for dealing with disputes. The Main Agreement is re-negotiated annually or bi-annually 
and the IC meets regularly, appointing full-time officials to run its affairs, including a 
Secrctary/General Secretary, agents (who police the agreements) and administrative 
staff to administer benefits and finances. Council business is financed by a levy on all 
employers and workers.
21 The Labour Relations Act of 1995 introduced 'flexible regulation', and aimed to shift from an 
adversarial to a co-operative framework (itaskin and Salgar, 1995: Coo|>er 1996; Smith 1997).
22 For this section, I have drawn extensively on Godfrey's study of Industrial Councils. In 1992, 
there were 7 national councils, 33 regional councils, 31 local councils, 6 single company councils and 
H local authority councils (Godfrey 1992, 44).
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The Councils were originally established in order to promote self-governance 
and minimise stale intervention (though the Minister retained the discretionary power 
to refuse to sign agreements, which then lacked legal force). The Act imposed a duly 
to maintain industrial peace. In the early years, Councils were mostly dominated by 
employers, some employer groups going so far as to establish unions in order to bo 
able to set up ICs. On the union side, the dominance of artisan unions can be seen in 
the elaboration of job categories and large differentials between artisans on the one 
hand and semi-skilled and unskilled workers on the other. Until 1070, ‘pass-bearing 
Africans’ were legally excluded from representation on ICs, for fear that majority 
power would enable their unions ‘to exercise such influence on the fixation |sic| of 
wages as to have a detrimental effect on the wage levels of European, Indian and 
Coloured workers in the same industry...’ (Report of the Industrial Legislation 
Commission of Enquiry, quoted in Godfrey 1992, 24). Instead, they were relegated to 
a separate industrial relations system, consisting of liaison and works committees.
legislation in 1956 imposed a further division on trade unions, forcing them to 
split into separate branches for while workers on the one hand and coloured and 
Indian workers on the other.21 This legal separation remained in place until 1979, 
when the government accepted the recommendations of the Wiehalm Commission of 
Inquiry that African workers be allowed to join registered unions and that trade unions 
be allowed to admit members from any racial group. The debates on the issue of 
registration centred on the questions of co-optation by the slate or strategic cniryism
21 Some unions paid little more than lip service to this requirement.
(Nicol 1980; Fine, De C'lercq and Innés 1981 ). Many of the new unions had 
developed on the basis of organisational principles which stressed ‘factory-floor 
organisation and the building of strong shop steward structures, workers control and 
plant-level bargaining’ (Godfrey 1992, 28). They were inherently suspicious of the 
government’s motives and held that the Industrial Council structures were 
inappropriate to their organisational style. There were, however, strong voices in the 
new unions, arguing that the Councils provided the mechanism for inter-company links 
and opened the way to broader mobilisation, if tactically used (Friedman 1987, 329- 
331). By the mid-1980s, especially after the formation of COSATU in 1985 and the 
subsequent mergers in the ‘one industry-one union' policy, the rapid growth of these 
unions led to increased concentration on centralised bargaining, and greater 
involvement in Industrial Councils (Patel 1990).24
Organising style relates closely to the bargaining structures which operate 
within a particular sector. If bargaining takes place at plant level, organising will tend 
to focus on the plant, with less attention to inter-plant linkages, particularly given the 
labour-intensive nature of plant by plant bargaining. Though links between members 
and the union officials responsible for the particular plant are developed through 
regular contact, broader links and incorporation into union activity at branch level or 
above may be stunted. There are major economies of scale in centralised bargaining, 
at regional or national level, allowing a far more rational deployment of union
24 Debate about the Industrial Council system continues, with Theron (1993) raising concerns about 
the undermining effect of a growing trend towards small business and Von lloldt (1994) focusing on 
whether the system constrains or renews industry.
resources (Tocrien 1980; Patel I WO; liaskin 1995). The attendant danger is that
bargaining may become the preserve of national officials, who centralise bargaining 
skills and experience and have minimal contact with members. Only where there are 
strong shop steward structures, backed by established practices of obtaining a mandate 
and reporting back to members, can this danger be minimised. There were centralised 
bargaining structures in all four studies, regionally based in the two clothing studies 
and national in the leather and transport sector studies. The arguments for centralised 
bargaining were cogently expressed by Lhrahun Patel, a SACTWIJ strategist:
Firstly, centralised bargaining allows for the most efficient use of skilled union 
and employer negotiators... Secondly, |it| allows trade unions and employers 
to establish industry wide minimum and fair standards... Thirdly, where 
centralised bargaining is conducted through institutions which allow the legal 
regulation of minimum standards, lor example industrial councils, it sets a clear 
rate for the job. This prevents wage cutting by weakly unionised competitors 
of companies paying fair wages... Fourthly, some industries consist of a large 
number of small operations and plants, and wage agreements cannot 
realistically be concluded at each such plant... Fifthly, some negotiations sacli 
as lho.se involving benefit funds or training; schemes benefit from economies 
o f settle which can only be achieved through centralised 
r/greerritvi/.v . lemphasis mine| Finally, |it| increases the power of both parties. 
Labour is strong because it is able to close down ¡in entire industry during 
industrial action. (Patel I WO, 50)
The studies
The first study was in a single-union 1C with regional scope, covering the 
clothing industry in the Western Cape, the union being SACTWII. The second study 
was in a multi-union 1C with national scope, covering the leather industry. Here 
SACTWIJ was a minority union, competing with the established majority union, the 
unalfiliated National Union of leather Workers (NIJI.W) for members and power.
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The third union, the Transvaal Leather and Allied Trades Industrial Union (TLAT1U), 
had a static and limited membership, and was targeted by both of the other unions for 
takeover. The third study was in another single-union council with regional scope, 
covering the clothing industry in certain parts of Natal, mainly in the Durban area. 
SACTWU was again the only union. Each of these councils had jurisdiction over 
many employers and representation consisted of employer organisations, along with 
some individual employers. SACTWU, given existing structures for collective 
bargaining in the Industrial Councils in two of the sectors in which it organised 
(clothing and leather), engaged with them vigorously and fought for their scope to be 
extended to all employers, including those in the ‘decentralised areas’ (Von Holdt 
1993a; Collins 1995; Rossouw 1997).
Although there was an Industrial Council in Transnct, the company which is 
the subject of the fourth study, the medical scheme was not dealt with in this forum. 
Instead a new body was established. The Board of Trustees had equal representation 
for the ‘employer’ (by way of appointees from the ranks of management) and for trade 
unions. This study was distinguished from the IC studies by the single employer, the 
large number of unions involved, the fact that they were all effectively one-company 
unions and the heterogeneity of the unionised workforce which ranged from railway 
labourers to pilots.” The decision to create a new structure, rather than to situate the 
issue in the Transnet Industrial Council, had far reaching effects, which arc explored in
”  SARHWU organised a small number of non-Transnet workers, in the airports authority and two 
small airlines.
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the fourth study. The first three, by eontrasl, place health care directly in the arena of 
bargaining, rooting it in the familiar exercise of a core trade union function.
Inler-union relations
Though each study has a primary focus on one union, this union cannot lx* 
considered in isolation from its relations with other unions. At the most direct level, 
two of the studies (leather and transport) look place in multi-union situations. 
Relations within bargaining structures may be competitive or collaborative, depending 
on the organisational definition of the unions concerned. Competition for members 
and for political advantage colour the bargaining process and open a wedge for 
employer manipulation, particularly when multi-unionism goes along with bargaining 
across the spectrum of employment, which adds the factor of sectional material 
interest. Two kinds of multi-unionism are seen in (he studies: in a homogeneous 
employment group (leather) and in a very heterogeneous group (transport), the latter 
ease made more complex by historic discrimination on racial grounds.
At a less immediate level, unions relate toothers within the same federation 
and are affected by developments and debates at a federation level. COSATIJ has 
followed a policy of ‘one industry, one union' which has gradually reduced the number 
of unions in a series of mergers. The mergers minimised but did not entirely eliminate 
inter-union tensions, as political and strategic differences remained. Traces of the (ire- 
merger identities of the component unions are discernible in the different approaches 
of the Cape and Natal regions of SACTWIJ. A projected move towards ‘super
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unions’, drawing all members into no more than a handful of unions, will inevitably 
revive some of the tensions which characterised the merger period.2'’
Lastly, there are relations between unions across federations and between the 
federations themselves, in countries with more than one national federation. In South 
Africa, new tripartite structures such as the National Economic Development and 
Labour Council (NEDLAC) have required a greater degree of contact and 
collaboration between the three remaining federations on national issues affecting 
labour, but political differences make for an uneasy partnership.
Trade unions are rooted in a particular political economy and their purpose is 
worked out in a dynamic relationship with the politics and economics of their time. 
This is clear in the trajectory of development of trade unions in South Africa, where 
political disenfranchisement and repression suppressed most forms of political activity 
of the black majority. legalisation of black trade unions was in the end an economic 
necessity, to regularise industrial relations and minimise disruption of production. But 
this legalisation also opened the door to the development of organisationally based 
resistance to the regime in a form of unionism which went fur beyond workplace 
issues. While repression greatly complicated the operation of trade unions, it also 
created the conditions for a renewal of trade union power. Political liberation has 
raised new problems and restrictions on trade unions’ pursuit of working class 
advancement. Political enfranchisement has provided other outlets for political activity
2,1 Initial discussion at the IW7 COSATIJ congress envisaged no more than six super unions, one ol 
which would unite the transport sector, public and private, uniting SAKIIWU ami the Transport and 
(leneral Workers’ Union (TfiWU).
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for members and presented the challenge of recrafting a relationship with the political 
party turned government, which is responsible fora range of policies which threaten 
labour. The shift is highly problematic and requires ‘defining a new etiquette of 
opposition and support’ (Adler 1997).
6. The limits and possibilities of trade union action
I argue that there are certain circumstances in which trade unions can pursue 
an agenda on health care that is political as well as practical, strengthening democratic 
practices inside unions and broadening union responsibility beyond the workplace and 
workers, to families and communities. This is a process of ‘extending the frontiers of 
control’, though not inside the workplace (on this latter point, see Goodrich 1975). In 
this case, trade union leaderships use workplace strength as a base from which to act 
for their members and challenge the power which medical and other professionals 
exercise over health care planning and provision. In the process, they open up a way 
to bring workers’ experience to bear in the processes which will determine the health 
care to which they have access. The power of trade unions in health care is directly 
linked to their organisation as democratic structures, which uniquely enable them to 
represent the views of their members as health service users and rescue them from the 
general isolation and disempowerment typical of the ‘patient’ experience.
The debate about democratic workplace activism took a particular slant in 
South Africa, addressing the potential for workplace activism to become a political
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force. European debates focused on the capacity of workplace activism to overcome 
the bureaucratisation of established unions and to dilute the power of distant 
leaderships, thereby renewing their unions (Hyman 1979; 1989; Fairbrother and 
Waddington 1990). In South Africa, the repression of the 1950s and 1960s had wiped 
out most black unions, often before they had the opportunity to establish 
bureaucratised forms of unionism. An exception was the precursor to the first union 
branch studied, which had a highly developed bureaucratic structure, challenged by a 
new leadership (Maree 1976; Lewis 1976a; Nicol 1983; 1984b). The ‘workerist’ 
stance was in opposition not to bureaucratic relations, but to ‘populism’, identified as 
too great an identification with broad front community and liberation politics (Foster 
1982; Friedman 1987; Baskin 1991). The danger was hijacking of the trade union 
project not by paid officials, but by community and political organisations.
‘Workerists’ placed particular emphasis on the development of strong structures of 
workplace democracy to guard against a repeat of the 1950s, when the union 
movement was undermined by alliance with the nationalist movement. This time 
round, they argued, the union movement must first develop its own base in the 
membership, in order to engage at a political level from a position of strength and 
independence. Over-concentration of leadership at the official level was problematic 
in strategic terms, given state hostility. For survival, the union movement needed to 
keep generating worker leaders (Gool 1985; Gostner 1995; Kcct 1992).
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The hases of trade unionism
Trade unions are based on relationships, the most basic being the relationship 
between members and leaders (Collins 1994b). Each of the studies in this thesis had a 
particular set of relations, arising out of different histories and developing in distinct 
ways. Only one was in a union branch with a bureaucratic history. Like 
bureaucratised unions in general, it was characterised by centralised structures, often 
remote leaders and relatively quiescent members, presenting a particular challenge to a 
new cadre of leadership, intent on transforming it. Unions built on participatory 
democracy have structures for representation and accountability which link leaders and 
members more closely and in an ongoing way (Hccry and Fosh, 1990). No system is 
static, however, and democratic unions manifest an ongoing tension between efficiency 
and democracy. Where unions become bureaucratised around entrenched leadership, 
renewal may be sparked by the emergence of new leaders, who establish links with 
members and develop this support base by articulating and developing demands which 
strike a chord in member experience, but are also winnable. They invest their 
credibility in these issues and distinguish themselves from the entrenched leadership by 
the nature of their relationships with members. In a competitive multi-union context, 
leaders also pursue strategic objectives, sometimes building alliances with other unions 
by acting in solidarity, sometimes defending or advancing the sectional interests of 
their members, sometimes taking the lead in order to attract membership from other 
less active unions. Access to official leadership positions holds the danger that they
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may in turn become entrenched and bureaucratised. Taking office exposes the 
principles of democracy to the test of practice: can new leaders maintain an open and 
accountable relationship with members once in office and are the habits and 
expectations of democracy sufficiently firmly grounded for the membership to 
challenge the new leaders if they fail?
Trade unions and struggle
The concerns of the thesis connect with debates about the scope for union 
renewal (Fairbrother 1996; Fosh 1993; and for a critique of these positions, Mcllroy 
1995). Are trade unions tied to the workplace, the wage relationship and bargaining, 
and docs this restrict their capacity for fundamental change? This study approaches 
these questions through the prism of trade union action on health care. Unions cannot 
neglect the basic relationship with employers, in which they bargain over the wages 
and working conditions of their members, but they can question the assumptions and 
limitations of the bargaining agenda. These trade unions were involved in challenging 
an instrumental view of worker health care by expanding its scope beyond workers to 
their families. They also moved beyond the sphere of the bargaining relationship with 
employers into a more political sphere, by exerting their right to determine the nature 
of the health services provided for their members and engaging in active management 
of these services.
This process is a dynamic one, involving an ongoing struggle at different levels: 
a struggle to get health care onto the union agenda and then to keep it there. Inside
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the union, the health eare issue is defined, shilled and rc-dcfincd in relation to other 
demands and priorities. In negotiation, these priorities shift again in response to the 
exigencies of bargaining. Without strategic support from key union leaders, health 
care issues may give ground to more high profile or immediate demands. Without 
active engagement in the management of health schemes, there is the danger that they 
become again the domain of medical professionals. Thus, struggle is a part of the 
model of health care provision which emerges in the studies which follow, in which 
success is related directly to a number of key factors: the identification of union 
leaders with the issue; the degree to which membership support is elicited and 
maintained; the complex equilibrium between the health care demand and others in the 
bargaining process; and finally, broader economic and political developments at the 
national level.
How the study is organised
Chapter 2 is a reflection on the methodology of the studies. Chapter 3 
provides an introduction to the South African health system, in order to contextualise 
the projects. The system, with its mix of public and private services and public and 
private funding, has features which may be surprising to readers from countries with 
national health services or national health insurance. This is followed by four chapters 
(4 to 7), each on a union health care project. Chapter 4 concerns the restructuring of 
(he Sick Fund of the Cape Clothing Industrial Council (CCIC) with the South African 
Clothing and Textile Workers’ Union (SACTWU). This chapter focuses particularly
on the possibilities for union aetion, while those that follow highlight the constraints 
and limitations. In Chapter 5, I explore the way in which a multi-union context and
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national scope affects the way in which the same union, SACTWU, pursues an agenda 
about health care in the National Industrial Council for the Leather Industry (NICLI). 
Chapter 6 focuses on failure, exploring the reasons for this failure and the difficulty of 
transferring a model of health care, even within one union and one industry, from the 
Cape to Natal. In this study, the unsettling effects of political transformation are seen 
in acute form. Chapter 7 concerns a project after the change of government and 
provides a dramatic contrast to the earlier studies, in almost all respects. This time the 
major union is the South African Railways and Harbour Workers’ Union (SARHWU) 
and the study of Transmed focuses on a medical scheme in the state transport sector, 
highlighting the particular problems and challenges of restructuring in a situation of 
multi-unionism of a very different type from NICLI, with a heterogeneous membership 
far more typical of the South African population. This chapter highlights the way in 
which competition between the leaderships of very different unions affects the process 
of restructuring. After the four studies, there arc two chapters which draw out 
analytic themes from the four study chapters, focusing on trade unions in chapter 8 
and on health care in chapter 9. Chapter 10 returns to the argument and looks to the
future.
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Chapter 2. Reflections on methodology
1. Advocate research
This thesis arises out of extended work on tnedieal funds with South 
African trade unions from a base in a research group established to provide support 
for the trade union movement. It has features of a number of styles of research: 
‘advocate research’, in that it is coloured by my political belief in the role and 
importance of trade unions; ‘participatory research’, insofar as it was carried out 
wiili the unions, rather than on them; and ‘action research’ in that I was not simply 
an observer of processes that would have occurred without me, but an actor whose 
involvement was part oflhe processes which I also observed (Burgess 19X4, 20; 
Cornwall and Jewkes 1995).
Features of the earlier phase of this work with simple Sick f  unds ( 19X7- 
1994) are highlighted by analysis of an intensive period of work in 1995/6 on a 
more complex medical aid scheme. The research is based on description, 
comparison and analysis of these medical funds, focusing particularly on union 
involvement in the process of re-structuring the funds and managing the process of 
changing them. Tracking and analysing litis process (and my relationship with it) is 
the heart of the thesis. It is a process which does not fit neatly with a conventional 
definition of research design, starting with a literature review and progressing to 
design, research and write-up.' Instead it is grounded in a ‘pre-fieldwork
1 liryman ( I9XX, 7) is reassuringly sceptical about the suspiciously ncal and linear textbook 
descriptions of research processes and their similarity to journal article format.
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fieldwork’ period of eleven years’ work from 1980-1991 in Ihe Industrial Health 
Research Group (IIIRG), based at the University of Cape Town, where the 
problems associated with the provision of health care for workers demanded rapid 
and practical responses.
2. The Industrial Health Research Group
The IHRG was established in 1980 to provide services in Ihe area of 
occupational health and safety to the independent trade union movement in South 
Africa, which had minimal research capacity at the time. These services vary from 
information and education on hazards and rights, through industrial hygiene and 
medical services, to consultancy on a range of issues, in my case, medical schemes 
and health services for workers. The IHRG’s purpose has naturally influenced Ihe 
direction of our work and the balance between ‘service’ and academic work, as has 
the fact that we have been funded primarily by the international trade union 
movement, in solidarity with South African unions, especially in the apartheid 
years.’ This leads to a constant, and only occasionally productive, tension between 
responding to immediate demands and carving out the time to write up the work 
for publication. The two aspects are not as contradictory as may at first appear: 
the rigour required for journal publication improves subsequent research design (at 
the very least it minimises repetition of mistakes) and our credibility as union 
consultants is enhanced by publication.
2 The university gives us offices. We fund ull other costs, including salaries, from international 
donors, consultancy or research. All staff are on one year contracts.
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Our working situation imposes constraints which arc relevant to this study. 
Time is always a problem, in terms of both competing demands and the deadlines 
of unions (sometimes unrealistically urgent, sometimes vulnerable to re­
prioritisation). Over the past ten years, consultancy on medical schemes (for many 
unions) has constituted an increasingly large and urgent proportion of my work, 
informing a desire to ‘research’ this area, to move towards a more rigorous study 
which would in turn feed into future work. The natural conclusion was to follow 
this through in a Ph.D. I used a brief sabbatical (3 months in 1991) to develop the 
research design and plan the project in some detail and planned to complete the 
major fieldwork involved in the study during a six month period of unpaid leave on 
my return to South Africa. In the event, I returned to work and took on another 
project, pending agreement between the union and employers. The union had 
decided that I should be an ‘Industrial Council consultant’, with a mandate from 
both parties, rather than a ‘union’ consultant. The advantage was that I had far 
greater co-operation and access to workplaces and information. The IIIRG would 
also be paid, which had implications not only for the precarious finances of the 
group, but also for the seriousness with which the employers and the 1C would 
view the research Report. Payment raises certain fundamental questions about the 
nature of the process: it turns the researcher into a consultant, imposes an 
organisational rather than academic timetable on the work and necessitates a form 
of output suited to those who contract the research. Unlike Fryer et al. (n.d. iii), I 
was not exercised about the title of ‘consultant’, which the union simply 
appropriated from management discourse to legitimate my role.'
fryer el al. (n.d., iii) were concerned because tor them ihe term ‘... implied connotations ol
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The fill-in project was re-designing the Leather Sick Fund, which was 
valuable experience, though the research style was different from the clothing 
study. In the end, the clothing study happened in the middle of IHRG work, rather 
than during sabbatical. This had both positive and negative effects: positive in that 
it could take its natural course, without pressure to fit my timetable (this was 
helpful in my relations with union leadership and removed a source of personal 
tension), negative in that I had to juggle conflicting demands on my time. My 
appointment was only agreed in May 1992, dangerously close to wage negotiation 
season. There was a danger that the emotions of negotiation would colour the 
research and skew the results and consequently 1 had to ‘leave the field’, in 
Beynon’s (1988) term, to avoid public identification with the union in a time of 
conflict and consequent erosion of trust and possibly access. Serendipity played a 
part in the Transmcd project. I had been systematically clearing my commitments 
in preparation for a sabbatical planned to start in April 1996, but funding problems 
resulted in a delay to September, leaving me with fewer commitments than usual 
and consequently far more time and energy to devote to Transmcd.
During the 1990s, cuts in donor funding led to shifts in the style of the 
IHRG’s work, as the deficit had to be made up from other sources (research 
grants, policy work and consultancy). The result for me was twofold: my work as 
director (planning, fundraising, organising and accounting for funding) became 
more demanding and the income from my consultancy work more crucial. Both 
features made it hard to take time out. Hickson’s comment on ‘...juggling thinking
expertise, advice to heads of authoritarian hierarchies and a generally un democratic approach to 
organizational change that we associated more with business enterprises than trade unions'.
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lime against fieldwork time against rcscarch-grant-proposal-cotnposing time’ 
strikes a chord (Hickson 19KK, 147).
In the past ten years, my written work, other than research reports (for 
non-academic audiences), has been largely for non-academic conferences and 
policy fora. In 1994 I registered fora postgraduate Diploma in Health Management 
(Economics and Financial Planning) (DHMEF), partly for exposure to a literature 
which I had not previously read which I thought would he relevant and partly to 
brush up on my increasingly rusty academic writing.
A feature of ‘advocate research’ is the necessity to take the process further 
than the delivery of a research report. In the Cape clothing study, the follow-up 
work was far more time-consuming than the original research. It was much more 
difficult to measure or chart, but fundamental to implementation. This involvement 
was both a consequence of my working base in the IHRCi, with its trade union 
funding and role, and also the price for union co-operation in a study, the style of 
which was unusual and, in their terms, dubiously necessary. I could, for instance, 
have reported on the Fund on the basis of analysis of 1C and employer records, 
with user information derived from union meetings at various levels. Instead, I 
undertook a sample survey, which took far longer. However, employers were 
reassured by the ‘scientific’ basis of the research report anil my time was cheap. (It 
turned out that the union and I had arrived at absurdly low rates, as the employers 
informed me at the end of the project).
The research was followed by a battle to carve out time to write it up.
Plans to publish several articles on aspects of the study during the research process, 
to gather comment and criticism before the final write-up, had to be abandoned
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because of lime pressure. This was frustrating, not only in terms of the thesis 
process, but also because publications (and higher degrees!) aid our credibility in 
the university, whose hierarchy is dominated by natural scientists and where there 
is some dispute about whether we should be allowed the use of the word ‘research’ 
in our title. The work of the IIIKG is not easily comparable with the output of, 
say, the ornithological research institute bul I argue that our undertaking as a 
whole should be seen as a valid part of a broader definition of research. This 
means taking seriously such issues as the production of the results of our research 
in accessible and popular form (which takes time as well as a set of skills not often 
recognised) and through worker education (again a specialised skill ironically not 
much recognised in universities outside of education departments). During IW6, 
the university began to shift its position on ‘research’, in the first place by starting 
to develop guidelines for recognition of policy research, recognising that 
contracted policy work (usually for government) by its nature does not result in 
peer-reviewed publications. The II IKCi is increasingly gaining access to domestic 
research funding, for example in major projects for the department of labour, and 
enough qualifications have been gained (or are in process) to reduce pressure from 
our Board of Control.
Since I registered for this degree in I W \ , change around me has inexorably 
affected the thesis process: major political change, health sector change and change 
in the nature of my work have all expanded my role and increased my experience - 
though they have also diluted my concentration and consumed my time. Twice 
during the process, I suspended registration beeause of the pressure of work.
There were times when it seemed both impossible that I could ever take enough
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time out to write the thesis and also dubiously justifiable to disappear when there 
were so many demands from unions. It was easier to use the sense that I was 
needed to justify sidestepping the fearful prospeet of sustained and lonely analytieal 
writing. I would have dropped the thesis altogether, had it not been for the 
encouragement and persistenee of my supervisor. On three brief visits, cn route to 
funding meetings in Europe, I argued my case against revisiting the thesis on the 
grounds of warring duties, the praetical usefulness of my non-thesis work and 
exhaustion, but found myself persuaded into reworking the thesis proposal each 
time. These discussions (and arguments!) brought the issues to life again anti 
reinserted the thread of intellectual inquiry into the work when I went home. 
Contacts inbelween were largely by electronic mail: on my side, frequently a rapid 
overview of current work, whether in or out of the thesis outline, and complaints 
about pressure of work; on my supervisor’s side, notes of challenge, occasional 
derision, but mostly encouragement. During this year’s sabbatical, as in the 
previous contacts, he has spurred me to open out issues, to go against my natural 
inclination to confine myself to the specifics of my own experience. In the process, 
I have learned that practical experience does not preclude analytieal construction, 
though it complicates it with the awkwardness of ill-fitting facts, feelings and 
phenomena. The result is not neat, but it is absorbing.
In the end, it became impossible to leave the thesis design the way it was: it 
would have been a piece captured in amber, historically interesting, but with 
diminished relevance. First, the leather study was included and then, as time went 
on, the Natal clothing study. Alongside these I was working on many other 
projects with unions in the mining, paper, food, transport and other industries. I
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was also increasingly caught up in policy work at a national level, for government 
and the unions. The research focus of the thesis was clear - medical schemes for 
low-paid workers - but my working life was full of synergies and contradictions, 
and I puzzled about how to incorporate these within the academic study. During 
this period, the issue of union involvement and its centrality to the developments in 
health care gradually took shape, partly as a result of discussions inside the country 
with union strategists.4 5 This sense of the importance of unions was reinforced by 
the lacuna in discussions in progressive health circles on labour issues. I frequently 
found myself in health policy fora where the focus was entirely on the public 
sector, for progressive reasons to do with views of the centrality of the public 
sector.' This was incontestable, but neglected to take account of the fact that a 
substantial number of people, including the working poor, were tied to the private 
sector, like it or not. The dominant policy line which seemed to be emerging was 
that the employed could look after themselves, which by default meant in the 
private sector, leaving the public sector for the unemployed. I was frustrated by 
the crudity of this analysis and by the lack of debate on alternatives, and especially 
the failure to consider seriously points of connection between the public and 
private sectors. This bolstered the sense that the Sick Fund studies were more than 
self-contained exercises, but had some important lessons - positive, negative and 
cautionary - for broader policy developments, which urgently needed to be
4 Mike Murphy, Bernie Bernickow, Wayne van dcr Rheede, Mark Bennett, Kevin Perumal, Mel 
Clark and Tsidiso Moshao.
5 For example, at one meeting in Cape Town attended by health systems researchers and health 
economists from around the country, each participant spoke of her or his area of work and 
interest. All except me worked on the public sector. There are a couple of researchers who do 
private sector work, but they are few and far between. Most private sector work is done in the 
commercial sector.
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explored in a rigorous fashion. Then I spent IW6 working intensively on 
Transmcd, a large and diHleult project which was about as different from the Sick 
Fund projects as it was possible to be. I was struck by the contrasts and 
implications for a more nuanced and complex analysis of trade union involvement 
in health care and consequent policy development and keen to include the 
Transmed study within the scope of the thesis. At this stage, a combination of 
impending burn-out and an overweight of material lent urgency to the need to 
remove myself and start writing, which I finally managed to accomplish in October 
1996.
3. Methodological issues
Aside from its ‘advocate’ nature, what kind of research is this? I have very 
little formal training in research methodology. Most of the research skills I have 
were learnt on the job and have the strengths and weaknesses of that source: they 
are practical and efficient, Inti their rigour is often constrained by time, access and 
financial constraints. Since 1980,1 have been involved in a large number of 
medical surveys run by the IIIKCi.'' Before the research for this thesis, I had also 
done one survey alone, a postal survey of workplace health services in greater 
Cape Town. Later, in 1994/5, the DIIMEF provided some exposure to formal 
research methodology, though I quickly discovered that the tools of economic 
evaluation were not directly relevant to my work. I have had considerable
' ' My involvement included: questionnaire design, naming of interviewers, administration of 
questionnaires and certain medical tests, data entry, assistance in writing up results for reporting 
to unions and for publication.
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explored in a rigorous fashion. Then I spent 1996 working intensively on 
Transmed, a large and difficult project which was about as different from the Sick 
fund projects as it was possible to be. I was struck by the contrasts and 
implications for a more nuanced and complex analysis of trade union involvement 
in health care and consequent policy development and keen to include the 
Transmed study within the scope of the thesis. At this stage, a combination of 
impending burn-out and an overweight of material lent urgency to the need to 
remove myself and start writing, which I Finally managed to accomplish in October 
1996.
3. Methodological issues
Aside front its ‘advocate’ nature, what kind of research is this? I have very 
little formal training in research methodology. Most of the research skills I have 
were learnt on the job and have the strengths and weaknesses of that source: they 
are practical and efficient, but their rigour is often constrained by time, access and 
financial constraints. Since 19X0, I have been involved in a large number of 
medical surveys run by the IIIKCJ.'’ Before the research for this thesis, I had also 
done one survey alone, a postal survey of workplace health services in greater 
Cape Town. Later, in 1994/5, the DIIMEF provided some exposure to formal 
research methodology, though I quickly discovered that the tools of economic 
evaluation were not directly relevant to my work. I have had considerable
My involvement included: questiontiiiire design, training of interviewers, administration of 
questionnaires and certain medical tests, data entry, assistance in writing up results lor reporting 
to unions und lor publication.
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experience of interviewing, mostly workers, hut on occasion also people with 
whom I am not naturally in sympathy, useful practice for (he complex interactions
in the studies. I am a sociologist come lately: my first degree was in drama,
English and ethics and contained not a single credit in Sociology. With hindsight, 
these factors (lack of formal training in the discipline, exposure to the methodology 
of natural science and a certain lack of confidence in my own less conventional 
skills) reinforced the sense that the Ph.D. must include some quantitative work. 
After five years in the I1IRG I look a year out for an M.A. in Comparative Labour 
Studies at Warwick, in order to situate and formalise what I had learnt in practical 
work. I went hack from the M.A. with greater confidence, not radically changing 
my practice, hut prohahly more able to describe, analyse and criticise it. Five years 
later, I knew I needed to step back again and place my work in a more rigorous 
framework, which is one of the purposes of this thesis.
An unfolding methodology
The methods used in the research changed and shifted in direction along 
with my research plan. Some parts of the planned study were dropped, others 
expanded. Some methods were unworkable because of lack of information, others 
because of the context of the research (specifically when part of a study would 
have served no purpose for the union research partners and was therefore difficult 
to implement and/or lost out against the demands of other work seen by the unions 
as directly ‘useful'). The studies involved a mix of qualitative and quantitative 
methods: quantitative because any substantive change to medical schemes had to 
be carefully planned and costed; qualitative because such changes had to take
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account of the members’ experiences and perceptions of health care. Their 
perceptions of what would be ‘good’ health care, based as they inevitably were on 
their experience, were at times at variance with the model/s which the union 
organisers (and I) saw as preferable. Unaddresscd, these differences could have 
undermined the success of the projects. For this reason, these were also interactive 
studies. The last stage was not merely tracking the progress of the proposals 
through negotiations, but also (and more importantly) their reception and 
modification by workers in the workshop process which preceded negotiations. 
This process had a clear didactic purpose: to give workers the opportunity to 
examine the kind of health care they had been accustomed to and to participate in 
designing an alternative model.
All four studies started with analysis of documents of various sorts. Most 
Sick Funds produce enormous quantities of regular documentation. Though I 
occasionally rued their prolix habits, they were preferable to the Natal situation 
which, from a researcher’s point of view, resulted in an impoverished source. Not 
only was the data sketchy in the extreme, hut there was no sense of the debates 
leading up to decisions. Transmed produced a mass of documents, from the 
administrators, the company, OMAC and others. The information coming from the 
administrators was often seriously Hawed and working through it was a forensic 
exercise, never satisfactorily concluded.7
Only the Cape Clothing study incorporated a structured questionnaire, used 
with a representative sample of scheme members. Instead of a structured
1 As I write, I receive regular updates by entail on problems uncovered in the accounting system 
at Transmed, the latest involving a mistake in the region of K20 million in annual accounts.
questionnaire-based survey, the leather study used group meetings with members in 
eaeh of the widely-scattered geographieal areas of the Fund, whose responses were 
noted and post-coded. This provided a rich vein of information on both utilisation 
patterns and member attitudes, which fed into the parallel process of finalising the 
questionnaire for the Cape Clothing survey, which was designed to establish 
current usage of health services both in the Fund and outside (for dependants) and 
attitudes towards these services, as well as vital information on family structure and 
residence, vital to the costing, planning and siting of new services. I chose not to 
use a team of interviewers, working with only one research assistant. We travelled 
together and shared an interview room (often the canteen or change room). As a 
result, I was in close contact with her interviews as well as my own: for each group 
of workers, I would briefly introduce the purpose of the survey, confirm its 
confidentiality and explain how the information would be used. Though labour- 
intensive, this process was very productive. Workers often commented outside of 
the formal questions and I learnt as much from tone and facial expression as from 
the direct answers. It became clear to me that certain questions would not produce 
useful data, especially if workers did not know me and assumed that there were 
‘right’ answers or were worried about being critical.“ Though this information 
docs not feature in the written report, it fed into the analysis and the planning 
process. For example, with the exception of those who knew me, workers were 
clearly uneasy about criticising doctors. However, many were revealingly slow in 
identifying positive features of their interaction with doctors. *
* Hrcsnen ( 1‘fXX) writes about his growing recognition ol the fragility of his questionnaire in 
early fieldwork. I experienced something similar, hut also a compensatory awareness that the 
process was serving purposes other than data-gathering.
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I do not have mainframe computer skills, and so drew on the expertise of 
die Medical Research Council (MRC), who did the mainframe data analysis. In 
retrospect, I believe it was problematic to involve the MRC in the design of the 
survey. Their locus is medical and though they accepted I lint my research covered 
broader issues, I am not sure that the f inal design was appropriate to the issues I 
wanted to explore. They lacked exposure to qualitative research, but I lacked 
confidence in my experience in formal research design, and their bias tended to 
prevail. Some of the questions were designed to meet accepted guidelines in 
medical research, for example, asking for details of last medical experience only if 
it happened in the last fortnight, on the premise (supposedly epidcmiologically 
sound) that memory beyond that cut-off is unreliable. l;rom the experience ol the 
studies, I think this cut-olf is of dubious value, at least as far as experiences of 
medical care with children are concerned. Most people recalled such experiences 
rather vividly, which probably relates to the care and expense of the choices they 
made for their children's health.
It is questionable whether the Ca|>e Town survey produced any really 
surprising information and certainly the project could have proceeded without it, 
but it is clear that the process of visiting so many factories and interviewing 
workers at each of them spread consciousness of the project very broadly, reaching 
inactive members who would have had little or no previous exposure to the plans 
to change the Sick Fund. Having gone through a very exhaustive process in the 
Cape, I thought I could avoid re-inventing the wheel in the Natal study. In the 
event, the survey was a fiasco because the 1C failed to involve shop stewards to 
explain the process to workers, as planned.
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The Transmed project involved no direct quantitative work on my part, as 
this was done by the actuaries. However, actuarial science is not absolute and 
projections depend very crucially on the assumptions built into the calculations.
My task was to question these assumptions and raise strategic issues, in terms of 
the workable speed of change, the degree of financial intervention necessary from 
the company to shore up the l;und while the process of re-design was being 
completed and the relationship between potential changes inside the scheme and 
broader developments in the private and - more particularly - the public sector. 
Transmed involved primarily qualitative work for me, in a range of situations in 
which I was both an observer and an actor:
• chairing/facilitating/mediating/informing the labour caucus
• translating the parties to each other (not strictly mediating between them, 
given my declared relationship with labour) in Board, sub committee and 
working group meetings
• assessing the credibility and usefulness of various potential service 
providers, and
• analysing design proposals in terms of their impact on users and so on.
My work consisted primarily of meetings, in retrospect an endless round of 
meetings, with different groups, in different cities, playing different roles. I think it 
is misleading to call this ‘participant observation’, which assumes that participation 
is protective colouration for the researcher, masking or distracting from the 
observation which is her/his true purpose. My involvement was highly visible, and
I was not agenda-free.
Progress reports were a regular feature of the researc h process in the Sick 
funds: to the SP'MC's and to the union at all levels. Though essentially labour 
advocates, our effectiveness depends on credibility, so we report to lora such as 
the Sl'Mf's or Hoards in a factual, neutral style but also produce simplified reports 
for the unions which are far less bland. This shill in style is a regular part ol II IR( i 
practice. I lie Reports resulted in a considerable amount of follow up work in the 
Cape and Leather studies (but not the Natal Clothing study), expanding on areas ol 
concern. In addition, prior lo the negotiation season, there would be a flurry ol 
meetings with union organisers and with shopslewards, exploring negotiating 
positions and programmes, defining priorities and fallback positions, and weighing 
this issue against others currently on the union negotiating agenda. This was a vital 
part ol the process, ensuring that policies and programmes were not decided in 
isolation from the membership, but with the broadest possible participation. 
Reaching the membership involved mass meetings, education sessions at union 
‘locals' (area based structures within the branch) and use of union media.
Lducation is an integral part of any II IK(i project and I had a particular 
interest in the development of appropriate teaching methods and materials for 
workers and the process of generalising these techniques within the II IK( i. This 
Inis been an ongoing process, given stall turnover. It has also had its particular 
challenges, not least in undoing the ravages of medical education, which habituates 
its victims to the unvarying use of the passive voice. More recently, I have had 
much less direct involvement in formal worker education, although an educational 
element is implicit in all my projects. In the Transmcd project, this involved 
educating the labour caucus and, more especially, SARI IWl I groupings (national
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executive, secretariat, regional leadership). I was also involved in assessing and 
commenting on OMAC’s educational materials and approach and ‘translating’ 
information from a variety of specialists who made presentations to the Transmcd 
Board. However, I had much less direct contact with ordinary union members in 
this project than in the SACTWU projects (even the problematic Natal clothing 
study), which may be a by-product of increasing specialisation, greater technical 
complexity and financial scale, as well as a more complex client relationship. 
Interestingly, I wrote almost nothing in the Transmed project. There was no 
equivalent to the formal Reports (Cornell 1992; 1993; 1994), or the interim or 
follow-up reports, or further special investigations of the Sick Fund projects. 
OMAC and Transmed produced reams of written output. My output was the 
process.
Shills and changes
The original intention in the Cape Clothing study was to focus more closely 
on the nature (and quality) of the services offered, through a study of a sample of 
consultations (direct observation or interview of provider and patient directly idler 
consultation) or a participant observer study using mock patients. This was 
dropped because of concern about the dubious ethics and usefulness of mock 
patient studies. Quality of care is notoriously hard to measure, and observation of 
patient-doctor interactions fundamentally alters their nature. The Sick Fund hail no 
diagnostic data from panel doctors and no standardised diagnostic system for the 
doctors in the Fund clinics. As a result, I could not use the records to evaluate or 
compare the care given hy the panel doctors and the Fund doctors. All that was
“¡5
possible was some degree of inference from a comparison of consultation rates, 
sick leave given and - even more dubiously - prescription costs.
The planned series of unstructured interviews with the providers of service 
and a selected sample of users at the Industrial Council-run clinics in Salt River and 
Atlantis fell away. It became clear that they would be entirely for the purposes of 
my thesis. The union had devoted substantial energy and resources to the research 
process and, from its point of view, there was quite enough information from the 
survey process (beyond the questionnaire) as well as from many union fora, to back 
the changes they wanted to make. The fact that it was not all gathered in a planned 
and quantifiable manner was irrelevant to the union. Further research was not a 
priority for the union, especially at the time.'' The employers had always been 
wary of the use of the term ‘research’, as a result of which I had always had to 
emphasise the practical usefulness of the work for the planning process.
4. The research role and factors which influence it
The range of research methods I used required me to lake on a number of 
roles. I was not, strictly speaking, a participant observer as I did not participate in 
the illness or the experience of medical care. Nor did I have an ‘ordinary’ role in 1
1 Hey non ( I ‘)XX, 30) identifies a familiar problem: ‘Researchers who have worked with trade
unions have often experienced Ihe sense that union offi>__.«leel that they know the answer and
simply require Ihe evidence to support this.’ The problems of anti-academic bias is described hy 
various writers who have engaged in research in organisations. Huchanan el al. ( I0XX) refer In 
the strong negative connotations of the terms ‘research’ and ‘interview’ and Fryer el al. (n.d.) to 
Ihe anti-academic bias of many union officials. I suspect that overt confrontations with unions on 
this issue have been averted in my work partly by their politeness and partly by my self- 
censorship (in tha' I seldom talk about 'research' or use academic terminology in trade union 
contexts).
any of the unions involved while researching their activities (a common feature of 
educational research projects): when I was present, it was specifically for the 
research (or, in the accepted term, the consultancy). However, the unions saw my 
work as useful and supported my appointment. I had a long history with 
SACTWU, which had resulted in a fairly high visibility. Workers could have seen 
and/or heard me in a range of settings: mass meetings, organisers’ forums, joint 
shop stewards’ councils, shop stewards’ committee meetings, women’s meetings in 
the union and elsewhere, union conferences and cultural events, TB screenings, 
IlIRCi education sessions, inter-union meetings such as Mayday rallies and other 
COSATU events, political meetings and protests."1 I imagine this would match the 
description of field research which Burgess gives: ‘field researchers have, 
therefore, to lake roles, handle relationships, and enter into the commerce and 
conflict of everyday life.’ (Burgess 19X4, 5) Certainly what Burgess (19X4, X2) 
describes as the ‘disadvantage’ implicit in advocate research of ‘... combining data 
collection with an area of social conflict especially in union-management 
relations...’ is part of everyday life in the IlIRCi.
Although I was officially a ‘joint’ consultant, there was clearly some 
reserve on the part of the employers in the Cape and leather Sick funds, especially 
at first. By the end of the (extended) process, grudging respect had given way to a 
degree of relaxed good humour, except around wage negotiation season, when 
both sides used this forum to rehearse positions and rattle sabres. In Natal, I had
I would agree with fryer et al. (n il., 10) that there are many situations... where there is no 
neutral, fence-sitting stance available, even if researchers want one', fence-sitting was not the 
IIIKCi style and we openly associated ourselves with union |>olilicul campaigns and protests.
much less contact with the employers or the committee and relations with 
Industrial Council staff were decidedly strained.
My role in Transmed was fundamentally different. SARIIWU, an 
established client of the IHRG, offered to ‘share’ me with the nine other unions in 
the company, an offer accepted with reservations unexpressed but radiantly 
obvious. This united labour front was presented to management, who promptly 
also asked to ‘share’ me, arguing that health was an issue of common concern. 
After a caucus, the labour team agreed and so did I, but on condition that if there 
was a management-labour split, I would go with labour, and if there was a split in 
labour, I would go with SARIIWU. The shifts and complications of my role, 
building and maintaining credibility with such a diverse group, arc explored in the 
chapter on Transmed.
The notion of a ‘friendly stranger’ is probably quite accurate as a 
description of my role in the clothing study. I was certainly seen by the union and 
by organisers and workers who hud had contact with me, as ‘on the workers’ side’ 
and I would unhesitatingly place myself in that position. This closeness to the 
unions did not give rise to major problems, because the immediate focus of 
analysis and criticism in each of the studies was the Sick Fund, not the union. 
However, there was some delicacy in listening to the demands of the membership 
in relation to the fund and giving them the weight they deserved, while recognising 
(heir possible limitations and providing the opportunity for members to rc-think 
their attitudes and demands. Relationships with union officials also called for a 
delicate balancing act. In the Sick Fund studies, I had a number of key informants, 
specifically organisers and branch officials. I also liaised with the union’s education
officer and with officials in the national office with responsibility for both Sick 
Fund issues and the development of broader policy on Industrial Councils. Certain 
of these relationships dominated at particular times and all of them shifted over the 
period, for reasons both intrinsic and extrinsic to the study itself." There was also 
a small group of people inside the union who regarded themselves as key 
informants because of their length of service and knowledge of the fund. Their 
loyalty to the fund tended to make them conservative about change and they had to 
be won over, because they had the power to influence at least some of the 
members and thus undermine the process of change.
The ‘friendly stranger’ role held through the Cape Clothing project and 
National Leather project and extended into the Natal clothing project, though I had 
much less exposure to workers there, partly because of distance but mainly because 
of the different design of the project, in that there were no interviews or structured 
meetings with members. In Transmcd, management initially saw me as a hostile 
figure, to be incorporated because this might make me less dangerous. The 
actuarial consultants were also initially wary, because of uncertainty as to my role 
and concern about potential interference in their accustomed sphere and style of 
work. However, my situation had changed from the beginning of the clothing 
research. First, I had five years more experience and exposure, resulting in a much 
higher profile, and was seen in some quarters as an ‘expert’ (in a very small pond) 
so I no longer had to answer to cross-questioning on my credentials. Transmcd 
management and the actuarial consultants knew of me, though the white unions did
11 Buchanan ct al. (1988, 54) describe some of the complications and frustrations of these 
relationships as follows: ‘But the members of organisations block access to information, constrain 
the time allowed for interviews, lose your questionnaires, go on holiday and join other 
organisations in the middle of your unfinished study.'
not. Second, the change in government had also had an impact: I had been on the 
ministerial committee on health financing and was on the statutory council 
controlling medical schemes. This was useful in giving me access to a mine of 
information on the inside workings of medical schemes and on the major players in 
private medicine and managed care and it also lent me a kind of respectability 
through official recognition.
Before the clothing study began, it was clear that closeness to the unions, 
otherwise a real advantage, had implications for my later relationships with them. 
Over the period 1992-4 I did more work for SACTWU than for any other union 
and they tended to regard me as ‘their’ adviser, even in the leather project, which 
involved three unions. However, I lost contact with the developments in the Cape 
Sick Fund after the new medical director took over, and gradually also with the 
Leather Fund. The relationship with the Natal Sick Fund was abruptly broken after 
the joint workshop, though I kept in contact with my main union contact. In the 
Transmcd experience, SARHWU showed signs of ownership, which have 
continued while I have been in the UK, raising issues generally less substantive than 
symbolic. The attitudes of the other unions in Transmcd shifted over time, from 
fairly polarised politeness masking caution and suspicion, to robust and critical 
candour. I was in a real sense in the middle, with management testing concerns 
about OMAC on me and vice versa, the unions checking on management and on 
OMAC, and on each other (and on me), and having to balance my own judgements 
with a complex and unstable ‘union interest’, all against the backdrop of creating a 
new fund, sufficiently stable to survive.
The Trunsmcd project raised an interesting set of relationships which 
presented a new challenge to me. In all the 1C projects, my relationships with the 
employers had been relatively distant, developing at most to a guarded informality 
over the extended processes. Relationships with Industrial Council officials varied 
greatly, from prickly and hostile in Natal to strategic in the case of one difficult but 
key official in the Cape, the only really good working relationship being that with 
the Cieneral Secretary of the Leather Council. In the Transmed project, I worked 
very closely and intensively with the key employer representative and the leader of 
the actuarial consultancy team, in the process developing complex relationships of 
trust.12 This was a new situation for me, accustomed as I was to fundamental 
scepticism (even mistrust) of the motives and methods of employers and employer- 
oriented consultants, and it occasioned regular soul searching about whether I was 
insensibly shifting allegiances and losing my ‘workerist’ base.
The visible researcher
In a provocative and thought-provoking article on research method as 
social practice. Fryer ct al. (n.d., I), talk about ‘the real world and the imaginary 
researcher’ as follows:
If research monographs and field study reports are accepted at face value, then 
readers are obliged to believe that whilst the subjects of enquiry plotted and 
planned, promised and deceived, lived and died, the impassive investigator 
maintained a consistently bland, pretcr-seicntifie posture. Apparently, the real 
world of organisation and struggle, failure and success is something which in 
common with road accidents, affects only other people (especially those 
unfortunates who figure as part of the researcher’s ‘sample’).
fill
12 In terms of llicse relationships and Ihe many more relationships with trade unionists 
developed in the course of my work, I can empathise with the concern expresssed hy Buchanan ct 
al. ( I'tXX, 67) about being seen to hold ‘a wholly instrumental attitude to friends and friendship’.
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I have often felt in writing this thesis that 1 am all too visible. I have dealt 
at some length above with my experience and the access which this gives me. As 
with all researchers, a number of other factors influenced the way in which I was 
perceived and operated. I am a middle class white woman, English-speaking, 
unmarried and childless, and I was 41 when I began this study in 1991. This is a 
mixed bag of positive and negative features: it helped to be a woman in the 
clothing study (as this is a predominantly female industry) and to be older rather 
than younger. There was an assumption, often expressed in meetings by women 
workers, that I would know something about life. Like Blum (1952), I spoke 
about myself on occasion, referring for instance to experiences of illness and health 
care in my family. The fact that I am unmarried and childless is not as obvious as 
my age but on the occasions when it did emerge, it struck most workers as 
distinctly odd. (It also sometimes gave rise to a certain wistfulness in women with 
families. The result was a combination of ‘you don’t know what you’re missing’ 
and ‘what freedom!’.) Women workers in the Cape spoke hesitantly (and only 
when no men were present) of the problems of ‘the change’ and the lack of male 
understanding about the impact of menopause on their lives. The same issue was 
tentatively raised by older women shop stewards who were active in the Task 
Group in Natal, chatting before the men joined us one day. 1 was too young to 
understand, they ventured, but ‘women’s problems’ didn’t end with the last baby. 
In fact, they had substantially underestimated my age, perhaps in order to avoid 
offence or perhaps as a result of the easier ageing of middle class (and childless) 
life. Once they knew my real age, by then mid-40s, they launched into passionate 
and often extremely funny stories about the menopause, not daunted even by the
arrival of the men. I would speculate that female gender (because of its relative 
powerlcssness) goes some way towards counteracting the distancing effects of 
class and racial difference.
In the Transmed experience, my gender was again probably useful, this time 
in a subversive way. It was a very male environment indeed. I was an oddity, to 
the white unions because my entry point was with a black union, to management 
partly for the same reason and also because the main representative had never 
worked with women before. He had to put up not only with me but also with a 
woman consultant from OMAC and in the end a (black) woman as his new boss. I
was probably least odd to my original clients, who would simply have placed me as
. , na com .
Both SACTWU and SARHWU have a strong policy of non-racialism, in 
common with all COSATU unions. However, SACTWU had no white members 
or officials in Cape Town at the time of the first study so I was certainly noticeable 
at most union events: people may have non-racial principles, but this does not yet 
mean in South Africa that they do not notice colour. Ethnicity and class intersect 
in different ways with different groups - there were some officials who shared 
elements of my background (university education and middle class families). 
However, the vast majority of the members lived in the townships of the sprawling 
desert of the Cape Flats, while I lived in the city. There is one feature of my class 
position which may have tempered some of these distancing features. Although I 
am an intellectual, a professional, ‘from the university’, I am not a doctor. In the 
context of a discussion about experience of health care with a worker, we were
11 Short for 'comrade', see discussion hclow.
both patients and had that experience and perspective in common. In the leather 
and Natal clothing studies, many of the same features were obvious. Though there 
were a couple of white union officials involved (Mike Murphy and Mark Bennett), 
the majority of union officials were black and the membership a more 
representative cross section of South Africans: African, Indian and coloured 
workers.
There were very interesting class features in the Transmcd case. This was 
the first time I had had to deal with white workers and their unions, and for that 
matter with while collar unions organising highly paid groups such as pilots and 
airline technicians. I was used to working with progressive (politicised, democratic 
and non-racial) unions which organised black unskilled or semi-skilled workers, 
who were usually very low-paid. These other unions were new to me and rallied 
my assumptions. I had to become accustomed to the idea of a labour solidarity 
broader than I was accustomed to, and sensitive to the limits on that solidarity, 
generally unsignposted but occasionally erupting in the labour caucus and even 
more rarely (and shockingly) in joint meetings.
Language is a complex issue in South Africa." Lnglish is my home 
language; I speak Afrikaans fairly fluently, Xliosa (and other African languages) 
not at all. There are very few African workers in the clothing industry in Cape 
Town, so the major issue there was the Hnglish/Afrikaans one. Though the 
majority of the workers probably speak Afrikaans as a home language, SACTWIJ’s 
official language is linglish. However, meeting language is a mixture of 'pure'
"  Many of the language issues raised in Lawrence ( 1‘fXH) about cross-country studies apply in 
multi lingual societies like South Africa.
Knglish, ‘pure’ Afrikaans and a mixed patois. On the other hand, in the country 
towns around Cape Town, the meeting language tends to he Afrikaans, of a more 
formal variety, with very little use of 'mix’. In administration of the questionnaires 
in the Cape, I discovered rapidly that the language in which you asked people 
about their language preference was important: if in Imglish, they agreed to I English 
and often struggled to speak ‘pure’ English; if in Afrikaans, almost all elected 
Afrikaans and sjroke much more freely, moving between linglish, Afrikaans and 
‘mix’. If linglish had been chosen but respondents seemed uncomfortable, I would 
ask the odd question in Afrikaans, which generally resulted in tin immediate switch 
to Afrikaans or ‘mix’ and a relaxed fluency.
In the Natal clothing project, the language of meeting was linglish, with 
occasional translation into or from Zulu. Afrikaans is not an issue, as there are 
very few coloured workers in the area. In the leather project, the language ol 
meetings was linglish, with translation into the African language of the particular 
region on (infrequent) request anti occasional use of Afrikaans in the Western and 
liastern Cape. National projects raise more complex language issues where there is 
a heterogeneous workforce. In the Trunsmcd project, linglish was the language of 
meetings, though Afrikaans was the home language of the majority ol the while 
unionists. A few, who struggled with linglish, occasionally spoke Afrikaans in 
meetings, generally when they fell particularly passionately on ¡1 subject. None of 
the while unionists could speak any ol the African languages, nor indeed could any 
of the management representatives or consultants, including me. lilack unionists 
had a fascinating relationship with Afrikaans - all could s|>cak it to some degree 
and occasionally did so, either when addressing a point raised in Afrikaans, or for
rhetorical flourish (most notably by the president of BLATU, a part-time preacher 
with a fine turn of phrase and an unstoppable llow). However, when tempers were 
high on an issue, the use of Afrikaans could give rise to formal protests and 
objections from the black unions and requests for translation. I consciously used 
Afrikaans strategically on occasion, generally in the labour caucus and one-to-one 
discussions outside of formal meetings. This was particularly important in 
developing relationships with the white unions. The main management 
representative was Afrikaans speaking but extremely fluent in English. He too 
used Afrikaans strategically, but had to be more careful in joint meetings than I did: 
if I spoke Afrikaans it could be seen as courteous, if he did, it was one Afrikaner 
talking to another.
Multi-lingualism is not the only language issue, there are also issues about 
home language vocabulary, accent and style which surface even in research in a 
monolingual s<x•iety.l, How did I, as a researcher, talk to workers, to managers, to 
joint fora, to medical professionals? I know that I shift language style with these 
different groups.1'’ I found that with medical professionals (and managed care 
operators) an offhand familiarity with (and strategic use of) medical terminology 
was useful, together with the ability (and confidence) to cut through medical 
obfuscation when necessary. (It is helpful to have worked with doctors in the 
IHRG for many years.) With managers, a bland and confident style is generally 
important, with the occasional use of polite intransigence: too much deference is 15*
15 l;or example, I observed a WF.A training course in Coventry in the research for my MA 
dissertation and was strongly aware of the alienating effect of the language of bookwork and of 
teaching, at odds with the rhetoric of student participation and despite the fact that the course- 
tutor was himself an ex-worker.
** liulmer notes that ‘Even within one’s own society, different speech patterns can be a harrier to 
communication and need careful attention.’ (Bulmer I9KH, 154)
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seen as a sign of weakness.17 On the whole, I was more comfortable speaking to 
workers than to managers, despite my own class origins. Without assuming a 
consciously ‘working-class’ accent and style, which would have been ridiculous 
and condescending, I sometimes noticed myself shifting subtly in meeting contexts 
where my normal accent or usage would be seen as ‘posh’. (This was one of the 
few times it helped to have been an actor.) For example, though the general form 
of address in union as in political contexts is ‘comrade’ (‘com’), in SACTWU 
meetings in the Cape middle-aged and elderly women are often addressed as 
‘Auntie x’. The use of this terminology places one quite clearly. (‘She may be 
white, but she’s got respect’ was a comment passed on to me with some 
amusement by an organiser.)
Before I started the thesis, I had anticipated that the ethical issues I would 
face would mostly relate to sensitive health questions, access to and use of 
confidential medical information and intrusion into the patient-doctor relationship. 
These issues fell away, as there was no diagnostic data to use and I chose not to 
observe consultations or conduct mock patient studies. The questionnaire data 
was not very sensitive, medically speaking, and links to individuals were broken in 
the analysis. However, the issue of confidentiality was very important in the 
questionnaire process. Stressing that the forms would not be shown to 
management, but would stay with me, though the information they gave me would 
be used to design the new scheme, was important in getting people talking.
Instead of the predicted ethical problems, I faced others, which centred on my role
17 Often, I can leave ihc intransigence to the unions, sometimes briefed by me, sometimes 
spontaneously. For example, when Transmed administrators questioned my experience and 
competence in one of the early (pre-study) confrontations, SARHWU took magnificent umbrage 
and demanded a formal, even abject apology for the insult to 'our expert'.
and responsibilities. Loyalty to trade unions and intellectual independence 
sometimes conflicted. It was not easy to maintain an evenhanded responsiveness 
to the unions in the multi-union studies, though there was an implicit acceptance in 
both the leather study and Transmed, that I was closer to my original ‘clients’, 
respectively SACTWU and SARHWU. Rather more difficult was the process of 
working with management, to an extent never before required of me. I was not 
always sure where the role stopped and I started.
5. Does research make a difference?
Whether research makes a difference is a question outside the scope of 
much methodological debate, but surely an important one. The studies in this 
thesis were motivated by a desire to make a difference to workers’ lives, however 
evangelical that may sound. They were successful to very different degrees and 
part of the purpose of this thesis has been to relied on the reasons for these 
differences, in order to inform my future work and also to examine the implications 
for broader policy debates both inside the trade union movement and with 
government about the direction for future working class health care. These issues 
are discussed more fully in the concluding chapter: here I focus more narrowly on 
methodological considerations.
The fluidity of the work process, subject to both internal and external 
changes, especially massive political change, meant that ‘snapshot’ style research 
such as cross-sectional surveys would have been seriously misleading. A great 
deal of the work took place outside the scope of the formal research, but was an
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essential part of the process. I tended to regard this fact as evidence of my lack of 
discipline and am reassured by finding confirmation of this tendency in others: i t  
can ... be difficult for the researcher to decide finally to leave the organisation, to 
gather no more information, and to begin the process of analysing and 
documenting what data have been collected’ (Buchanan et al. 1988, 64) and 
Crompton and Jones’s (1988, 71) dictum that ‘You have to regard all the time you 
spend inside the organization as part of the research’. I was not a simple observer, 
or a participant-observer, but an actor-participant-observcr and no doubt a 
different analysis would result from an observer who had included my action in her 
observation. The diffidence of case study researchers described by Yin (1984) was 
true in my case, though the accumulation of case studies advocated by Bulmer 
(1988) as a means to promote a degree of leverage on generalisation certainly 
helped. The Leather and Natal clothing studies enabled me to highlight the 
conditions which were germane to the success of the Cape clothing study and 
explore the question of transferability of a model generalised from this experience.
1 also felt it necessary to go outside of the sphere of ICs to raise broader issues 
about working class health care in a very different sector and set of organisational 
structures. In strict terms, these studies could not pass the test of reliability: they 
could not be repeated with the same results by another rescareher. The time, 
political and trade union climate and leadership were intrinsic to the research, as 
was my involvement. I felt that I knew a great deal about one particular situation, 
was hesitant to generalise from it but at the same time concerned that these hard- 
won lessons would be lost in the process of national policy formulation about 
working class health care.
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I am left with a constant sense of unfinished business, despite revisiting projects for 
years after the formal work was completed, and still continuing at long distance 
while I write this thesis. In a way, it is, of course, intensely reassuring to be needed 
and I look forward to re-engaging with my working world, in particular to taking 
up the policy debate more actively. Discussions of methodology generally focus on 
the stern sphere of problems, pitfalls and responsibilities. They seldom reflect on 
the rare but real pleasures of research and writing, processes shot through with 
moments of achievement and insight, hilarity and sheer exhilaration.
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Chapter 3. Trade Unions and Health Care
1. Introduction
lleallh care was forced onto the agenda of the independent trade union 
movement in South Africa by a combination of factors which directly affected 
members, especially the structure and nature of apartheid public health services and 
rampant cost inflation in the private medical sector. Health care was politicised under 
apartheid. It will continue to be, because there will be losers as well as gainers in the 
process of dismantling apartheid and restructuring the health system for equity.
South Africa has a population of about 40 million people, growing at a rale of 
2.5% a year. It is an upper-middle income country, with vast income inequalities.' 
Until recently, its main claim to public notice was its institutionalised racism, aspects 
of which are directly relevant to the studies. The population is made up of 70.2% 
Africans, X.6% coloureds (people of mixed race), 2.0% Asians and 13.3% whites 
(McIntyre el al. 1995, 4). Until 1994, a minority while government ruled the country, 
which was divided along racial lines into four (white) provinces, four (black) 
‘independent states’ and six (black) ‘self-governing territories'. Those classified as 
coloureds and Asians fell into an uneasy position: subject to some restrictions in 
common with Africans, such as residential and educational segregation, they were free
1 The ONI* was US$2,560 per person in 1991.51 % of annual income goes to the richest 10% ol 
households, while less than 4%. goes to the poorest 40% (World hank 1993).
of others, most notably restrictions on freedom of movement. They were relatively 
privileged in the labour market, generally occupying skilled and semi-skilled positions, 
while the African majority were overwhelmingly confined to the ranks of unskilled 
labour. In the Western Cape, this relative privilege was enshrined in the Coloured 
Labour Preference Policy of 1955, which barred employers from employing Africans 
without a certificate from the Department of Manpower (later Labour) indicating that 
no suitably qualified coloured worker was available (Kraak 1993, 6). The legacy of 
this policy is still visible in the clothing industry in Cape Town, which is dominated by 
coloured workers. Similarly, the high proportion of Indian labour in the Natal clothing 
industry reveals an equivalent preference for Indian labour, though never enshrined in 
formal policy and therefore not as pronounced.
After the 1994 election. South Africa’s administrative structure was drastically 
reorganised. The artificial borders of the past were dissolved and the ‘independent’ 
states reincorporated. The old tricameral parliament (with separate chambers for 
whites, coloureds and Asians) was replaced by a single elected national parliament 
headed by a President. The internal borders were redrawn, forming nine provinces, 
each with an elected legislature headed by a Premier. Considerable power was 
delegated to the provinces, including responsibility for health services. The provinces 
vary enormously in size, population and level of development. Gauteng (the 
Johanncsburg-Prctoria area) is the smallest and richest of the provinces, the economic 
centre. Two of the studies have a provincial base: the first in the Western Cape, a 
relatively prosperous and well-resourced area, the third in KwaZulu-Natal, a markedly
poorer area, scarred by endemic violence.2 These two provinces are also the only ones 
which do not have ANC majorities: the Western Cape legislature has a National Party 
majority (but an ANC Health Minister) and KwaZulu-Natal an Inkatha Freedom Party 
(IFP) majority. The other two studies have a national scope, though only a small 
proportion of membership is in the less industrialised provinces.
South Africa’s population divides roughly into about 17-20% high earners, 
with about a third in the low to middle income group, and the rest - approximately half 
the population - defined as poor (below the household subsistence level of R183 per 
week for 1993) (McIntyre et al. 1995, 8). The clothing and leather workers in the first 
three studies (though organised and relatively privileged in comparison with the 
unemployed, rural subsistence farmers and many in the informal sector) were 
perilously close to poverty (SALB 1992a). Many were household heads in single 
income families and supporting extended families on an income of between RI85 and 
R240 per week in 1993 (Collins 1994d).’ (The Rand-sterling exchange rate has been 
highly unstable for the last few years. At the time of writing, the rate is approximately 
R8 to the pound sterling. However, a figure of roughly R3 to the pound would give a 
more useful sense of wage values and buying power.) Some 16% of all employment in 
1995 was in manufacturing (Standing 1996). The clothing and leather industries were 
in decline, particularly the clothing industry, which was highly threatened by the
2 The Western Cape is third in contribution to CiDP, second in income per capita and highest in the 
Human Development Index, a composite of indicators of health status, education and income. 
KwaZulu-Natal, while second in contribution to GDP, is only sixth in income per capita and seventh 
in the Human Development Index (McIntyre ct al. 1995, 5-K).
' In 1994, a clothing machinist earned R265.50 weekly in Natal and K263.00 in the Western Cape 
(Collins I994d).
reduction of tariff protection which was introduced in the early 1990s and accelerated 
after the new government rejected a strategic plan for restructuring the clothing and 
textile industries developed by a tripartite body over a two year period (Hirsch 1993; 
Hirsch and October 1994; Altman 1994). The fourth study focuses on the public 
sector transport company. Transnet, which went through major retrenchments in the 
process of commercialising. The transport sector (public and private sector combined) 
accounted for 5% of all employment in 1995 (Standing et al. 1996).
2. The South African health system
South Africa had neither a national health service nor a national health 
insurance system at the time of these studies. Instead, it had a mixed system: public 
sector health care funded from taxation and private sector health care usually funded 
by private medical insurance schemes, related to employment. In the late 1980s, when 
the preliminary work leading up to this thesis began, the health care system mirrored 
the apartheid state (Savage 1979; De Beer 1984; Dorrington and Zwarcnstein 1988;
De Beer et al. 1988; McIntyre 1990; Pick 1992). South Africa spent 8.5% of its Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) on health services in 1992/3 (McIntyre et al. 1995, 16). 
Other indicators of health service provision such as hospital beds and health personnel 
were reasonable for a country at its level of development (McIntyre et al. 1995, 16- 
17). However, South Africa compared very unfavourably in health status indicators 
such as infant mortality, life expectancy and tuberculosis incidence with other middle
income countries. The table below highlights the obvious fact that resources were not 
optimally used to produce a healthy population.
Table 1: Health status indicators related to health expenditure
Country Health
expend- iture 
as % of GDP
Infant
mortality rate 
(per 1,000)
Life
expectancy at 
birth (years)
Incidence of 
TB (per 
100,000)
South Africa 8.5 49 63 250
Botswana 3.3 36 68 -
Hungary 6.0 16 70 38
Malaysia 3.0 15 71 38
Venezuela 3.6 34 70 44
Chile 4.7 17 72 67
Source: World Bank Development Report 1993. (HST 1995, 2)
The most obvious reason for the discrepancy between input and output in 
health highlighted in the table above was the distribution of health care expenditure 
between the public and private sectors: average private sector expenditure per medical 
aid scheme beneficiary was nearly fifteen times public sector spending per person in 
the poorest magisterial districts (McIntyre ct al. 1995, 20).
The public sector
This thesis is informed by an unashamed bias against for-profit health care and 
a concern to maintain and build up the public sector in health care. When this thesis 
began, the public health sector in South Africa was underfunded and overstretched,
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characterised by multiple authorities (the central state, four provinces and about 800 
local authorities) each level having responsibility for different elements of health care 
provision. In addition, each of the four ‘independent’ states and six ‘self-governing 
territories’ had its own Department of Health. A few figures will illustrate the 
endemic problems of maldistribution of resources in health care. Averages reveal more 
when they are disaggregated: the overall South African infant mortality rate of 40 was 
shocking enough, but it concealed a range from 7 for whites and 10 for Asians, to 36 
for coloureds and 54 for Africans (McIntyre et al. 1995, 13-14). Similarly, the 
national averages masked provincial differences: public health care expenditure per 
capita in 1992/93 varied between R49I in the Western Cape and Rl 37 in the Eastern 
Transvaal (op. cit., 40). Inside provinces, less was spent in the poorest districts. Given 
the strong correlation between low income and high incidence of illness, this pattern 
was disturbing.
Though 83% of the population was dependent on the public sector, it had only 
38% of general doctors, 34% of specialist doctors, 7% of dentists, I 1% of pharmacists 
and 40% of supplementary health professionals. Nursing was the only category of 
health staff in which an appropriate proportion (79%) worked in the public sector 
(McIntyre et al. 1995, xiii). Once again, these personnel were maldistributed between 
provinces, with a ratio of nurses to population nearly five times as high in the Western 
Cape as in the Eastern Transvaal (McIntyre el al. 1995, 17; Masobe 1992).
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Government spending was heavily concentrated on hospitals, and primary services 
were seriously underfunded.4 *
The private sector
In 1992/3, 61% of all health service expenditure was in the private sector, 
which serviced less than a quarter of South Africa’s population/ Most medical 
schemes locked their members into private sector health care, especially medical aid 
schemes, the most expensive and elaborate of the hierarchy of schemes and the 
pinnacle of aspiration for most people. Few medical aid scheme members had any 
experience of the public sector, except perhaps for specialised public health functions 
such as inoculations against childhood diseases or for foreign travel. The exposure to 
the public sector increased in medical benefit schemes, many of which tailored their 
hospital benefit to public hospital cost levels, and was most extensive in the Sick 
Funds (exempted schemes), whose members used the public sector for their own 
specialist and hospital care, all care for their families, and all care for themselves after 
retirement, with the exception of the occasional use of private doctors on a cash basis.
4 XI % of public sector health funds were spent on hospitals in 1992/3. Nearly half of the budget was 
in tertiary or referral hospitals (Health Systems Trust 1995, 10).
'  17% of the population were covered by medical schemes, while a further 6% had access to health 
services at work, or hold health insurance policies (Health Systems Trust 1995, 3; 7).
3. Medical schemes
Medical scheme membership is generally associated with employment and 
contributions split between employer and employee. The schemes work on a group 
basis. Very few accept individual members and when they do, their contributions are 
loaded. Generally, membership is compulsory within a defined employment group. In 
the past in South Africa, this was not always the whole workforce, as many companies 
differentiated between white and black employees (and sometimes between different 
black groups) or between salaried and waged workers, in respect of medical cover/’
As companies moved towards equalising benefits, they encountered a legal problem, as 
they were unable to impose a new condition in the course of employment.* 7 As a 
result, in many companies medical aid scheme membership became compulsory for 
new black employees, while for existing black employees it was optional. This 
undermined the basic principle of cross-subsidisation and introduced the possibility of 
adverse selection (joining just before predictable heavy use). Compulsion was a vexed 
issue for unions, caught between the basic union principle of solidarity and distrust of 
institutions which previously excluded them and now wished to forcibly include them.
It is important to stress that these medical schemes were not strictly speaking 
insurance schemes, but worked on a ‘contributions in-benefits out’ basis, with some 
provision for reserves to cushion against fluctuations in use. They were legally ‘not
* Unequal distribution is a feature of occupational welfare benefits in general, including pensions, 
education subsidies, housing and bonuses, as well as medical aid scheme membership (Torres 1996).
7 This would be deemed an Unfair Labour Practice in terms of SA labour legislation.
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for profit’ schemes, whose surpluses (and deficits) belonged to the collective 
membership. Until 1993, medical schemes were divided into different categories, 
which will be used in this thesis for clarity, because there are still major differences 
between the different kinds of schemes in cost, structure and benefit design. The 
categories are: exempted schemes (Sick Funds); medical aid schemes and medical 
benefit schemes. The terms ‘medical schemes’ or ‘funds’ will be used to refer to these 
schemes collectively.
(a) Lxempled medical schemes (Sick Funds)
The first three studies were all Sick Funds, the simplest and cheapest kind of 
schemes, falling under the jurisdiction of the Department of Labour, because they were 
negotiated and administered within the collective bargaining framework of Industrial 
Councils (Chapters 4 to 6).* There were 34 industry specific Funds in 1994, most 
covering only workers, excluding dependants and pensioners. Most members were 
black workers. They were administered by Industrial Council staff and managed by 
joint employer-union committees. They provided limited medical benefits: 
consultations and medication from contracted general practitioners (‘panel doctors’).
In addition, some schemes ran small-scale medical services (‘clinics’) of their own, run 
by salaried medical staff, which members could use as an alternative to the panel 
doctors. Additional benefits sometimes included simple dentistry and optical benefits. 
Few Sick Funds offered hospital cover, as their membership was largely drawn from
* The average annual contribution per beneficiary in I992/.3 was K7I3, a figure raised by schemes 
tor higher paid industries like the motor industry (McIntyre 1995a, 22). The contributions in the 
f  unds studied were K 152 (Natal clothing workers), K20K (leather workers) and R.IX5 (C'ape clothing 
workers)
an income group for whom state hospital care was extremely cheap.1' Some provided 
maternity benefits and most covered sick pay, usually with conditions inferior to 
statutory sick pay.
Statutory sick leave and sick pay is regulated in terms of the Basic Conditions 
of Employment Act (No. 6 of 1983). This law allows for 10 days per year of sick 
leave on full pay, paid by the employer. Medical certificates are required for absences 
of three days or more (for one or two day illnesses workers may self-certificate). 
Unused sick leave is carried forward over a three year cycle. These conditions apply 
to all employees in the formal sector, with the exception of groups covered by 
collective bargaining agreements with alternative sick leave and pay arrangements, 
supposed to be ‘no less favourable’ for members. All the Sick Funds studied had 
alternative sick pay arrangements, which allowed for longer periods of sick leave but 
at reduced wages and with no payment for one or two day absences.1" Taken alone, 
the sick leave conditions were distinctly unfavourable, but comparison was 
complicated by the link with medical benefits.
(b) Medical aid schemes
The last study focused on a medical aid scheme (Chapter 7). Medical aid 
schemes (of which there were 165 in 1992) were at the luxury end of the private health 
insurance market.9 *11 They were usually administered by commercial administrators and
9 These workers would have paid RI3 lor an outpatient visit and only R26 p e r  adm ission  for 
inpatient care at a tertiary hospital in 1994/5 (McIntyre 1994; 1995, 33).
111 The leather fund was the worst, with 52 days sick leave per annum, but at about 22% of wages.
11 Average contribution per beneficiary (1992/3): K1,800 (McIntyre ct al. 1995, 22).
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lew had representative management structures.12 Medical aid schemes offered the 
widest range of benefits and the greatest freedom in choice of providers. They paid 
for medical services according to an agreed ‘tariff’.11 Some schemes imposed limits on 
utilisation for particular benefit categories (especially dental and optical care). Their 
membership profile reflected the racial and class distinctions of South African society. 
Though whites made up otdy 13% of the population, they accounted for 35% of 
medical aid scheme membership in IWI .M Black membership grew from 28% in 10X2 
to 45% in I00I . All medical aid schemes covered dependants and were legally obliged 
to allow members to retain membership after retirement.n Some schemes were 
company-specific (closed), others were ‘open’ to membership from different 
companies.
Medical aid schemes fall under the jurisdiction of the Registrar of Medical 
Schemes (in the Department of Health), with the exception of medical aid schemes for 
government employees which are exempt from reporting. Transmcd, the subject of the 
fourth study, was the largest of the non-reporting schemes. Other non reporting 
schemes included those for the police, defence force and national intelligence force.
12 The maximum allowable administration lee is 10% ot contributions. The average lee in 1002 was 
5 t% (Valentine and McIntyre 1004, 40).
11 The Ialiti was a list ol lees lor medical services issued by the Representative Association ol 
Medical Schemes (RAMS).
M 1001 was the last year in which the Registrar kept racial statistics (McIntyre el al. 1005, 4; 22;
25). The issue ol race and statistics is a vexed one: though classification try race is ollensive, its 
removal makes it dillicult to track anil analyse changing patterns ol access, distribution and advance 
in eighty.
‘ Subsidy was a mailer between the employer and employee. ( liven the cost ol unsiihsidised 
membership, tew |>eiisioners could retain membership wilhnut an employer subsidy.
(c) M ed ica l b e n e f it  schem es
There were no medical benefit schemes in the studies. They are similar to Sick 
Funds, though they fall under the jurisdiction of the Registrar of Medical Schemes 
rather than the Minister of Labour. They are cheaper than medical aid schemes, the 
benefits simpler and subject to lower financial limits than in medical aid schemes."'
4. Health policy after 1994
This was the health service inherited by the new government in IW4. The 
clear priority of the new government was to restructure the public sector, 
concentrating on primary care in order to increase access by (he poorest. The new 
Department was faced with an administrative nightmare, required to create a new 
structure with a central department and nine provincial departments from the mass of 
overlapping Departments. This was to be underpinned by a new district health system, 
with broad community participation. At the same time, government had to provide 
new services and re-design the system of resource allocation. A program of clinic 
building started almost immediately, and a policy of free primary care for pregnant 
women and children under six was announced in May I994, with immediate effect.11 
The process of adjusting the provincial allocations began, along with a gradual shift of 
resources within budgets from the tertiary to the primary level. Later a policy of free
Average contribution per beneficiary (1992/3): R 1,408 (McIntyre el al. 1993, 22).
17 The result was to increase the load on public sector services, pulling them under severe strain 
(Malhiane 1994; Skosana 1994).
primary care for all residents was announced (in April 1996), though there was some 
confusion about whether this included medical scheme members and some provinces 
delayed implementation."’ Hospital care was to be charged at more realistic rates and 
more effort was to be pul into recovering fees."' The national and provincial 
Departments of Health started to look to the medical schemes as sources of income, 
provided they could attract their members into public hospitals.
The issue of National Health Insurance (NIII) was part of the ANC’s election 
manifesto. Because it introduces a new dedicated contribution, NIII is attractive to 
health departments looking for new sources of funds to bolster and develop struggling 
health services. Social Health Insurance (SHI) is a variant which generally privileges 
contributors above non-contributors to some degree , thus benefiting those in formal 
employment (Normand and Weber 1994). There has been a great deal of 
concentration on this mechanism to deal with the funding problems of many third 
world and developing countries (Abel Smith 1986; 1994; Ron et al. 1990; Ron 1993; 
Normand and Weber 1994; Henderson el al. 1995; Liu and Hsiao 1995; Arhin 1994; 
Yang 1991). However, there are a number of arguments against its usefulness as a 
universal model. NIII works best in countries with relatively high employment levels 
in the formal sector, as the employed can more easily subsidise the unemployed when
K In October 1996, the Minister of Health appealed to remove the right ot medical scheme 
members to free primary health care in the public sector. Later, she announced dial die ( iovernment 
Gazette had been issued in error and would he withdrawn (South Africa 1996). However, contusion 
continues and some provinces continue to exclude medical scheme members from 'lice' access ll)i 
McIntyre, personal communication, 5 October 1997).
Under the previous system, hospitals did not retain fees: all lees recovered were deducted from 
llieir grunt from central government. Obviously this was not an incentive to lee recovery.
unemployment is low. In countries with high unemployment, the cross subsidies are 
harder to sustain. The problem is exacerbated where there is a large informal sector, 
from which contributions cannot easily be collected.20 Income from contributions is 
vulnerable to economic downturns, especially if accompanied by large-scale 
retrenchments. New contributions may also cause more problems than they solve: 
government may react to a new inflow of funds to the health sector by cutting the 
allocation from the general budget and contributors are likely to expect new benefits 
for new contributions. If their expectations are already raised by political change 
resulting in a new government with broad popular support, the problem will be 
intensified. This is borne out in the studies and is likely to prove a serious problem in 
any new national scheme.
NHI/SHI was investigated by two commissions, but final decisions are still 
pending at the time of writing (McC'utcheon and Price 1994; H room berg and Shisana 
1995). In 1995, I attended two workshops for COSATU affiliates on the NIII 
proposals. A document was drawn up, outlining a response to the proposals, but 
never submitted to the Department of Health. In 1997, a delegation from COSATU 
met with DOII officials. At COSATU’s request I drew up a briefing document for 
discussion inside the federation (Cornell 1997). The latest version of the policy 
document was published for comment in September 1997 and is discussed in the
20 A recurrent objection raised in South African trade union meetings about Nill centred on tree 
riders in the informal sector, particularly the infamous mini-bus taxi industry, which is largely 
outside the lax system.
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concluding chapter (South Africa 1997a). COSATU’s response to the new SHI 
proposals of September 1997 is currently being drafted.
The NHI commission also made a series of far-reaching recommendations 
about regulation of the private sector (Broomberg and Shisana 1995). The private 
sector argued strongly for self-regulation and against ‘interference’ by government, 
though group interests divided on specific issues. The pharmaceutical industry 
protested vigorously about a proposal to make primary drugs available generally, 
either free or at very low cost (Sidley 1996). The administrators were cautiously 
optimistic about NHI, arguing that they alone had the expertise to run such schemes 
and that they could do so far more efficiently than government. The medical 
profession was very concerned about ‘nationalisation’ and the threat to their medical 
independence (and income), though their concern about commercial ‘managed care’ 
initiatives from medical schemes (a concern shared with pharmacists and hospitals) 
drove a wedge between them and medical aid scheme administrators. At the time of 
writing, the Department of Health is holding fire on reform of the private sector, 
though an updated document has been issued (South Africa 1997b). In the 
meanwhile, this billion Rand industry is monitored by a tiny section of the Department 
of Health, run by the Registrar of Medical Schemes, with a minimal staff.
These developments are directly relevant to the schemes studied. Members of 
the Sick Funds depend on the public sector for some of their care, specifically 
specialist and hospital care, and the Funds arc building links with the public sector to
crcalc payment mechanisms and improve the How of information between practitioners 
dealing with different levels of patient care: primary care in the Funds’ clinics, 
secondary and tertiary in the slate hospitals. These links have to be created province 
by province, in line with the devolution of responsibility from the central Department 
of Health to the provinces. There is a lingering stigma attached to the public sector. 
This stigma is a common theme amongst workers, often despite socialist politics. It 
has a material base in the poorly resourced and overcrowded nature of public facilities, 
but relates also to a racist past when whites at the top of the pile had almost exclusive 
access to the private sector. The end of apartheid raised expectations to a high pitch: 
for many, the expectation for health care was that all would have what whites enjoyed 
in the past. This expectation permeates the studies, complicates the process (and my 
role in it, as a white) and colours the outcome.
5. Health care as a union issue
Health services, whether public or private, are generally not delivered at the 
workplace. Where workplace services do exist, they lend to be provided by employers 
rather than the state and to be limited in scope, with the extent of services indicating 
their instrumental purpose (Dcrickson 1989). They would generally provide first aid 
and treat minor ailments and in juries (thus reducing time off work due to accidents and 
illness) and possibly some occupationally-specific services, such as lung screenings in
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dusly occupations. The instrumental purpose of factory services was clearly 
highlighted in a survey of factories in Cape Town, which revealed that the commonest 
of all services provided was ‘family planning’, especially in female-dominated 
industries such as food and clothing (Cornell 1984). The obvious exception to this 
trend in South Africa is the mining industry, which has its own in-house health 
services, part of an extensive system of social control including single-sex housing for 
their predominantly migrant workforce. With these exceptions, workers go outside 
the workplace for health care. In the process, they lose their collective identity as 
workers and are individualised as ‘patients’. The terminology is telling, with all its 
implications of passivity. This passivity is compounded by the power relations oft he 
interaction with health professionals and the vulnerability of illness, which may subdue 
the most vocal activist.
Iiy the 1980s, South African government policy was explicitly directed 
towards the increasing privatisation of health services and the deregulation of the 
private sector, in line with broader policy aimed at making the South African economy 
more competitive (Price 1988a; 1988b). The doctrine of individual responsibility and 
its correlate of freedom of choice was an essential part of the ideological thrust of 
‘modernising’. In terms of health care this translated to a view that, on the one hand, 
workers were responsible for the health earc of their families and, on the other, that 
they should be free to choose the level and style of care to which they had access - in 
the private sector. The only constraint on choice was affordability. This formulation 
is based on two assumptions: that health care is an individual responsibility and that
ability to pay should determine the nature of the care to which an individual has
access.
Unions taking up health care as an issue are, in effect, challenging both these 
assumptions. They are asserting that the responsibility for health care is not individual 
but collective and that need, rather than ability to pay, should determine the nature of 
the care to which an individual has access. In this way, the issue of health care 
connects directly with the central trade union principles of collectivism and solidarity. 
Consequently, it has a rightful place on the agenda of any trade union, other than those 
with a very narrowly economistic definition of their role. By taking up health care in a 
collective way, trade unions take a quantum leap, extending their support to their 
members in time of illness and giving them the backing of a collective organisation 
which will assert their rights and challenge the attitudes and practices of health 
professionals. As individuals, workers might well be afraid to confront doctors, but 
jointly they have far more power, especially when their unions are directly involved in 
the management of health care schemes which employ medical staff to deliver services. 
When unions employ medical staff, on behalf of their members, the power relations 
shift dramatically.
In formulating demands, members’ views and wishes on health services arc 
important, but cannot be taken up simplistically. Union leaders have a responsibility to 
explore the source of these views and to engage with them dynamically, questioning 
received opinions and exposing members to alternatives in discussion and debate. In
(he dying years of the apartheid regime, there was an extensive debate in progressive 
health circles about the kind of health service that should be built for the ‘new’ South 
Africa.21 The union movement took very little part in this debate, and the few articles 
which referred to the trade union movement had little practical basis (Price and 
Tshazibane 1988; 1989; Broombcrg et al. 1991). A rare exception was London 
(1991), written by a doctor who worked in a trade union clinic outside of Cape Town. 
There is a danger in separating decision-making about health care from other union 
issues, because other factors have more impact on health than health services (Pillay 
and Bond 1995; Vagero 1994). Some of these other factors fall within the sphere of 
union bargaining, most obviously wages, which provide the basic necessities of life.
It is possible (for individuals and for countries) to spend too much on health 
services and too little on health and there are clear indications that health status does 
not rise in direct proportion to the amount spent on care. ‘More’ does not necessarily 
equal ‘better’. This is one argument for a gradualist approach to improvements in 
health care, alongside active pursuit of other trade union goals such as improvement of 
wages (enabling workers to pay for better food, housing and education) and working 
conditions (reducing the harmful impact on health of exposure to hazards at work,
21 The broad thrust of the debate was towards a system of nurse-based primary health tare (a broader 
definition than ‘medical’ cure, including a stress on preventive and promotive health), which should 
be ‘progressive’ ( a broad formulation incorporating ideas of greater involvement of patients and their 
communities, as well us replacing the classical medical hierarchy with a health team approach). The 
debate included a conference in Maputo on ‘Health and Welfare in Transition', which drew together 
progressive health activists from inside South Africa, exiles and international sympathisers, with the 
liberation movement (Zwarcnstein 1990). A major theme in the debate was the need for a National 
Health Service or National Heultn Insurance. See, for example, Price (1987); Owen (ed.) (1988); 
Centre for Health Policy (1988); de Beer (1988); Brixmiberg and He Beer (1990); Bachmunn (1994); 
Price (1994); Blcchcr et al. (1995); (1996). Some concentrated on women’s health (Klugmun and 
Weiner 1992).
extended working hours or unhealthy shift systems). I lowever, in a country like South 
Africa with a historical legacy of savage inequality, the gradualist approach is difficult 
to argue, smacking as it does of reinforcing the divisions of the past, when 50% of all 
health expenditure went to 20% of the population, leaving the other 80% to the care 
of the slate (McIntyre el al. 1005).
6. Health care as a subject for bargaining
What does it mean to bargain about health services ' It means accepting that 
health care is one need among many, which cannot he fulfilled in isolation. It means an 
economic approach in the strictest sense of economies as the science of scarcity, ol 
choice, of allocating finite resources between competing demands (see for example 
Drummond et al. 1087).
Health care is not usually the subject of bargaining. In general, health services 
are designed by health care funders and/or providers, not users (see for example Wall 
1004). Planning and provision are the domain of experts in both public and private 
sector health care (Xaidi 1004; Cassels 1005). In theory, public sector services are 
designed to meet objective needs. The pattern of need is assessed by c x |x t Is (health 
economists and planners and/or medical professionals), rather than articulated on the 
basis oflheir experience by users of the health services. Health service users have little 
or no part to play in the process (C’arr-llill 1004) In practice, political considerations
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colour the process of deciding where to direct resources and to whom. This is seen in 
acute form in the South African public health system under apartheid (see for example 
McIntyre et al. 1995; McIntyre 1997).
In the private sector, different imperatives drive the process of health service 
planning. Users of the private sector have greater latitude in choice of services, and 
private sector providers compete with each other in a way foreign to the public sector. 
Services are designed to meet the demands of users (and potential users), who have 
the power to go elsewhere. Private hospitals and clinics compete on facilities and 
advanced medical technology, to attract not only patients but also specialists, many of 
whom situate their consulting rooms in private hospital complexes, and lend for 
convenience to direct patients to these facilities for treatment. Competition over 
technology has the effect of raising user expectations and stimulating demand for high 
technology interventions, especially when both users and medical practitioners are 
cushioned from consideration of the cost by the third party payment systems of 
medical insurance (Broomberg 1990). The result is the inflationary spiral seen in 
medical aid schemes in South Africa, leading to consideration of methods to regulate 
private sector medical care (Broomberg 1991; Fouric 1993; McIntyre et al. 1995; 
Price and Masobe; Pillay and Bond 1995; Van den lleever 1994; 1996).
Union bargaining agendas are shaped by political context. In countries where 
there is an NHS or unified NMI/SIII system, health care drops off the bargaining 
agenda for individual unions (Navarro 1989; Swartz 1993; Taylor-Oooby 1996).
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Health sector unions take care of the issues affecting their members as workers, and 
the task of taking up issues which affect all union members as health service users is 
generally left to the national federation, which interacts with government, registering 
protest at cuts in public health service budgets. It is impossible to bargain with the 
state on behalf of members on an issue like health care because the state is too large, 
too departmentally discrete. Decisions about budget allocations to departments are 
made at a level remote from citizens and the organisations of civil society. There is no 
mechanism for budgetary (lows between departments, and departmental autonomy and 
power is fiercely guarded. The Minister of Health cannot offer to improve health care 
in return for reducing or delaying a demand on housing, pensions or education, which 
fall under the jurisdiction of other Ministers.
In contrast, bargaining with employers generally allows a degree of flexibility in 
the decision of how to cut the wage/social wage cake. In countries with compulsory 
health insurance, but a choice of schemes, health care will be on the bargaining agenda 
with employers, but bargaining will focus on choice of schemes and division of costs 
between employer and employee (Taylor-Gooby 1996; Graf von der Schulenburg 
1994; Dcppc and Orcskovic 1996; Nonneman and Van Doorslacr 1994; Chinitz 1994). 
In countries like the US, where health insurance is not compulsory, the scope of union 
bargaining with employers includes both the choice of schemes, the division of the 
costs and also the basic demand for cover in industries or companies without current 
cover (Staples 1989; Navarro 1989). The principal division between the two systems -
the social insurance ‘Bismarck’ system and the social welfare ‘Beveridge’ system - is 
summed up hy Taylor-Gooby (1996) as follows:
In a social insurance system the central problem is how to control medical 
costs; in state-controlled systems, it is whether funding is adequate and how to 
handle the problems of deciding priorities and deal with waiting lists and 
rationing measures. (Taylor-Gooby 1996, 217)
Bargaining assumes an ongoing relationship and structures. These are more 
common and more developed between employers and unions than between unions and 
the state, especially outside of mature liberal democracies. In general, employers arc 
more familiar bargaining partners. The collective bargaining process involves the 
membership to varying degrees. Leaders may do the negotiating, hut with an agenda 
defined by (or at least acceptable to) their members, and they are accountable to those 
members for the outcome. There is no equivalent structure to the relationship 
between unions and the state. The base of representation lacks the symmetry of the 
employer-union relationship: the unions’ base is their membership; government’s base 
is either its party membership (likely to overlap with union membership to varying 
degrees according to the nature of the ruling parly) or more broadly the citizenship 
(which incorporates union membership). Union powers and weapons are different, 
less focused and more constrained in relations with the slate. For example, a strike 
against the state is possible, but more difficult and dangerous than a strike against an 
employer or group of employers.
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Nevertheless, unions have to engage with the state around health eare.22 Even 
when there is no direct relationship between unions and the state in terms of health 
eare, the state is part of the picture. It creates the legislative structure within which all 
health services and funds must operate; it creates and administers policy on crucial 
matters such as drug pricing and distribution; it regulates access to public services and 
operates those services. The legislative and regulatory framework may be either 
favourable or prejudicial to the development of union-initiated schemes. For this 
reason, if no other, it is necessary for unions to engage with the state in bilateral or 
trilateral fora to protect and advance their members’ interests.
Change of government may require a radical shift in the approach towards 
engaging with the stale, especially where this change involves a movement towards 
formal democracy. In South Africa alter 1994, despite an apparently privileged new 
relationship with government, trade unions have continued to keep the issue of health 
care on the bilateral bargaining agenda with employers. The relationship with the state 
Department of Health is being developed in parallel with, rather than as a replacement 
for, the collective bargaining relationship. There is an argument for using the 
combined strength of the unions to back a demand for broad class demands, not 
limited to their members. On the other hand, there are sectional concerns within the 
trade union movement, and divisions between the organised and unorganised, and 
between the employed and unemployed, all of which militate against such action.
11 Swartz (199.1) points to the danger of dropping the struggle prematurely, arguing that though 
Canudian unions won health insurance, they did not achieve fundamental redistribution of resources.
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There is also the risk that, given economic and political constraints on the new 
government’s capacity to deliver in practice, the response from government would be 
premised on uniformity at the lowest level. Unions with established health care 
arrangements and a powerful base for bargaining with employers would be reluctant to 
surrender hard won gains in return for a least common denominator outcome.
Management of health care
Though the bilateral structure of bargaining may be familiar, health care brings 
new challenges to the process: when the scope of bargaining is extended beyond the 
division of the costs of health care to the restructuring of the content and delivery of 
that care, unions enter uncharted territory and encounter new parties, with whom they 
have to develop relationships. Health care professionals and consultants enter the 
picture, along with financial intermediaries (such as medical aid administrators and 
managed care enterprises). Dealing with these different and potentially conflicting 
groups presents trade unions with particular problems. The imbalance of technical 
knowledge and expertise in a specialised area can be crippling for a union, rendering it 
vulnerable to manipulation by vested interests. On the other hand, gaining the 
expertise necessary to negotiate with specialists on relatively equal terms can result in 
over-concentration of skills in a small group of full time officials, cutting other officials 
and, more particularly, worker leadership out of the negotiating process and distancing 
the membership from the issue. The challenge is to retain a reasonable degree of 
worker control of the issue, so that it docs not become a technical question only, while
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at the same time ensuring that union negotiators can hold their own against specialists, 
rather than being forced onto the defensive.
In most countries, health insurance schemes are managed and administered 
independently of unions or bargaining structures and their relationships with unions or 
employers are at arms length. This thesis focuses on the unusual phenomenon of 
schemes which are jointly managed by unions and employers within an industry. This 
is a much closer relationship, particularly when the schemes run their own health 
services, rather than simply contracting with private providers. The trade unions 
involved have to develop a set of relationships, as employers, specifically as employers 
of professionals, and even more specifically, of medical professionals, one of the most 
hierarchically organised, minutely divided and professionalistic of groups (Doyal 1983; 
Swartz 1993).
Employment relations inside trade unions can be complex, embodying a 
conflict between the rights of union employees as workers and the rights of the 
membership whom they serve. The relationship with medical professionals is even 
more problematic. They have a right to express demands to their ‘employer’ (the joint 
management structure, in which the union participates) and are likely to be particularly 
demanding on the basis of professional status. The union as joint ‘employer’ is in turn 
accountable to and employed by its members, with whose interests the professional 
demands conflict. How will unions manage to be at one and the same time employers 
of the medical staff and representative; of the workers who rely on the services they
provide? Unions have to intervene in a number of relationships to facilitate a shift in 
the balance of power: within the group of medical professionals (the weh of medical 
manager-doctor-nurse relationships) and, more importantly, between them and the 
union’s members, in order to increase those members’ involvement in their own health 
care. There is a significant imbalance in power between health care professionals and 
users. Health care is not an ordinary consumer good: you cannot be certain when you 
will need it or how great your need will be. When you do need it, you are vulnerable 
because of pain and/or fear and reliant on advice and decisions which you lack the 
expertise or vocabulary to challenge. You are also usually alone. On the face of it, 
this would seem to be a very difficult area for trade unions to enter, requiring 
intervention in an individualised and confidential relationship.
7. Conclusion
The central task for unions is to maintain the ’union’ character of their health 
services in the face of a number of conflicting pressures. The involvement of 
professionals gives them a stake in the process and results in pressures towards 
‘efficiency’ and professionalisation. There are competing demands for union leaders’ 
involvement, which may result in withdrawal from involvement once the decisions are 
made. This is problematic because health service developments need ongoing union 
involvement in the implementation of decisions and monitoring of outcomes to ensure 
that they do not revert to professional control as a result of losing the vital contact 
with their user/members. As the health system develops, it places increasing demands
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on the lay management structures. In order to manage appropriately, representatives 
need skills, training, experience and continuity, which can centralise decision-making 
power in the hand of a small group of union ‘experts’.
There is a continuing tension between the need to highlight health care as an 
issue, recognising the importance of appropriate union structures and procedures, and 
the need to locate it as a union issue like any other and one that is intimately related to 
the mainline issues of wages and working conditions, in terms of their impact on health 
status. Health care must not overtake health as the central union concern.
The Sick Funds which are the subject of the first three studies in this thesis 
operated in an uneasy middle ground between private and public sector. They 
provided access the private sector via a system of contracted private (panel) doctors 
(though in the second-class queue), sometimes supplemented by simple primary 
clinics. Sick Fund members, unlike members of most other medical schemes, shift 
between private and public sector care. For secondary and tertiary care, they used the 
public sector.
I argue that it is possible to reclaim this middle ground and to create funds 
which are public in form, though technically private, by transforming the existing 
clinics and using them as the base for an expanded system of neighbourhood primary 
health care centres, employing medical staff to operate them under the control of Sick 
Fund structures, and developing strong relationships with state health services for 
secondary and tertiary referral. Such funds protect members from the inflationary
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spiral of private medicine. Though they arc part of a tiered system, privileging 
members above workers with no health cover and the unemployed, the differences arc 
less acute than with medical aid. The style of the services is similar to public sector 
services, the major difference being the degree of control which the users, via their 
representatives, can exert. It would be romantic to characterise this as 'worker 
control’, but it is at least worker influence. The next chapter describes the process of 
restructuring a Sick Fund for clothing workers in Cape Town with the South African 
Clothing and Textile Workers’ Union.
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Chapter 4. The Cape Clothing Industry Sick Fund
1. Introduction
The focus of this chapter is on a trade union project: its origin, 
development, implementation and outcome. This project was informed by a 
broader purpose among a key group of new trade union leaders, engaged in a 
broad process of renewal within the union, one thrust of which involved the 
process of restructuring members’ health care (on renewal, see Fairbrother 1996). 
The union had more than 48,000 workers, members of the Sick Fund, the 
overwhelming majority coloured women. They were spread over 399 factories in 
the Western Cape, the majority in small and very small factories, earning low 
wages.
The nature of the state and the political environment influences the way in 
which unions function. When this project began, the South African state was still 
constituted on racist lines and unsympathetic to the organised working class. This 
situation combined with a legacy of state resistance to independent trade unions 
and the vacuum in formal party politics for black South Africans (legal parties were 
discredited, credible parties were illegal) to politicise a significant part of the trade 
union movement and broaden the scope of union activity and responsibility. In the 
1980s the state was intent on dismantling the remaining elements of intervention 
and protectionism in the economic system. In health care, the decay of the state 
health system and rampant inflation in the private health sector fuelled worker
1 0 0
dissatisfaction. At this juncture, it was obvious that the state would not respond to 
demands for improvements in public sector health care.
This pressure intersected positively with an organisational imperative. The 
union project was undertaken to legitimate and concretise an existing union 
agenda, an agenda which was in turn closely linked to the need to legitimate and 
establish a new leadership. The new leaders moved beyond the defence of historic 
benefits, extending and improving them, and entered political terrain by asserting 
the union’s right to involvement beyond bargaining over the division of the costs of 
health care into the new area of design and management of health services for their 
members. Locating the issue in the familiar structure of bargaining required 
conscious weighting in relation to other issues being pursued simultaneously, tested 
commitment and allowed for delays in return for key concessions.
Workers looked to their union for assistance. Union leaders made a 
strategic decision to develop the project within the bilateral framework of the 
existing Sick Fund management structure, translating a union policy document into 
a joint project shared with employers (GAWU 1989). They believed that this 
would require the appointment of an independent ‘expert’ acceptable to both 
parties to research the Sick Fund and present proposals for its restructuring for 
negotiation by the parties.1
The study traces the way in which the issue was defined, related demands 
articulated and embedded, and membership commitment secured in order to
1 In all four studies, I was nominated by a trade union to act as consultant to both parties (trade 
unions and employers): this was then agreed by the employer/s (and by the other trade unions in 
the two multi-union studies). Differences in the extent and nature of my involvement are 
highlighted in the studies and discussed in more detail in the methodology appendix.
support the leadership in the bargaining process. The union leadership’s 
investment in the project kept the issue on the bargaining agenda and resulted in 
the negotiation of crucial agreements, in which delays were conceded at terms and 
times advantageous to the union project.
Unlike the other studies, it contained within it a formal piece of planned 
research, in the form of a sample survey. The original research plan was constantly 
modified in response to a volatile situation, incorporating new developments and 
demands and shifting its timetable and pace to accommodate the rhythms of the 
industrial relations negotiating process. My involvement extended beyond the 
formal study, developing from internal work in the union started some four years 
prior to the study, and including an intense two-year period of involvement in the 
process of implementing the recommendations.
This first study focuses particularly on the possibilities for union action on 
health care, while those which follow highlight the constraints and limitations. This 
chapter charts the way in which a ‘great notion’, as expressed in the union’s 
internal policy document, was brought to the bargaining table, legitimated by 
‘independent research’, paced by the collective bargaining process, and then 
implemented in a process subject to the checks and challenges of the joint 
management process (GAWU 1989). In the process, a model for working class 
health care provision emerges: this is - crucially - not a technical model which can 
be transferred with case, but rather a model of process, which is founded on
struggle.
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2. Origin: the union agenda
The impetus for union renewal may come from different sources: 
membership dissatisfaction and pressure, shills within the leadership, entry of new 
leaders, external forces, and any combination of these. New leaders must 
distinguish themselves from the old order where this is problematic, but identify 
and lay claim to the elements of tradition which attract the loyalty of members. To 
do this, they must define an agenda for action which builds on these issues. In 
order to understand this project it is necessary to understand the ideological weight 
of Sick Fund benefits for clothing workers in the Western ('ape and the challenge 
posed to a new leadership intent on extending the boundaries of a narrow but 
paternalistic form of unionism.
This study was rooted in a crucial stage of the transformation of the trade- 
union involved from bureaucratic quiescence to democratic activism (Hyman 
19X9). The origins of the Garment Workers’ Union - Western Province (GWII- 
WP) and its establishment as a compliant, non-militant union were described in 
chapter I. One of the bulwarks of the union was its benefits, and the leadership 
presented the Sick Fund as chief amongst these. The Sick Fund of the Cape 
Clothing Industry was first established in 1942, 15 years alter the formation of the 
union.2 It provided for partial replacement of wages lost due to illness, as well as a 
simple health care benefit, giving workers (but not their dependants) access to 
contracted general practitioners ( ‘panel doctors’) and medication and, in lime, a
2 Note that though lurmed in 1927, the union did not (unction us a union until the mid 19 tils 
(Nicol 19X3).
103
number of other benefits. At the time of the study, there were 96 panel doctors in 
103 surgeries (some had two surgeries). In most areas there was a choice of 
doctors and workers were not bound to one doctor but could change at will, 
visiting doctors where they lived or worked. Doctors near factories tended to have 
particularly busy practices.
The first medical clinic was opened in 1964. A maternity benefit was 
introduced in 1991. These benefits were administered by the Industrial Council 
and funded by equal contributions from employer and worker. (See chapter I for a 
description of the Industrial Council system.)
The Fund represented a major advance for clothing workers, giving them 
access to sick pay twenty five years before it was written into the Factories Act in 
1962. Once the benefit was introduced, however, its administration was removed 
from the arena of struggle. Though there were occasional minor improvements in 
benefits over the years, there was no systematic analysis of their value, especially in 
comparison with statutory sick leave and pay, until the late 1980s.4
The spur to re-examination of benefits was the entry of the new officials in 
the 1980s. Most of them came from an activist tradition, either from youth and 
student movements, or from experience in other, more radical unions (specifically 
those which had emerged in the new wave of unionism which began in the 1970s). 
There was a change in the top leadership, as the grip of the Petersen family was
' Regular sessions with a gynaecologist ( I95X), an ante natal clinic (1962), an optical clinic 
(196.3), dental clinic (197.3) (Cooper 1979).
1 'Hie problems ol (other) Sick funds had been raised, tor example in IIIRC (19X1). which arose 
Irom an analysis ol the I ;ixkI workers' Medical licncfit fund (I WMItl) undertaken hy the 1111« i 
at the request of the food and Canning Workers' Union. As a result of this study, the f  WMItl 
established a workers' clinic in I’aarl. for a description of this clinic, see laindon (199.3).
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loosened.5 When GAWU was formed in 1987, it adopted policies and principles 
consciously aligned to those of COSATU affiliates (non-racialism, non-sexism, 
democratic worker control and ‘one union, one industry’) and called for six months 
observer status in COSATU structures to be followed by affiliation (GAWU 
1988a; 1988b). The new officials were faced with a largely passive membership, 
unaccustomed to participation in union affairs, anxious about radicalism and 
‘politics’ (Nicol 1983; 1984a; 1984b; Bloch 1982). The membership was 
overwhelmingly ‘coloured’, a disenfranchised group, marginalised in national 
politics, whose only forum for political representation was a discredited puppet 
parliament (the House of Representatives), which had responsibility for a narrowly 
defined list of ‘own affairs’, related to people classified as ‘coloured’ and delegated 
to it by the white-only parliament.
At work, clothing workers in the Western Cape had long been 
‘represented’ by a paternalist, highly centralised union leadership which had a close 
relationship with the employers, of which it was proud:
What marks our Industry, by and large, is a happy relationship between 
workers and management. Where else in the world would you find a Trade 
Union running an inter-factory Spring Queen competition with management 
and workers co-operating just for the fun of it?” (Clothes Line 1982, 
quoted in Suttner 1983, 17)
The task of organisers (full-time officials) was described in the union's own 
pamphlet as follows: ‘ORGANISERS: Are employed full time to deal with 
workers’ problems or problems relating to benefits due to workers. They visit
5 The long serving general secretary was Louis Petersen, his son Cedric was assistant general 
secretary, and other family members were also employed by the union (Nicol 1984a). Cedric 
Petersen was also editor of the weekly union newsletter ‘Clothesline’.
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factories periodically to enlighten workers on Trade Union policy and act as liaison 
between employers and employees in order to resolve any disputes and maintain 
amicable understanding.' (GWU-WP n.d., quoted in Sultner 1985, 88) Inline 
with this top-down approach, wage agreements were simply announced to 
workers. Though there was a shop steward structure on paper, shop stewards’ 
scope of action was limited to minor tasks related to benefit administration. They 
were not involved in negotiations and there had been no industry-wide industrial 
action since 1936 (Nicol 1984a).
The GWU-WP’s proprietorial attitude towards the benefits associated with 
membership was somewhat misleading, as most of the benefits were in fact jointly 
funded by employers and administered by the Industrial Council.1' The benefits 
arose from being a clothing worker, rather than from being a union member, 
though given the fact that there was a closed shop, the confusion is understandable 
and compounded by the fact that the clinic and the Industrial Council offices where 
sick pay was collected were in the same building as the union, Induslria |sic| 
House.' This confusion undoubtedly suited the ‘old’ union: during the brief period 
when the Clothing Workers’ Union (CUOWIJ) attempted to organise in the 
industry in opposition to the CiWU-WP, the old union used its newsletter to warn 
that workers who joined CI.OWU would lose their benefits.
'' The confusion was undoubtedly strengthened by the tact lli.il all workers were provided with a 
set ol lour pamphlets ol identical formal, two on the Sick fund and die Provident fund (both 
Industrial Council hcnclils) and two on die union. One ol the union' pamphlets provides a long 
list ol hcnelils lor 'bona fide members' of the CiWU-WI’, from luncral assistance to Xmas cheer 
Clothes h u e, the weekly newspaper, aimed 'to make wotkers aware ol their advantages and 
disadvantages in the social, economic, management and labour fields'. I.asl on die list was ‘the 
trade union’ (representation in negotiations and affiliations to national and international 
organisations) (Sudner 198 f).
1 Induslria House was owned by the union, which let offices to the Council.
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One of the new entrants to the union, Howard Gabriels, appointed as 
research officer, was assigned the task of formulating a proposal for improvements 
to the Sick Fund." He and others among the group of new officials saw this as a 
way to connect with members, tapping into their attachment to the Sick Fund in 
the process. In engaging with a central benefit, the new leadership did two things. 
First, they struck a blow at the image of the old union by questioning the real value 
of the benefits on which its reputation rested. Second, by raising the possibility of 
improved and expanded benefits, they claimed the mantle of authority and 
leadership, establishing a continuity with the positive aspect of the union style to 
which clothing workers were accustomed (that is, protectiveness), and dramatically 
enhancing it by taking on responsibility for families for the first time. In the 
absence of adequate state provision for working class families, the union took on 
responsibility for organising this aspect of social reproduction.
It was important to establish some continuity, because the new leaders were 
challenging the old union in a fundamental way, questioning both the content and 
the style of the old unionism. In relation to the Sick Fund, this was the first time 
that members were asked about their experience of the system and given the 
opportunity to voice problems. The new representative structures being developed 
by the union provided a mechanism for this process. The project was part of the 
process of schooling workers in democracy, but it also required the exercise of 
leadership. Alongside the question of extending benefits to dependants, generally 
positively and enthusiastically embraced by members, the leaders raised a more
" Before joining GAWU, Howard Gabriels had worked in two unions from the 'political' wing of 
South African unionism: first the Gcnerul Workers' Union (based in Cape Town) and later the 
National Union of Mineworkers.
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contentious issue, questioning the value of the sick pay benefit for the first time and 
introducing the possibility of its replacement by statutory sick pay. This was a 
highly emotive issue for all parties.
3. A summary of the project
A brief overview of the project highlights the slow pace of change, closely 
related to the fact that the project was rooted in collective bargaining 
arrangements. Internally, it was subject to all the checks and balances of a bilateral 
decision-making structure and a ponderous Industrial Council bureaucracy, as well 
as the impact of developments in wage bargaining. Externally, it was affected by 
factors including union mergers and escalating political change on the national 
stage.
The issue of improvement of benefits offered by the Sick Fund (SF) of the 
Cape Clothing Industrial Council (CCIC) was discussed first in the union from 
early 19X8 and then in the various fora of the 1C for a number of years before the 
formal project began. A special sub-committee of the 1C was appointed in 
December I98X to ‘examine all aspects of the Sick Fund and Provident Fund’ and 
the union (at this stage GAWIJ) presented a proposal for a replacement SF' 
agreement in May 1989 (CJAWIJ 1989). In the first two years, the sub-committee 
focused on two areas, sick pay and maternity benefits. A maternity benefit was 
introduced for the first time in January 1991 and during the 1990 wage 
negotiations, the parties agreed to change the sick leave and sick pay system in
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mid-1992." Sick pay would no longer he paid and administered by the Sick l;und, 
but directly by employers, in accordance with the Basic Conditions of Employment 
Act (No. 3 of 1983) (BCEA).
Attention now switched to medical benefits. In May 1992, the Industrial 
Council approved the Sick Fund Management Committee (SEMC) proposal to 
appoint me to investigate the restructuring of the Sick Fund.1" By proposing and 
supporting my appointment, the union was apparently moving away from an 
established informal behind-the-scenes relationship to a formal relationship which 
included the employers. In fact, it was establishing the new relationship in parallel 
rather than as a replacement: a formal relationship via the Sick Fund Management 
Committee in addition to the informal relationship, which continued and expanded 
in the course of the project. The union presented my appointment as a union 
victory, part of the process of claiming ownership and a ‘union’ character for the 
project." Throughout, I had very much more contact with the union side at all 
levels (officials, shop stewards and workers) than with employers. Other than the 
SFMC meetings (where the union was also present) and contact with individual 
manufacturers to organise interviews at their factories, the connection with 
employers was mediated through the Director of the Cape Clothing Manufacturers’ 
Association (CCMA). In the project, the union expected me to shill between the
' Members with two years’ continuous service were entitled to 25% of die weekly wage lor I t 
weeks. This was in addition to maternity pay from the Unemployment Insurance Fund (till ).
I had been working behind the scenes with Howard (iahricls, formulating the union |Milicy 
document on the Sick Fund since IdXK
" Alter my initial presentation to the SI MC, the employer parly promised an alternative 
consultant. We both made presentations to a follow up meeting. Despite a suggestion from the 
employers that their consultant he given a copy of my presentation in order ‘to orient him’ before 
another presentation, my appointment was confirmed. This background may explain both die 
union's sense of victory and the employer party's initial concern about my appointment.
roles of independent authority and union advocate, as strategically necessary and 
on demand, shifting language (between English and Afrikaans or ‘mix’) and style 
(social scientist to activist) to suit the context.12 *
The mandate for the study, as defined by the parties to the Council, was to 
investigate the viability of establishing additional clinics and extending benefits to 
members’ dependants." In a move which highlighted the context of the study, the 
SFMC asked me to delay the membership survey until agreement had been reached 
in the annual wage negotiations, fearing that the project would be ‘politicised’ by 
the conflictual atmosphere of the negotiating season.14 Background work, drawing 
on the Sick Fund data, began immediately. My formal relationship with the SFMC 
lasted through 1992, with implementation and follow-up through to the end of 
1994. The quantitative aspect of the study included:
• calculation of the number of dependants likely to enter the scheme
• mapping the distribution of membership (residence and workplace)
• establishing patterns of panel doctor usage and expenditure in different areas
• establishing optimum sites for new clinics based on all these factors
• costing clinics (set-up and running costs)
• drawing up guidelines for staffing, opening hours, facilities and equipment
12 This issue is discussed in greater detail in the methodology appendix.
1 ’ The scope of the study was consciously narrow and informed by a number of assumptions:
- the scheme would provide only primary health cure
- it would facilitate access to public sector secondary and tertiary cure and co-ordinate cure
- expansion of the panel system made neither financial nor clinic sense: it was expensive and 
quality and abuse were impossible to monitor
- a team approach to health cure, using the skills of nursing stuff more fully and appropriately, 
would be preferable to the system of over-reliance on doctors
- there was considerable scope for rationalisation in the Sick Fund.
14 The decision was made at the 1C meeting of 7 May 1992, confirmed by letter from the 
Secretary on 2 1 Muy.
Qualitative information came from an extensive membership survey, which 
established current usage of health services and attitudes towards these services, 
both in the Fund and outside (for dependants). This was fleshed out through the 
process of interaction with the union and its members at all levels, as well as with 
employers, Council and Fund staff, panel doctors and other interested parties.1'
The context influenced the design of the research and the style in which it 
was conducted. In addition to providing the data necessary to cost and plan new 
services, the quantitative aspect of the study was also designed to allay employer 
fears. Exaggerated estimates of family size fuelled concerns about an explosion in 
Fund expenditure. The source of these estimates can only be speculatively traced 
to unexpressed racial stereotypes.1'1 The sample survey did not yield substantial 
new information, particularly in relation to the time costs, but the process had 
importance beyond the data it provided, taking the issue into a wide range of 
workplaces and giving workers a chance to talk about their experience. The 
spread of interviews was also important to establish the breadth of worker support 
for the proposed changes and counter any potential claims by employers that only a 
small group of activists backed change. The most significant feature of the survey 
was that it clearly identified the project with the union: though the study was 
backed and funded by the SFMC, a joint structure, the union presented it in 
Clothes Line and in union fora as a union project. Shop stewards facilitated the 15*
15 1,107 workers (of a total of 48,348) in 86 factories (of a total of 399) were interviewed, in 
factories of all sizes throughout the area covered by the 1C (Cornell 1993).
Official concern about the threat of ‘population explosion’ amongst black South Africans 
lingered from the 1960s, when white women were urged by government to have babies ‘for South 
Africa' at the same time as ‘family planning' programs urged blacks to 'plan a smaller family for 
a bigger future'.
administration of questionnaires in the factories (though the respondents were 
identified by random selection from payroll lists). The process linked the activity 
of a previously remote structure (the SFMC) with workers on the ground. The 
survey was deliberately based on practice (‘what did you do the last time one of 
your children was sick?’) rather than being open-ended (‘what do you want?’) and 
thus avoided acting as a conduit for demands which were unlinked to costs (and 
therefore likely to be unrealistic and lead to disappointment).
A number of important changes were introduced before the Report was 
finalised. The most significant was the change to the sick pay system (and 
accompanying computer and staffing changes). Staff changes were urgently 
needed because the delay in starting the survey meant that the Report could not be 
completed before the end of 1992. The Executive Council decided not to renew 
the annual contracts of the two doctors and dentist employed by the Fund (see 
section 7 below for a discussion on the medical staff), so that new staff could be 
selected in late 1992. The SFMC also agreed to begin the process of upgrading the 
central medical clinic and dental facility, recognising the necessity of physical 
changes to assist in changing members’ attitudes towards clinic-based services.17
The formal report on the research was presented to the SFMC in January 
1993 (Cornell 1993a). This was followed by a joint workshop for employers and 
the union in March, which drew up an agreed plan for implementation. The central 
recommendations were: first, upgrading and expanding the existing medical and
17 The upgrading of the dental facility was done in response to a horrified report from the new 
dentist who found that the steriliser had rusted through, and hud clearly not been used for some 
time (Mukenete 1993).
dental clinics; and second, establishing a network of local clinics, run by Fund- 
employed staff, to provide health care for the membership, including dependants.
The second recommendation involved a shift from dependence on panel 
doctors, with Fund clinics playing a minor role in service provision, to a system 
based on direct service provision, retaining panel doctors only in areas where 
membership numbers were too low to make a Fund clinic viable.1*
The research process then entered an expansive phase in which I undertook 
new tasks on request in order to provide greater assurance of feasibility and 
affordability. The requests came from all parlies, and were indicative of the 
different concerns of the parties. The employers were concerned about cost over­
runs and the implications for their future financial liability, and about efficient 
management of medical services.1'' They asked for:
• three year budget projections, incorporating a range of options for benefits
changes and different timetables
• actuarial evaluation of the soundness of these projections
• projections of drug costs for dependant children
• proposals for a new management structure for the fund.
The union asked for numerous projections of variations in benefit design 
which would result from different budget levels, as well as costings for 
improvements in other benefits (specifically the maternity benefit introduced in 
1991). The union's requests were associated particularly with preparation for *
'* The minimum number of members in un area required to support a clinic was 2,MX). This 
allowed a small margin lor safety.
,v A repealed refrain (noted in my notes of SFMC and sub-committee meetings) as ‘We're in the 
clothing business, not the medical business' |sic|.
wage negotiations, and union strategy meetings in the course of negotiations. 
Council staff asked for advice on staffing, verification and modification of budgets, 
and (sometimes explicitly) reassurance during the process of implementing the 
changes. They were concerned about the rate and degree of change and the 
management demands of an expanded system. The new doctor in the central clinic 
asked for advice on new information systems, the development of an essential drug 
list and staff issues.
The first four new health centres (plus a new dental facility attached to one 
of them) opened on 7 April 1994, just three weeks before the first democratic 
elections in South Africa. In the three and a half years since then, developments 
have continued. At the time of writing, there arc nine health centres, three dental 
facilities, one optical facility (and another planned) and a full X-ray facility.20 The 
Fund has employed four full-time social workers and plans to expand this service. 
There are special sessions in key clinics for members with chronic illnesses, such as 
asthma and diabetes, and this system will be extended to all health centres. A 
health promotion officer has been appointed to expand this area of work, with a 
staff of clinical nurses, who arc currently being trained. A Well Women’s Centre 
was opened in early 1997. The first change in the panel doctor system was made in 
February 1997, when the contracts of all doctors in the area surrounding the 
central facility at Salt River were terminated. A joint union-employer workshop 
was held in February 1997 to decide on direction for the Fund for the next five year 
period. Among other issues, the parties agreed on a system of parental leave, in
20 Source for information on recent developments: personal communication from Ronald 
Hcrnickow, October 1997.
terms of which workers could take time off to care for sick children against their 
sick leave entitlement. Panel doctor consultations were restricted to eight per year, 
in addition to unlimited access to the Fund’s health centres. The Fund has bought 
an entire factory complex behind the union building for development as a major 
health facility. This will be the central facility, to which the satellite clinics will 
refer patients for specialised tests and services. Despite all these expenses, the 
Fund has healthy reserves. The Dependants’ Fund is invested for long term 
development and drawn on only for capital expansion, all running expenses being 
met from contribution income. The Health Fund (as it has been renamed) is, in 
short, thoroughly healthy.
4. Relationships
Trade unionism is essentially concerned with relationships: transforming a 
union involves re-defining and restructuring these relationships. This section 
focuses on an analysis of the complex and shifting web of relationships around the 
issue of health care provision for union members. Health care provision is an 
unusual issue for trade union bargaining agendas (see chapter 3 for discussion) and 
it brings into the labour-employer-state equation additional interest groups, who 
may potentially disturb the balance, despite their avowed professional neutrality.
All the parties bring their own agendas to their involvement in health, with
sometimes clashing effect.
Relations between leaders
The project of restructuring the Sick Fund was both an example of the new 
style of unionism and leadership and part of the way in which the new style was 
created. Relationships between leaders were particularly complex in the early 
stages of the project (1988-1989). The interim GAWU leaders were insecure and 
suspicious of the motives of the new entrants. They were particularly uncertain 
about challenging the worth of a core benefit. The first hurdle faced by the 
research officer was to persuade the general secretary that this was a legitimate 
issue and not due to the intervention of ‘outsiders’. There was an organisational 
imperative to this early process, given the merger with GWIU (Natal) and the 
secretariat’s intention of merging the Funds of the two ICs. The new entrants had 
to prove their capability by providing workable plans for reworking the Sick Fund, 
without overtly threatening their ‘seniors’.
The late 1980s was a time of realignment in the clothing and textile sector, 
culminating in the merger which formed SACTWU in 1989. By this stage, few of 
the old guard remained and the Young Turk entryists had taken control of the 
Cape Town branch: indeed, one of them (Lionel October) was elected first General 
Secretary of SACTWU at the founding congress. The next organisational challenge 
was to incorporate the new group of organisers and officials from the textile and 
leather sectors into the Cape Town office and develop a coherent regional identity 
and a relationship to the other regions and the national union. The union devoted 
considerable energy in the years following the merger to attempts to centralise 
bargaining: the leather sector already had a national Industrial Council; in the
textile sector bargaining was done at company or plant level; clothing was 
organised in four regional councils.
The Sick Fund project had a relationship with these developments. Union 
strategists wanted to create uniform conditions in the four clothing councils, 
bringing wages and benefits to equal levels. The Cape Sick Fund project was a 
flagship development, which union leaders saw as a model to be introduced into 
the other regions, first Natal, then the Transvaal and finally the Eastern Cape.
They envisaged similar developments occurring in parallel in the leather and textile 
sectors and ultimately a merger of the three into one giant Sick Fund.31
Relations with members
For the new leaders, the project was one of the routes by which they 
developed and established a new kind of relationship with the members, 
differentiating themselves from the remote leadership of the past. They were in the 
process of developing shop steward and local structures, into which the project 
was linked. These new structures were crucial as fora in which workers from 
different factories met for the first time, in the process creating horizontal networks 
and relationships, as well as vertical connections between members at the 
workplace and union leaders.
21 The Feather and Natal Clothing Sick Funds arc the subjects of the next two chapters. A 
proposal to revamp the clothing Sick Fund in the Transvaal did not progress beyond the level of 
discussion. I advised on a number of textile company medical aid and medical benefit projects 
around the country, and did a small project on the Cotton Textile Sick Fund in the Cape (Cornell 
1495). I also advised in an ongoing problem with medical aid in the clothing industry in the 
Eastern Cape, the only region without an 1C Fund. All these projects fed into SACTWII 
discussions about policy and strategy on worker health care.
The leaders also had to look at the existing structures in which the union 
was involved, such as the Sick Fund Management Committee (SFMC). The 
balance of continuity and innovation in structures like this is a delicate one. On the 
one hand, there is a need for continuity, but on the other hand, a danger of 
entrenchment and a need to spread skills and exposure amongst workers. 
Representation on the SFMC was strengthened by the appointment of several of 
the new officials, but the existing worker representatives were retained. They were 
highly respected elderly workers, who had served for many years on the committee 
and were strongly identified with the Sick Fund. Their support for the changes was 
vital in the process of garnering broader membership support. The SFMC was 
linked to the new Shop Stewards’ Council meetings, at which SFMC 
representatives spoke regularly about the progress of the project and gave the 
stamp of their approval to the process, to the new officials’ action on the Sick 
Fund, and to me. The continuity of representation on the management committee 
was a key factor in the success of the project.
Relations between the union and employers
Formal structures existed for the primary external relationships involved in 
the Sick Fund: between the union and the employers, and between the union and 
Industrial Council staff. The challenge was to transform these relationships and to 
explore and exploit the powers of the structures. Employers and union had equal 
representation on all Council structures: the Industrial Council itself, its committees 
for the Sick Fund and Provident Fund, and all sub-committees and ad hoc 
committees. The main employer representative on all structures was the full-time
Director of the Cape Clothing Manufacturers’ Association (not himself a clothing 
employer). The rest of the employer party would consist of individuals from the 
industry, potentially including those affiliated to the smaller Garment 
Manufacturers’ Association (GMA).2! As a full-timer, the CCMA Director was 
more extensively involved in Council business than individual employers. He 
reported back to CCMA structures, was mandated by them and served as the main 
liaison with employers in this project.
Relations between union and employers in the SFMC had clearly shifted 
over time, as the union became more assertive and active. The SFMC was a sub­
committee of the Industrial Council, tasked with the management of the Fund, but 
required to refer all substantive changes for ratification by the IC. Decision­
making was generally on a consensus basis and there was an established format for 
meetings, which usually proceeded in a routine fashion. The consensual mode fell 
away at certain key moments, sometimes related to internal Sick Fund issues and 
sometimes infected by more general tensions, especially during the negotiation 
season.* 21 This was largely unproblematic, other than when it reinforced entrenched 
positions, but it did tend to result in delays. Times of tension were characterised 
by formality, with committee members speaking through the Chair and addressing
22 CCMA membership comprised 34% of factories but 74% of employees. The GMA, many of 
whose members were owners of extremely marginal 'cut-make-trim' establishments, played little 
part in the SFMC and maintained a resentful attitude towards the union, the IC and the CCMA 
(Thcron 1993). ‘We believe that the executive of the CCMA have sold the industry down the 
river for a number of years.’ (CiMA Newsletter September 1989) The only unco-operative 
employers in the membership survey were GMA members.
21 This was generally recognised, sometimes with humour, when one side or the other would 
reassure me outside the meeting that they were merely engaged in a bit of sabre-rattling. The 
SFMC continued to operate throughout the period of this project, even in periods of industrial 
dispute.
each other hy title, compared with the rather more conversational mode of relaxed 
periods, when there was also a greater acceptance of informal contact.24
Relations between the union and Sick Fund stall'
As the union and the Council were situated in the same building, informal 
contact between union and Council staff was easy and frequent. The shared 
location was one of the main sources of member confusion about the source of 
their benefits. They came to the same building to see the union and to collect sick 
pay or visit the Sick Fund clinic. It was extremely easy to confuse the functions of 
the Council and the union and this confusion was frequently evident in the sample 
survey interviews.2' The union’s relationship to the Council as landlord and 
neighbour was a recurrent source of irritation to the employer party. Employers 
co-fund the Council and thus pay half the rent and half the salary bill for Council 
staff: the union gets the rent and by virtue of proximity, enjoys easy access to 
Council staff and resources. Over the years of my involvement, employer 
annoyance at this situation was a regular theme. It reached a peak in I W(t over the 
question of moving the Salt River clinic. The chief medical officer argued strongly 
that the clinic should move out of Industria House into a new building to be bought 
by the Dependant’s Fund as an investment. The employers supported this move, 
arguing that it would be beneficial for the clinic, which could be purpose built from 
scratch, allowing room for expansion and easier access for members. The union
24 For example, I might he given a task which required some response. At a relaxed time, 
follow-up could he ratified hy a phone call to the Secretary of the t't'M A  and another to the union 
official responsible, rather than referral hack to the SFM('.
2 For example, a number of workers used the terms ‘unitin’ and ‘council’ interchangeably, 
saying they were members of the council and collected their sick pay from the union.
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had originally agreed to this proposal but backtracked and, despite employer 
opposition, managed to substitute a move inside the building for a move away,’'’ 
(See Section 7 below for a discussion of the tension with the doctor.)
5. Bargaining and bilateral relationships
One of the central questions arising out of this study is why the union chose 
to retain the issue of health care within a bilateral structure, and in a bargaining 
context. The choice was implicit: there was never a debate on the issue of the 
alternative of cutting loose and taking the Sick Fund under union control. It is 
understandable why they first took the issue up as they did: the structures were 
there, the management structure of the SFMC and IC, and the benefit and 
contribution structure of the Fund, with reserves, administrative routines and legal 
status. The reasons why health care remained a bargaining issue are more 
complex.
The management structure of the Sick Fund, like all Industrial Council 
structures, has equal representation of employers and workers, five from each side. 
On the face of it, this relates simply to the bilateral financing of the Fund but this is 
misleading, given the way in which bargaining is now conducted. In the past, 
increases were agreed by the parties on the basis of budgets prepared by the Sick
2,1 In interview, the union oftlciuls involved confirmed that the positions taken were political 
rather than practical: employers wanted a relative separation between the Sick Fund and the 
union, to assert their own involvement and share in the credit for the Fund's advances; the doctor 
wanted an independent base in order to reduce union governance of the scheme; the union wanted 
to retain the clinic - the nerve centre of the Fund - within reach and was strongly opposed to a 
move which would dilute union influence. (Interview with union officials conducted hy author. .11 
January IW7, Cape Town.)
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Fund Secretary and without reference to the wage bargaining process. There was 
a pattern of annual increases, always equally split between employer and worker, 
and generally uncontentious. Three factors undermined this practice: first, wage 
bargaining shifted to a global basis; second, the research report recommendations 
required a fundamental restructuring of benefits and contributions, in place of the 
incremental increases of the past; third, the introduction of dependant cover broke 
the pattern of equal contributions.
Global wage bargaining takes all wage and benefit-related costs into 
account. The parties come to a package agreement and the union then has some 
latitude to decide how to divide the increase between the cash wage and various 
benefits. This style of bargaining highlights the fact that employer contributions 
towards benefits are part of their overall wage bill. By extension, there is no 
reason why the union should not manage these benefits without the involvement of 
employers. In the CCIC, there were strong grounds for this argument: the fact that 
Fund no longer covered sick leave and sick pay (which had unavoidable links with 
the employer) and the structure of dependant contributions. The ‘employer 
contribution’ was kept at the single member level, because of the difficulty of 
factoring differential contributions into wage bargaining and employer budgeting. 
The costs of dependant cover were thus met entirely by the workers involved and 
the symmetry of ‘employer’ and ‘worker’ contributions was broken.
I would argue that keeping health care on the bargaining agenda retained 
the ‘union’ character of the issue. Bargaining is a constant balancing act: weighing 
demands against each other and adjusting them in the light of advances and
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rclrcuts. Il involves an acceptance of the relativity of the concept of ‘needs’ in 
health. Union membership is not homogeneous: in order to take up an issue like 
health care successfully, a union has to create (and continually re-create) sufficient 
consensus amongst various groups. It has to balance the competing voices and 
claims of old and young, men and women, sick and healthy, the childless and those 
with children. The more transparent the process becomes, the more visible are the 
cross-subsidies and the price of solidarity. Trade union members are accustomed 
to the concept and practice of compromise in relation to bargained issues: keeping 
health care in this context reined in unrealistic expectations. The involvement of 
the employer party rationalised a slower pace of development than members might 
have demanded had the union had sole control of the Fund. The employers acted 
as the brakes, tempering the extent and pace of change. The union had a strong 
sense that employers should accept responsibility for the health of workers and 
their families, especially where the stale had abdicated this responsibility. The llip 
side of responsibility was that the bilateral structure of the Fund allowed them to 
assume part of the credit for the advances made in health care benefits.
The structural character of the issue was reinforced by external factors. 
When I first had contact with the union, it was unalTiliatcd and regional. The 
merger and the affiliation to COSATU happened in the course of the project and 
did not shift the focus. By the early 1990s, though unions were being drawn into 
joint fora on a range of issues from economic development to the restructuring of 
local government, health tended to be low on most unions' agendas, particularly in 
the newer COSATU unions, most of whose members had no form of health care
cover. Health fora, whether political (such as ANC health department meetings) or 
general (such as the Cape Metropolitan Health Forum - which drew members from 
all ‘constituencies’) tended not to draw in unions. As a result, the policies which 
began to emerge from these fora were notably lacking in insight on labour. 
Generally speaking, there was some consensus that the state’s responsibility was 
for the unemployed and indigent, and that the employed should find (and fund) 
their own health care (by implication in the private sector). The largest part of the 
employed workforce, the working poor, was effectively overlooked. At this stage, 
COSATU had no formal policy on health care, which was generally regarded as an 
affiliate issue and dealt with largely on a fire-fighting basis.
There was no impetus or support from the federation to take the issue to 
other levels by collaborating with other unions, or engaging jointly with 
government. It remained an internal SACTWU issue. The union engaged with the 
state, but at a local level and strategically, in order to secure a crucial concession 
for the Cape Sick Fund. After the union merger, SACTWU used the project in the 
Cape in the process of working towards a single bargaining structure for the 
clothing industry.
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6. Breaking the connection between sick pay and health care
One of the most signifieant bases for the success of the CCIC project was 
breaking the connection between sick pay and medical benefits, by changing over 
to statutory sick pay. This was crucial in terms of opening up development: in 
1991,43% of Fund expenditure was on sick pay.27 This was (he single largest 
expense, at R8.5m compared with R7.4m on panel doctors, only R1,6m on the new 
maternity benefit (introduced mid-year) and R1.5m on the two clinics, including 
dental and optical services. Switching systems released substantial resources for 
development of benefits without significant increases in contributions. Sick leave 
(‘absenteeism’ in management terminology) is a source of conflict in all industrial 
relations systems. Administration of sick leave by the Industrial Council brought 
this conflict from the workplace to the joint forum. Statistics were centrally 
collected and monitored and the issue of ‘abuse’ was a constant theme at SFMC 
meetings, with complaints from and against all parties: doctors, members, 
employers and Sick Fund staff.
The shift to statutory sick pay was not easily accomplished, as there were 
concerns from all sides. Many workers strongly believed that they were better off 
under the Fund’s sick pay dispensation, a recurrent refrain of the old union. The 
Fund entitled them to 40 days sick leave at 65% of wages, with no payment for one
27 Information drawn from financial statements, Sick Fund of the CCIC, 1991.
or two day illnesses. The impression that this was a better deal than that offered by 
the statutory system did not hold up under examination: 211
• the Sick Fund was contributory and so workers were collectively paying half 
their own sick pay (the statutory system was non-contributory for workers, 
employers carrying the whole cost)
• the average annual use of sick leave in the industry was 4.7 days, 5 1 % of 
members made no claim at all and 30% used more than 10 days* 2''
• all workers off sick lost wages under the Fund: those off for one or two days 
lost 100%, the rest 35% (only workers off for more than 10 days lost wages 
under the statutory system)
• statutory sick leave worked on a three year cycle, with unused days 
transferred to the next year, the Sick Fund on an annual basis (unused days were 
‘lost’).
Worker unease about the change was sharpened by the project’s intention 
to shift away from panel doctors: there were fears that doctors employed by the 
Fund would be more receptive to employer influence than panel doctors (for whom 
the Fund was only part of their practice) and therefore less sympathetic to workers 
on the sick leave issue. This was and remains a delicate area for Fund doctors, 
who have to establish trust with patients without compromising their professional 
standards. The problem was somewhat eased by the fact that initially the new 
clinics dealt mostly with children, who did not need certificates for absence from
2" The argument seems to have been based on simple arilhmelhic as follows: 40 days at 65% 
equals 26 days pay, compared with the It) days at lull pay allowed by the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act.
2'' The figures refer to I9HH and are drawn Iroin Sick pay - special hardship fund, a report 
prepared by the author for a (iAWU shop stewards’ meeting, 4 April I9H9, Cape Town.
126
school. This removed Ihc source of conflict and allowed parents to build up 
relationships of trust with the service on the basis of the quality of service provided 
for their children.
Employers were extremely concerned about the change, their fear of an 
escalation in sick leave illuminating the role played by the Fund’s system in the past 
in holding down claims by penalising workers. Rough calculations of employer 
savings over the previous decade hardened union resolve and were used in 
negotiations to counter employer claims about the potential cost of the 
changeover.'" There was, however, dissent inside the union leadership about the 
change. Lionel October, General Secretary and later Cape Regional Secretary of 
SACTWU, argued powerfully against the change on the grounds that the current 
system brought workers to Industria House to collect their sick pay from the 
Council, incidentally exposing non-active members to the union and associating the 
union with a monetary benefit. Changing to BCEA sick leave conditions would 
mean that workers received their sick pay in their wage packet from the employer: 
this would break the connection with the union. Other officials argued that the 
connection with the union was a negative one, as workers had to travel (costing 
time and money) to collect often negligible amounts. (It was also not universal, as 
some factories arranged to collect the sick pay for their workers.)
Though the demand was tabled, the current of disagreement inside the 
leadership remained. Ironically, this turned out to the advantage of the Fund in the
My rough calculation, prepared for the negotiations in 1992, was that the employers hail 
saved nearly R36 million in the eight years from I9H2-1991. (f  igures for 19X6 were not 
available.)
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long-term. 1992 was a difficult year for negotiations as SACTWU and other major 
unions struggled to keep pace with inflation and to stave off retrenchments (SALB 
1992a; 1992b; Keel 1993). The influence of the two lines of argument can be seen 
in the agreement reached about sick pay that year: the union conceded a year’s 
delay in implementation of the changeover, but exacted in return an extra weekly 
contribution from employers to a dedicated fund for dependant cover. The 
Dependants’ Fund (DF), as it became known, was crucial to the success of the 
process. At the end of the agreed year (mid-1993), it had reached some R9 
million.11 There was some disagreement between the parties about the purpose of 
the DF: employers insisting that it was to be used only for capital expenditure, the 
union insisting that it had a broader purpose, including subsidising running 
expenses if necessary. In the event, its main purpose was political: it became a 
source of security and as such a weapon for the union in pushing through changes 
which inevitably had some incalculable effects. Despite actuarial checking of the 
projected three year budgets, projections on the drug costs for dependant children, 
the drug deal with the State health authorities (described below), and the constant 
checking and updating of budgets, the employers were still extremely nervous 
about a rush on facilities, uncontrollable utilisation and consequent cost overruns. 
Without the DF, implementation would have been even slower.
There was a down side to the sick pay switch: administration of sick pay at 
the workplace level opened the door to a degree of manipulation by individual 
employers, no longer subject to centralised control. There were reports of some
11 Though contributions ceased after the agreed one year period, the DF grew to a high point of 
K2I million by investment, reduced by capital expenditure to approximately K12 million by the 
end of 1996.
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employers who refused to comply wiili certain of the conditions of statutory sick 
pay, specilleally the clause which allows one or two day uncertiHeated illnesses. 
Workers anxious about disciplinary action and fearful of being marked for future 
redundancies tended to play safe and obtain certificates for all absences.1' There is 
also no doubt that the process of planning major changes in a joint working group 
was made more difficult by the disruption caused by the early period of the change 
to statutory sick pay and attendant employer resentment and unease.
7. Dealing with doctors
Doctors on the panel
In the past, the parlies to the Sick fund had had little occasion to engage 
with medical professionals. The panel doctors interacted with the Sick fund 
largely through the Assistant Secretary, as did the medical staff employed in the 
two fund clinics. The fund contracted with doctors in most ol the areas where 
members lived and worked. These contracts were administered by Council stall, 
who processed accounts from the doctors and produced statistics for the SI MC."
I he panel doctors had a liaison committee which occasionally met with the 
Assistant Secretary and several nominated SI MC members to discuss problems, 
requests for fee increases from Ihe doctors, and for co operation m cost 
containment from Ihe fund. The committee expressed considerable concern about
The si at u lory system did mil require medical cerlilieales tor one 01 Iwn day illnesses. In 
I henry, Itiis should have lesulled ill a rediielion ol ( ip consultations lot minor ailments (and non 
illness relaled absence).
" «online statistics mi luded a hicakdown ot consultations, ding costs and sick leave practices, 
indicating averages and exceptions. These figures were included m die monthly agenda pack loi 
the SI M<'
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the project and its potential impact on their practices and income." Despite 
repeated complaints about the level of the contract fees, many panel doctors 
depended on the Fund as a reliable source of income, given its fairly rapid payment 
record, unlike account patients and many medical aid schemes." A number of 
panel doctors, particularly in factory areas, made very substantial incomes from the 
Fund.1'’ They were paid a fixed rate per consultation and an agreed price for 
medicines prescribed.14 *7 Payments to panel doctors were the largest Fund expense 
after sick pay. The average cost per consultation was 75% higher than at the Salt 
River clinic, despite the fact that the clinic had a higher than average proportion of 
chronic patients, who generally require more expensive medication (Cornell 1993a,
.5).
While the cost of care under the panel doctor system was easy to calculate, 
quality was extremely difficult to monitor or assess, particularly with a large panel. 
It is clear from the range in medicine costs that prescribing practices varied widely, 
as did practices relating to sick leave given."1 These are crude indicators: more 
accurate measures of quality of care, such as thoroughness of history-taking and 
examination, accuracy of diagnosis, appropriateness of treatment, time spent per
14 I outlined my research and employer and union representatives stonewalled suggestions from 
the panel doctors that they should he involved. This was the extent of my formal contact with 
panel doctors.
"  Panel doctors generally had mixed practices, with cash practices and medical aid (account) 
patients alongside their Sick Fund patients.
In October IW2, the account lor a panel doctor near the Salt Kiver clinic was K44.000, more 
than hull us much again us the monthly running costs for the clinic. A machinist's monthly wage 
was less than R900.
17 The refund for drugs prescribed was set at the wholesale price, plus 15%. The profit margin 
was greater, given the range of discounts available to dispensing doctors.
In October 1992, medicine costs runged from K4 to K .31.30 per consultation (Cornell 199.3, 3).
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patient, and advice given are difficult to apply in most circumstances, and 
practically impossible with a panel as large and widespread as the CCIC one.
The fee for service system under which the panel operated tends inevitably 
towards a curative model of health care and over-servicing. It amounts to a 
disincentive to doctors to practice promotive or preventive health care or to 
contain costs. The end result was that the Fund was caught in a cycle of escalating 
expenditure without satisfying either providers or users to a significant degree. In 
the course of the project, the Senior Medical Officer (SMO) changed the payment 
system for panel doctors to an all-in system (combining consultation and drugs in a 
set fee), requiring doctors to provide diagnostic and prescribing information in 
return for a fee pitched high enough to cover almost all consultations. There was 
some resistance to the administration involved in providing this information, which 
was now de-linked from payment for the drugs.
The most contentious issue relating to the panel doctors was sick leave. 
Before the change in sick pay system, the benefit structure of the Fund, with its 
requirement of a medical certificate for all absences from work (even periods of 
one or two days, which were unpaid), had direct industrial relations implications. 
Employers had an interest in the panel doctors in terms of how much sick leave 
they gave: patterns were regularly reported to the SFMC and doctors perceived as 
out of line were warned and asked to justify their habits. Members equally 
classified panel doctors in terms of their sympathy or otherwise on the sick leave 
issue, though there were also complaints about doctors who assumed that all 
workers wanted was certificates. (See discussion in Section 6.)
D o cto rs  in  th e  clinics
The relationship with doctors employed by the Fund was entirely different. 
Though the two doctors and the dentist had clinical independence, their scope of 
practice was restricted by the equipment provided and the limited drug stocks. 
When (he project began, all three were in their seventies and had been recruited 
specifically because it was cheaper to employ semi-retired doctors on one year 
contracts. Their status translated into a semi-detached altitude towards their jobs, 
in that they did not challenge or question the restrictions under which they 
practised and were generally disengaged from management issues. Though this 
situation had contributed to a membership sense of second-rate service, it hail at 
least one positive spin-off: it was easy to replace the doctors by simply informing 
them that their contracts would not be renewed.
The replacement of the clinic medical staff was a significant moment. 
Despite problems with the panel doctors, utilisation patterns indicated that 
members preferred them to the clinics. The reasons for this preference were 
complex and varied. At the simplest level the clinic hours were restrictive and their 
location less convenient.1'' More significantly, during the survey workers with 
experience of the clinics often became uncomfortable when asked whether they 
were satisfied with the service. It was clear that many perceived the clinics as 
unfriendly, with reservations about the quality of care and the doctor-patient 
interactions. In Atlantis, workers had no choice, as there were no panel doctors.
w The Sail River clinic kepi ‘office’ hours, closing before factories in Ihe vicinity. Workers had 
lo clock oul to visit the clinic, losing pay in the process.
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and this emerged as a source of grievance.4" Given this level of disaffection, it was 
important that the clinics were visibly reworked early in the project, in order to 
send a signal to members that the new system would not mean merely more of the 
same. The appointment of the new staff heralded the changes that were to come, 
as this was the first time that the parties to the Sf-'MC were involved in the 
selection process. It was a new experience for all those involved: for workers, 
union officials and employers to interview medical professionals, and for the 
professionals to face non-medical people, rather than the familiar medical 
hierarchy. From the Fund side, the focus was not on clinical competence (which 
was taken on trust on the basis of qualifications, experience and references) but on 
attitude, motivation and ability to cope with practising medicine in an industrial 
relations context. The selection committee shied away from an explicit affirmative 
action approach, but selected one coloured doctor and one white doctor (both 
men) and an African woman dentist. All three were young.
The new doctors and dentist took up their appointments in January 1993, 
just prior to the presentation of the research Report. They were thus in on the 
process of consideration and implementation from the start, though they had not 
been involved in the research. Their presence signalled the changes that were to 
come and paved the way for the shift in members’ attitudes towards the clinics 
which would he vital to rebuilding and extending the system. Within a week, a 
change in language indicated the beginnings of this shift: members were overheard 
on their way from the clinic talking about ‘our’ clinic, rather than ’the’ clinic, as in
4" The Fund hud hud persistent difficulty in persuading doctors in Alluntis to join the panel. The 
remoteness of the area and an under-supply of doctors combined to give them monopoly power.
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the past. There was a great deal of curiosity about the new staff, evidenced by an 
increase in the rate of consultation at the clinics. Their youth was widely 
interpreted as a positive sign, even by older members.
The new medical staff started operating in a very difficult situation. They 
had all joined the Fund with a commitment to practising within a ‘progressive 
primary health care’ approach (sec chapter 3). However, though major change of 
the system was in the air, for the first year their jobs were largely unchanged. Only 
the medical staff were replaced. Nursing and auxiliary staff were retained, their 
routines and relationships shaped by the old doctors and also significantly by the 
Assistant Secretary of the Sick Fund, their interface with their ‘employers’, the 
parties to the Council. They had mixed responses to the changes in the air, on the 
one hand concerned about job security and changes to their working conditions, on 
the other pleased about the upgrading of facilities and consequent shift in status 
and in members’ attitudes towards the service. The new staff had first to prove 
themselves and then to try to rework the relationships and habits of the past.
Medical management
As 1993 wore on and plans for the first phase of new clinics advanced, the 
problem of medical management became more acute. The employer party was 
concerned about capacity within the existing Sick Fund to manage an enlarged 
structure of six clinics instead of two, plus the influx of new (dependant) members. 
The existing employment structure of the Industrial Council was ill-suited to 
incorporate a large group of medical professionals. Doctors arc not accustomed to
13 4
being managed by non-doctors. And non-doctors, in this case the SFMC, were 
uneasy at the prospect of asserting authority over doctors. Their response was to 
delegate the medical management to a doctor. The first appointment was the 
young doctor who had joined to run the Salt River clinic (though the employer 
party had initially insisted that the Fund needed someone more high-powered, ‘an 
MBA-type doctor’). The first wave of new clinics increased the medical staff by 
four doctors, a dentist, an oral hygienist and four nurses, all appointed by selection 
committees consisting of employer and union representatives, plus the Senior 
Medical Officer (SMO) and myself.
Even before his formal appointment, the SMO had gradually been drawn 
into the project, initially informally and later via attendance at SFMC meetings. 
When he took on the position, he worked in concert with the Assistant Secretary, 
gradually broadening his role in the period leading up to the Assistant Secretary’s 
retirement. Fie had had some previous union exposure as a shop steward in the 
health services union while he was working in a public sector hospital. His position 
was complex: on the one hand, he was in a management position in relation to 
health staff (which was new to him and took some adjustment); on the other hand, 
he himself was answerable to a management committee, one of whose parties was 
a trade union. His management responsibilities expanded dramatically with the 
establishment of the four new clinics in 1994. New staff were appointed, on 
slightly different conditions of service, specifically greater flexibility in working 
hours, so that the clinics could be open for longer hours, to facilitate access. This 
gave rise to uncase among old nursing and auxiliary staff, who were anxious about 
the prospect of changes in their working conditions. Worker confidence and sense
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of ownership of the new system sometimes translated into rudeness to staff along 
the lines of ‘I pay your salary, you do what I want’.41 This sense of entitlement 
also resulted in some resistance to treatment by a nurse (interpreted as ‘second 
class’ care) and insistence on seeing a doctor. This was predictable enough, given 
the conventional medical hierarchy. (It also underlines the difficulty ahead of the 
Department of Health in implementing a system of nurse-based primary health 
care.) Many of (he staff found this form of patient power both personally and 
professionally hard to swallow, particularly as they battled with the teething 
problems of new facilities and an inllux of patients and consequently the SMO was 
extensively involved in fire-fighting activities in the early days. A proposal that 
clinic-based committees be established to deal with problems rapidly and directly, 
was pul to the SFMC and stalled there. The employers were clearly concerned to 
maintain control in a centralised structure, the SFMC', aside from the powers 
delegated to the SMO, who was answerable to the SFMC’. 41
In retrospect, the medical staff should have been incorporated into the 
project more centrally. In particular, there was a real need to develop a way for 
them to interact directly with the SFMC', rather than through the Assistant 
Secretary. Dealing with staff issues with elderly semi-retired doctors grateful for a 
little undemanding part-time employment had not prepared him for young, 
energetic and assertive doctors, lie began to refer issues to the Industrial Council 
Stal ling Committee, which coped little belter. Part of the problem arose from the
" A Working (¡roup meeting was called for 3 June 1994 to discuss die ‘crisis’ in the Health 
Centres. ‘Iliis included ‘verbal abuse of stall members' (Agenda document SFMC' 3 June 1994) 
41 The issue crops up again in the minutes of meetings in 1996, this time with more explicit 
opposition from employers who warn against the creation ol 'autonomous policy-making bodies 
at the local level' (Sick Fund Management Committee minutes. October 1996).
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fact that the Assistant Secretary was close to retirement and though he wanted to 
stay on, his unpopularity with all parties was such that his request was refused, 
though his powers and duties were left intact until his retirement. Though he had 
no power to stop the changes, he had the capacity to stall them or generally make 
life difficult for the doctors and for me. I saw evidence of this in his treatment of 
the Atlantis doctor, whom he classified as a ‘trouble-maker’."
From the point of view of the parties to the SFMC, the Assistant Secretary 
had a job to do which he might as well do up to the time of his retirement, given 
that he was generally recognised as doing it reasonably efficiently, if 
unimaginatively and in an authoritarian style. He was not so much managing the 
Sick Fund as documenting it, producing statistics and monitoring expenditure, but 
without a planning perspective. I had to develop a reasonable working relationship 
with him, because of his position and the information he controlled. Had he chosen 
to be obstructive, I could have forced him to provide information (given that the 
information was ‘owned’ by the parties and not by the functionaries who generated 
and managed it), but this kind of combativeness would have been fraught and time- 
consuming. From the point of view of the new doctors, he was a more powerful 
figure, whose relations with them were sometimes coloured by resentment and 
frustration arising from his own situation.
The SMC) stayed with the Fund until the end of l‘)‘)4, at which stage he 
resigned to study public health. I lis replacement came from a management job in a 
local state hospital. A change in style was immediately obvious - he changed the
"  lie routinely deterred requests lor minor improvements to the Atlantis clinic (without referring 
these to the SFMC) while the Salt River premises went through a major face-lilt, which was 
motivated to the Sf’MC and passed without opposition.
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job title to ‘Medical Director’ and introduced a more elaborated medical hierarchy, 
with a new tier of Senior Medical Officers.
Expansion was slower under the new Medical Director, who concentrated 
on developing systems and protocols and upgrading services and opened only one- 
new clinic in the following two years. The professionalising of the service was 
starkly obvious to me in one incident. I was invited to the formal opening of a 
clinic (more accurately re-opening, as this was not a new clinic, but a move of 
premises). The new premises were startlingly more elaborate than the original 
ones, with a large staff. The event was sponsored by a drug company. The 
provincial minister of Health had been invited to open the clinic and there was a 
sizeable crowd present. However, when I looked around, I realised that the crowd 
consisted of equipment and drug suppliers, panel doctors and employers. There 
was only one trade unionist there - the event had been scheduled for a time when 
the union was involved in a major conference, long-planned. This indicated at best 
a lack of care, at worst a disregard for the union’s investment - both financial and 
political - in the scheme.44
His relationships with the union, and to some extent the employers, were 
marked by tension. A number of incidents reinforced an image of high-handedness 
and personal ambition, according to union informants.* 4' In one, he set up a 
separate account, to which he routed certain discounts from pharmaceutical 
suppliers. He then dispensed these funds on a discretionary basis for ‘staff
44 I incline towards the latter view, given the medical director's statement to me on another 
occasion that the union hud ‘done nothing lor the fund' and that he found it best to work with the 
employers, because ‘democracy is so slow'.
4’ These accounts are confirmed hy SI-'MC minutes.
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development’ (for example, conference attendance). This was done without 
discussion with the SFMC. Both parties were angry at this action and he was 
ordered to close the account. More disturbing was the trend towards high 
investment in existing facilities, rather than increasing access by developing new 
facilities in residential areas. This investment included both more elaborate 
equipment than envisaged in the first phase of implementation, in which the stress 
was to be on access to simple facilities, appropriately equipped and attractively 
furnished. In the new Medical Director’s time, a number of the existing clinics 
were moved and upgraded at great expense. According to union officials, the re­
decoration of his own offices in Salt River was particularly lavish.4* He has since 
been dismissed by the Sick Fund and Dr Morar, the Senior Medical Officer 
appointed during the research project (who left to study further) has been re­
appointed with effect from November 1997.
The experience of the two different medical managers illustrates the tension 
between efficiency and loss of control, the difficulty of incorporating medical 
professionals into a non-medical structure and the need for continued vigilance to 
ensure that the agenda for change is not hijacked by sectional professional interests 
within the Fund. Specifically, it underlines the importance of continuity and 
commitment on the part of the union representatives on the SFMC.
4,1 According to union informants, this was done without (he approvul of the SFMC. (Interview 
with union officials conducted by author, 31 January 1997, Cape Town.)
8. Assessment
The deep roots and slow development of this projeet strengthened it and 
were erueial to its sueecss. The central idea survived the battering of the wage 
bargaining system over a number of years, holding its own against competing 
demands and beeoming embedded in member consciousness in the process. The 
slowness of the process tested the commitment of officials and worker leaders and 
associated their credibility with a successful outcome. Schemes like this one 
cannot be selected off the peg and implemented according to a blueprint: their 
design is fundamentally rooted in relationships specific to the parties and also 
dynamic, shifting and developing in response to the economic and political context. 
The process is political as much as technical.
Management of change was relatively straightforward in this l;und, 
primarily because the change was associated with an expansion of benefit, a new 
style for a new benefit. Dependants, brought in for the first time, were to be 
treated only in the fund’s own facilities and were not given access to the panel 
doctor system. The Fund had neither to force, nor to coax, primary members away 
from the panel doctors and into the clinic system at this stage: indeed, it was 
impossible to accommodate them in the clinics, given problems of capacity in the 
first phase. In addition, though the union made a policy decision that family 
membership would be compulsory for all with dependants (unless they were 
covered by a spouse’s medical aid scheme), there was a tacit agreement not to 
enforce this policy. This avoided resentment about coercion and gave the new
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clinics a breathing space. This was facilitated by the way in which budgets had 
been formulated, allowing for different levels of family membership, and by the 
existence of the Dependants’ Fund: though never actually used to cover income 
deficits, it served a stabilising purpose. In (he event, family membership took off 
rapidly and instead of coercing members into (he system, the union had to issue a 
plea to members to stay away from the clinics and give precedence to dependants, 
until the next phase of expansion.47
The irony of this project was that its success was rooted in the apartheid 
era. The groundwork of the Cape project was done well before the change of 
government. The first wave of new health centres opened just three weeks before 
the election. The timing significantly affected the progress of the project.
First, it was conceived at a time when workers could expect little in terms 
of social security from a stale apparently determined to shift both responsibility and 
provision as much as possible onto the private sector. This concentrated the mind. 
Instead of pursuing the issue at political levels, responsibility devolved onto the 
union, and as a consequence workers had greater influence in the design of their 
health care system, at least at a primary care level, than they would have laid as 
citizens.
Second, though in the late 1980s and especially the early 1990s, the union 
was faced with an unsympathetic slate in general terms, the monolith was 
beginning to crack, t he unbanning ol political organisations and the release of 
political prisoners set in motion an extended process of negotiation and
47 Hy the end ol IWft, 25% ol all consultations at health centres were lor principal members.
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constitutional talks. Also, there had been some changes in crucial sections of the 
state health bureaucracy, particularly at regional level. The CCIC Sick Fund 
benefited from its provincial basis to negotiate a breakthrough deal with the then 
Department of National Health (DNH) local office, allowing access to drugs for 
chronic conditions from state clinics at extremely low rates. The Fund had a 
bargaining chip in the imminent extension of cover to dependants, which would 
relieve the state health system of responsibility for primary care for some 100,(X)0 
people. The deal was also facilitated by the sympathetic interest of the Deputy 
Director of the DNH, who had a long history of association with progressive trade 
unions.4* Since the change in government, the Sick Fund has interacted with a 
provincial Department of Health which is both interested and sympathetic, but 
restricted by a shrinking budget from giving practical expression to this support, 
though it honours the pre-election deal on chronic medicines.49
The link with the state was more than a cost saving mechanism. It was part 
of a vision that attempted to rework a private sector scheme in the image of an 
admittedly idealised vision of the public sector. The doctors and other medical 
staff were employed on salary, rather than paid on a fee for service basis. This was 
intended to remove the perverse incentive to over-treat inbuilt in the fee for service 
system and to reduce spending on unnecessary treatment so as to redirect it more 
positively (for example, towards preventive and promotive health). The painful
4* While working as a doctor in the public sector, he was a volunteer organiser for the General 
Workers’ Union and was banned for five years as a result. He also had a history of involvement 
in progressive health organisations.
49 More recently, the union has taken a new tack by actively pursuing negotiations with local 
government aimed at securing free land on which to erect new clinics. The size and financial 
status of the Fund gives it substantial bargaining power. (Interview with union officials conducted 
by author, 31 January 1997, Cape Town.)
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irony of the panel system was that poor workers were making doctors rich in a 
system that satisfied nobody.
The other aspect of the link with the state was an explicit recognition of the 
limits of the Fund: workers got their primary care from the Fund, but were reliant 
on the State for secondary and tertiary care. In the past, workers had to negotiate 
the state system individually. In the new system, the Fund’s own doctors would 
co-ordinate referrals, maintain contact with members through the process, and take 
over care as necessary. While this is not holistic care, it is certainly an 
improvement on the past. The CCIC Sick Fund is fortunate in that direction was 
well established before the change in government. It may also have influence 
further afield, if the union chooses to make a strategic intervention in state policy 
formation, based on a unique experience in the restructuring of working class 
health care.
The next chapter focuses on a restructuring project in the leather industry, 
introducing the complicating factors of national scope and multi-unionism.
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Chapter 5. The National Leather Industry Sick Fund
1. Introduction
The second study examines a trade union project in a multi-union context. 
The chapter traces the way in which the South African Clothing and Textile 
Workers’ Union (SACTWU), pursued an agenda about health care in the National 
Industrial Council for the Leather Industry (NICLI). The union tapped into worker 
discontent on this issue, maintaining a delicate balancing act between establishing 
itself as the driving force in the project of transforming the Sick Fund, and the need 
to win and hold sufficient support from the majority union in the sector, the 
National Union of Lcathcrworkers (NULW). to ensure progress. The relationship 
with the third union, the Transvaal Leather and Allied Trades’ Industrial Union 
(TLATIU), was less crucial, given its small size. The NULW could, however, 
have scuppered the project at any stage and did impede progress at a number of 
points: the crucial challenge to SACTWU was to ensure that the issue was handled 
in a way which minimised the possibility of rejection by NULW officials.
SACTWU officials had to develop an area of consensus within which NULW 
officials were comfortable and identify them with the process by ensuring that they 
acted as union spokespersons at certain crucial moments: on the one hand, this 
gave the NULW credit for active pursuit of the union agenda, on the other hand, it 
locked them into an agenda which actually emanated from SACTWU.
Workers’ discontent was the spur to union action and the specifics of 
worker complaints shaped that action. All four studies in this thesis revealed
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problems with existing services, but none as vividly as this one, by virtue of an 
accidental effect of research methodology. A scries of extended meetings around 
the country yielded a mass of detail about the experience of working class people 
in small rural towns and large cities spread widely across the country. The broad 
geographic scope yielded information suggesting common patterns and these 
experiences, rendered vivid by workers’ words, echo those which emerge from the 
mix of formal and informal enquiry in the other projects. The chapter traces the 
way in which these experiences were incorporated into the recommendations for 
re-structuring this scheme (and others) and ends with a section reflecting on the 
influences which shape workers’ attitudes and aspirations regarding health care.
This study provides a counterpoint to the Cape clothing study in a number 
of respects. First, it explores some of the dynamics of research in a multi-union 
situation, which arc seen in a more pronounced way in the Transmcd study. It also 
outlines the way in which SACTWU distinguished itself from the other unions in 
the leather sector and exhibited strategic leadership in the project, despite its status 
as a newcomer to the sector.
Second, while the CCIC Sick Fund was regional, the NICLI Sick Fund was 
national. Though the process of investigation was essentially regional and the 
recommendations which resulted differed by region (for reasons both practical and 
strategic), decisions were made centrally, at the Sick Fund Management
Committee (SFMC), where union rivalries were more open and acute than on the 
ground, where members of the different unions worked side by side in the factories.
Third, there were significant methodological differences between the 
studies, which coloured the outcome. This project had no sample survey, no 
questionnaire and no statistical analysis. This was due to a combination of 
geographical, financial and time constraints. There were 34,500 workers in the 
leather industry in 1992. Women were in the majority, though not as 
overwhelmingly as in the clothing industry. The only sub-sector in which men 
were in the majority was tanning. Many of the workers were in small workplaces, 
and very widely dispersed around the country, creating serious problems of control 
and management for the Industrial Council staff, whose headquarters were in Port 
Elizabeth. The geographical spread imparted a peripatetic style to the research 
process, which consisted of separate meetings with the parties in each region and 
working from sick fund data (centrally held in Port Elizabeth).1 It also involved 
regular contact and discussion with the SFMC and the Sick Fund Negotiating 
Committee (commonly called the ‘Ninc-a-Side’ Committee) throughout the 
process.
Fourth, the balance of involvement of the parties differed significantly from 
the CCIC. There was markedly more involvement from both employers and 
Council staff. The General Secretary of the Industrial Council, in particular, 
supported the process and took a major role in the implementation of 
recommendations. As with the CCIC project, this was an extended research
i Some 30 trips to the regions and meetings in Cape Town.
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relationship. There are overlaps in all three Industrial Council studies: meetings for 
one fitted into research trips for another, budgets for one provided prices for 
another, deals and discoveries were adopted and adapted and, not least, mistakes 
and problems in one project informed new approaches in the others.
Last, the capacity for fundamental change was limited. The NICLI fund 
was much poorer than the CCIC Fund, with minimal (and falling) reserves, and a 
low contribution base.2 *The leather industry was even more marginal than clothing 
and in recent years had been particularly threatened by cheap imports (Keel 1993).1 
Given the economic climate and conditions in the industry, it was unlikely that 
there would he a substantial increase in either wages or benefits in the near future. 
In addition, employers were insistent that they would not agree to change to the 
statutory sick pay system, thus blocking a potential source of savings, which could 
otherwise have been redirected towards improvement of benefits, as in the Cape.
It was evident that dependant cover was not an option in the short-term in the 
NICLI Fund and that the first priority was to restore financial viability.
2. Workers ’ experience of health care
The NICLI Sick Fund, like those of the CCIC and the Natal Clothing 
Industrial Council (NCIC), was established as a joint medical benefit and sick pay 
fund for all workers covered by the 'idustrial Council. It dTfcrcd from the CCIC
2 In 1990, the Fund's reserve was just under R2m: hy 1991, it had shrunk by 25% to RI 5m. By 
comparison, the CCIC Sick Fund had a reserve of R5m in 1990 and R6.5 in 1991. (Financial 
statements, CCIC Sick Fund 1991 and NICU Sick Fund 1991)
' Between 1994 and 1996, 3,(KM) jobs were lost because of imports from countries which were 
not signatories to the World Trade Organisation (mostly China) (Cape Argus 22 May 1997).
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Fund most notably in retaining a sick pay system which was markedly 
disadvantageous to workers. When the project began, the Fund had no clinics of 
its own, relying entirely on panel doctors to provide services. There were 325 
panel doctors, spread around the country in all areas where there were members of 
the Sick Fund. The doctors were paid on an all-in basis (consultation and 
medicine), with a small levy from patients. The Fund differentiated between 
consultations for acute and chronic illness, initially only in terms of reimbursement 
of doctors, but later in terms of limits. Contributions were low and wage 
differentials were larger than in the clothing industry.4 The leather industry was 
divided into three sub-sectors (footwear, general goods and handbags, tanning) and 
five geographic regions. It was dominated by the NULW, which also had a 
majority in the biggest sector (footwear) and all regions except the Transvaal, 
where it had no members.5 *7 SACTWU had made some advances in the Transvaal 
region and in the smallest sub-sector, tanning.'’
The Fund was in trouble. Concerns and complaints about the benefits were 
raised with increasing frequency in the SFMC in the late 1980s. Contribution 
increases had failed to match spiralling costs and the Fund had been in deficit every 
year from 1988 to 1991.7 A contribution increase in 1990 only momentarily 
checked the trend of increasing deficit. A history of unsuccessful attempts to
4 Contributions were R2 a week each side in May 1992, compared with R3.70 in the Cape.
Wages ranged between R160 and R185 per week, with the majority of workers on RI80 per week. 
'  The NULW accounted for 76% of organised workers, SACTWU 18% and TLATIU 6%.
'' SACTWU had 59% of tanning sector union members and 36% of Transvaal members ( the 
rest belonging to TLATIU). SACTWU had also organised a new area, Botshahelo. and was 
actively campaigning for its incorporation into the Council.
7 Surplus: R120,594 (1987) Deficits: R 186,480 (1988); R706,528 (1989); R 183,393 (1990); 
R459.337 (1991)
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contain escalating expenditure on the panel system by appealing to panel doctors 
and members for restraint culminated in the imposition of limits on acute 
consultations." The new restriction came into effect in May 1992, just as the 
research stage got under way. This was not a coincidence: union agreement to the 
contribution increase and the imposition of limits was conditional on a fundamental 
review of benefits. Nevertheless, the changes, which were unpopular with 
members, heightened the temperature and concentrated the minds, lending a new 
urgency to the search for solutions to the Fund’s problems.
The first stage of this process gave a broad group of members an 
opportunity to speak directly about their experience of the Fund, their problems, 
needs and preferences. For many of them, in unions not distinguished by a 
participatory style, this was a new experience. The consultation involved a scries 
of workshops with shop stewards and union officials, held separately with each 
union, in each of the regions in which the Council operated.M In each of these 
meetings, after I had given a brief introduction to the process, I asked all of those 
at the meeting to speak in turn, answering a series of questions. What was your 
most recent experience of the Fund? What was your most recent experience of 
illness of a child in your family? Where did you take the child and why? How 
much did it cost?
" The administrators calculated that an annual limit of X initial and X repeal consultations would 
be more than adequate: average use in 1991 was 6.4 (combined). Registered chronics would have 
unlimited consultations.
* National officials of the NUI.W and TI.ATIU insisted on separate meetings, which were held 
except in Great Brak. Local officials organised the meetings, generally in union venues on 
Saturdays, though some negotiated paid time off work with employers. Some 260 shop stewards 
and a number of officials attended 11 meetings.
The discussion was then opened to allow them to pass on experiences 
related to them by the members they represented. The meetings moved on to 
discuss options for future developments in the Fund, focusing on clinics, new
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controls in the panel doctor system and alternative methods of financing cover lor 
dependants (a vote was taken on this issue after discussion). I took detailed field 
notes at the meetings and drew extensively on these to formulate the 
recommendations in the research Report (Cornell 1992).
Inside the system
The meetings yielded information which amounted to far more than a set of 
rough and ready statistics on utilisation patterns.10 As workers spoke, a vivid and 
textured sense of their experience emerged, along with the factors which informed 
the choices they made about healthcare. Most of the discussion centred on the 
panel doctors, the central benefit of membership and, for many members, the only 
one with which they were familiar. Only a very small minority of workers (X%) 
were positively in favour of the panel system. A larger group (27%) were 
relatively indifferent or did not use the system. The majority (65%) were strongly 
dissatisfied, and expressed their views strongly.
• The minority view: satisfaction with panel doctors
A preliminary analysis of Sick Fund accounts had indicated that the panel 
system needed urgent re-design, which must be based on an understanding of the 
factors influencing worker behaviour in the Fund. It was important to explore the 
reasons why some members liked panel doctors, gauge the extent of their
10 The utilisation patterns were calculated from my notes of the meetings.
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attachment to the system and the potential to diminish distrust, and secure support 
for clinics in areas where they were viable.
A small minority of workers (8%) expressed overt satisfaction, which was 
always explicitly associated with their own panel doctor rather than the system as a 
whole. It was quite clear that everyone would have preferred a system of free 
choice of doctors, rather than a panel, but the fact that a number of workers chose 
to take their children to these same doctors, paying the cash rate, was evidence of 
satisfaction. Even when workers disliked the panel system, they would generally 
identify some ‘reasonable’ doctors in an area, whose names were rapidly spread on 
the worker grapevine.
Satisfaction with the panel was most uniform among members of the 
TLATIU. This union’s attitude throughout the research process was at best wary, 
more often aggressive. It was a small, embattled union, struggling to survive and 
engaged in a complex web of negotiations with its two rival unions. Nevertheless, 
the meeting did yield at least two potential reasons for the low utilisation: lack of 
information and boycott. It emerged that few shop stewards knew, for example, 
about the ‘chronic’ benefit. (This is borne out by the low proportion of ‘chronic’ 
registrations in the Transvaal.) Many members with chronic ailments were using 
other facilities and not drawing on the Fund for this treatment. In addition, two 
shop stewards at the meeting simply stated that they ‘preferred’ to consult private 
doctors and pay out of pocket, because of the quality of the panel service. This 
preference must have been strongly felt to have been expressed at this meeting, as 
the union General Secretary controlled the meeting and announced that the union 
supported the panel system and opposed any change to it. SACTWU members in
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the Transvaal spoke of similar action in choosing to go outside the panel (to both 
public and private services) and highlighted the problem of access, complaining of 
a shortage of panel doctors in African residential areas.
A second group of workers around the country (22%) expressed a muted 
satisfaction with panel doctors, or hesitancy about criticism. Some felt they were 
adequate for minor ailments, but chose to go private (or use state services) for 
more serious ailments. A small number of workers (6%) either had medical aid 
scheme cover (from a spouse) or used panel doctors never or very seldom."
• The majority view: strong dissatisfaction
Critical and often angry voices outweighed the largely tepid praise of 
supporters. A sizeable majority of workers (65%) was seriously dissatisfied. 
Complaints gathered weight through constant repetition, and were rendered 
credible by the individual stories from which they emerged.
Cursory examinations: Workers complained of careless, hasty examinations 
and, in some cases, no examinations. This was linked to a complaint that many 
doctors assumed that all workers were malingerers, only wanting sick certificates: 
‘they’ve got their pen out when you come in the door’. Speed o f examination was 
particularly marked when panel doctors (‘the one minute doctors’) visited 
factories. Rates of 20-30 patients an hour seemed barely credible, but were borne 
out by factory sisters. Fund accounts and a particularly frank interview with one 
panel doctor.* 1-’ Workers’ expectations were not high: markers of excellence
11 Some women workers covered by their husbands' medical aid schemes nevertheless chose to 
use the Sick Fund for minor ailments, to avoid co-payments and conserve their limits.
1 This quote and all direct quotes which follow are taken from my notes o f the meetings, except 
when otherwise indicated. I met factory sisters in the Transvaal and Natal. The factory in Great
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mentioned by workers included simply having their blood pressure measured. One 
doctor had become popular because word had spread that he did not re-use 
syringes ‘even on leatherworkers’.
Poor and insufficient medication: Patients frequently complained about the 
‘quality’ of the medication ('Panudo for everything’). They resented being given 
incomplete courses of medication, requiring a repeat visit (and consultation fee) to 
collect the rest. The ‘all-in’ consultation fee (examination and medication 
combined) gave doctors an incentive to cut back on cost and quantity of 
medication for acute illnesses. Workers complained that panel doctors were 
particularly reluctant to see patients with complaints which might require extensive 
medication, unless they could be classified and registered as ‘chronics’, in which 
case the Fund paid medicines separately, giving doctors a perverse incentive to 
over-prescribe (see section 6).
Frequent recall: Workers clearly interpreted frequent recall as a ploy on 
the part of panel doctors to compensate for the low consultation fee, along with 
the practice of ‘double-signing’, when doctors told workers to sign for two 
consultations when (hey presented with two complaints (for example, flu and a 
stomach ache). Interestingly, workers tended to be very clear about the difference 
about a ‘real’ recall (to check recovery from a non-trivial illness) and a 
‘manufactured’ one. One of the characteristics of a ‘real’ recall identified by 
workers was a ‘proper examination’.
lirak no longer employed a sister, hut both the employer and the wage clerk who made 
appointments lor the factory doctor confirmed these rales.
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Discriminatory treatment: Workers identified a number of ways in which 
panel doctors treated them differently from other patients, which they fiercely 
resented. Some doctors restricted the hours when they would see leather patients, 
for example refusing to see them after 6pm. This seriously restricted access 
outside of working hours and could result in time off work (and loss of income). 
Some doctors even had separate waiting rooms or made Fund patients wait 
outside. Workers insisted that all non-Fund patients were given ‘better’ medicines, 
though it is likely that cash patients, who pay an all-inclusive fee, would be issued 
similar medicines to Fund patients.11 Cash patients were certainly often treated 
preferentially in terms of waiting time.* 14 Workers were confused as well as 
irritated by this preferential treatment, given the fact that the cash fee set by 
doctors was generally identical to the fee paid by the Fund.
Reluctance to ffive sick leave: A common complaint related to doctors’ 
reluctance to authorise sick leave. This complaint was particularly directed at 
panel doctors who visited factories. They were seen as closely aligned with 
management and reluctant to jeopardise lucrative contracts by alienating 
employers. Sick leave is a contentious issue in all industrial schemes, but this 
complaint gathers weight from the markedly low utilisation rates in this scheme. 
The record-keeping system makes it hard to calculate how many days were actually 
taken, but rough estimates from sick pay result in a national average of 2.4 paid 
days per member for 1991. The Transvaal region led the field, with less than a day 
of paid sick leave per member. These figures are not an accurate reflection cither
1' Medicines lor medical aid members are generally prescribed or dispensed on a more lavish
scale.
14 In general, only medical aid patients can make appointments and they would be given 
preference over both cash patients and fund patients.
ol total sick leave taken (as I and 2 day illnesses are unpaid and therefore 
unrecorded by the Fund) or of sick leave needed (as the loss of wage involved in 
taking sick leave may keep sick people at work in addition to its intended aim of 
keeping the healthy from making frivolous or fraudulent claims).1' liven unpaid 
sick leave had a direct impact on Fund expenditure: workers were obliged to 
present doctors’ certificates to justify any lime off work and as a consequence were 
forced to consult doctors even for trivial, self-limiting ailments. The result was 
over-medication and easy money for panel doctors.
Reactions from workers to the sick pay provisions of the Sick Fund were 
uniformly extremely negative. They perceived the system as punitive, designed to 
keep them on the job, however ill. In every meeting, workers complained about 
the low rate of pay, delays in payment, reluctance by management to accept 
certificates from non-panel doctors and opposite but equally resented attitudes on 
(he part of panel doctors: either they were unwilling to put workers off or they 
assumed that workers only came to them for certificates. In a number of cases, 
shop stewards were aware of the provisions of the Basic Conditions of 
Fmploymcnt Act (BCEA), comparing their own conditions very unfavourably and 
proposing that the industry revert to the statutory system.
These perceptions were soundly based, as the NICLI conditions were 
markedly worse than those of any of the clothing Industrial Councils, which 
themselves compared unfavourably with BCFA sick leave. Though NICLI allowed 
52 days sick leave (compared with 40 in the original CCIC system and 10 in the
”  My estimate of use in the CCIC was 4.7 days (see previous chapter). NCIC does not keep 
records of sick days taken. Sick pay accounted tor 47% of expenditure hy the CCIC ( I')') I) and 
2H% hy the NCIC (1993).
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BCEA), it was paid at a flat rate which translated to only 22% of the wage 
(compared with 65% in the old CCIC system and 100% in the statutory system). 
The extended period of sick leave allowed benefited only workers who were off 
sick for a stretch longer than 45 days. This was extremely rare, particularly as 
workers were not protected against job loss for this period. In addition, any 
worker with a lengthy illness would fare better by applying for sick pay to the 
Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF).'6 In practice, the average used was very 
low. Expenditure on sick pay actually dropped by 14% in 1991, a fact explained in 
part by retrenchments. It is also probable that in a period of retrenchment, workers 
were wary about taking time off work. It was not surprising that workers, without 
exception, wanted the sick leave and sick pay provisions improved. However, it 
was impossible to analyse the utilisation and costs of sick leave meaningfully with 
the statistics kept by the Fund at the time, or to make detailed recommendations on 
the basis of the information available, particularly in the light of the concerted 
opposition of employers to the statutory system.17 The employers, especially from 
the Footwear section, repeatedly threatened to withdraw from the Sick Fund 
altogether if the unions forced them to pay sick pay under the statutory system. 
They argued that the medical benefits provided by the Sick Fund were provisional 
on the retention of this sick pay system. The unions chose not to force the issue.18
16 This Act replaces wages lost due to illnesses lasting longing than three weeks, paying 45% of 
the wage. Entitlement is one week's payment for six weeks’ contributions to the UIF.
11 The recommendation was to consult the Council's computer consultants on systems to record 
sick leave and pay as a first step towards detailed analysis, planning and costing of alternatives. 
'* 1 consulted with SACTWU officials before formulating the recommendation on sick leave. 
They judged that there was insufficient support from NULW or TI.ATIU to force through a 
change. In the fragile union alliance, their first priority was to avoid potentially divisive issues 
and maximise common ground.
Outside the system
The meetings also provided extensive information on workers’ current 
practices when family members were ill. In the absence of Sick Fund cover for 
families, workers had to choose between state and private services. Their choices, 
especially for children, highlighted some very interesting attitudes.
Choices for dependants: In the first instance, it was clear that parents were 
more concerned about their children’s health than about their own. The question 
asked in the meeting referred to the most recent experience. A large majority of 
workers (69%) had taken their children to private doctors, paying cash, because 
they thought the care was better.19 They were prepared to spend a day’s wage for 
the consultation and to travel (which involved additional expense) to take sick 
children to doctors they judged to be particularly good.20
State services had been chosen by the other workers (31%) for a range of 
reasons: some facilities were judged to be good (workers often travelled out of 
their area to go to a clinic with a good reputation for treating children); for minor 
illness (and therefore not worth the outlay of a private consultation, or seen as 
within the competence of a state clinic); for serious illnesses requiring specialist 
investigation (where state referral hospitals clearly had the edge over general 
practitioners) and ongoing treatment (which cash practice doctors were often 
unwilling to take on within the standard fee); or - most frequently - when workers 
had no cash (and were not able to borrow). Fees at state clinics were very low, 
ranging generally between R2 and RIO per visit. Interestingly, all women present
19 The percentages relate to the 15X workers at the meetings who had dependent children at 
home.
211 Consultations cost R30-R35 on uverage. The uveruge weekly wage was RI HO.
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knew Ihc fees, while few men did: it was the women who took cure of sick 
children. The restrictive hours of state clinics obliged workers to take time off 
work to attend with sick children. This in turn often resulted in an extra visit to a 
panel doctor, for a sick certificate to cover the lost day (even though there was no 
sick pay for a single day’s absence) in order to avoid the threat of disciplinary 
action.
There was very strong support for dependant cover in the Sick Fund, but 
marked disagreement about funding options, an apparently technical issue. In fact, 
this disagreement was indicative of the problem of creating and maintaining 
consensus within a union. Cross-subsidisation was seen us a good principle 
(particularly by those who would benefit from it: the sickly and those with large 
families), but a problem in practice (by those who would subsidise it, the healthy 
and those with small families). Older workers, in particular, were reluctant to pay 
higher contributions to cover only a spouse, if younger workers would be getting 
cover for spouse and children for the same price. They spoke of the hardship of 
their own youth, when they had to provide for children now 'uitgetroud' (‘married 
out’). This was one of the few times that the issue of the extended family was 
raised by workers in any of the 1C studies : older workers wanted to bring 
grandchildren living in their households onto the scheme.21
With some defensiveness, workers related their reluctance to cross- 
subsidise to the difference between need and choice. (‘If I could be sure their kids 
really needed to sec the doctor, I wouldn’t mind, hut some people are always
21 This was in stark contrast with iny other work with African workers, where the nuclear 
definition of family common in medical aids was constantly raised as a problem, ignoring as it 
did the common phenomenon of broader family responsibility (including aged parents, 
grandchildren, siblings and their children).
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running in about every little thing.’) A similar phenomenon emerged in all the 
studies in a small group of workers who actively took pride in their status as 
‘responsible’: ‘ek i.v nie van daai wat siek vat nie' ( ‘I’m not one of that lot who 
take off sick’).
3. A summary of the project
The exploration of attitudes towards health care held by workers and their 
unions was only a part, though a pivotal part, of a more extensive project. The 
process was initiated some eighteen months earlier by a request from Mike 
Murphy, a SACTWU official, to cast a critical eye over the benefits and finances of 
the NICLI Sick Fund.22 This resulted in a presentation to the Sick Fund 
Management Committee (SFMC) in October 1990, later expanded at the 
Committee’s request into a preliminary report outlining steps to stabilise and 
improve the Fund and highlighting a number of issues needing more extensive 
investigation.2' I heard nothing more from the Fund for a year, though SACTWU 
kept me briefed on developments. The issue of the Sick Fund was raised again at 
the 1991 Annual General Meeting of the 1C anil in the SFMC meeting in
11 Mike Murphy was a founder organiser of the Trade Union Advisory and Co-ordinating 
Council (TUACC), the umbrella body of the Natal-based unions which spearheaded the 
watershed 1973 strikes, generally viewed as marking the rebirth of independent unionism. 
TUACC merged into FOSATU, which later incorporated other unions in the formation of 
COSATU. Manned in 1976, he went into exile for 12 years, working internationally for the South 
African trade union movement, before returning to South Africa and joining SACTWU ((¡wala 
and Murphy 1994). He subsequently left SACTWU and became the Regional Co-ordinator for 
the Africa Region of the International Chemical, Hnergy and Mineworkers’ Federation (ICFM) 
(Murphy 1996).
11 The issues were: the implications of converting to IICHA sick pay; potential revision of the 
chronic illness benefit; cost of expansion of benefits (specifically dental and optical); cost 
implications of expansion of cover to dependants (Cornell 1991).
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September 1991. At this meeting, SACTWU supported the idea of a clinic system, 
while the NULW objected to any change in the benefit structure. The assumption 
by the end of the meeting was that there would be a ‘re-structuring process’. In 
response the following month, the NULW stalled outright and SACTWU said that 
they were waiting for my return from sabbatical in January in order to prepare their 
counter-proposals.24
In November 1991, a decision was made to set up a Sick Fund Negotiating 
Committee, with nine members for each party. Each of the unions had three 
representatives on this ‘Nine-a-Side’ Committee. At the first meeting, there was 
extensive discussion on the issue of changing to BCEA sick pay. Employers were 
strongly opposed, insisting that they would negotiate on a ‘package’ basis (sick pay 
and medical benefits combined) or not at all. This decision was a significant 
constraint on the scope of the recommendations. The concerns of the parties and 
their involvement in defining the terms of reference for this study were clearly 
indicated in my appointment letter from the General Secretary of NICLI, which 
specified broad consultation to ensure balance as the first requirement for the 
process.25
24 As in Ihe Cape, SACTWU originally intended to contract me to undertake an independent 
study and later decided that I should operate as a joint consultant.
25 ‘(i) the views of all the parties in the various sections of the Industry must he solicited in order 
to I'htain a balanced view; (ii) all regional patterns must be examined and regional views taken 
into account. Any abuse of the system should he highlighted; (iii) the various options relating to 
Sick Pay should be addressed; (iv) Ihe general trends taking place presently in Funds similar to 
the Leather Industry Sick Fund; (v) to investigate any financial assistance the fund can obtain 
from the State; (vi) the issue of the panel doctor system and their numbers, as well as Panel 
Doctors visiting factories, including the legal implications applicable to doctors visiting factories 
must he addressed; (vii) any proposals in respect of the Fund must he cost effective und 
affordable; (viii) the clinic system must be thoroughly investigated.’ (le tter to uuthor from Mr L 
van Loggerenberg, General Secretary, NICLI. I April 1992)
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This project was notable for the degree of involvement by employers and 
Sick Fund staff. There was initial caution from employers (which resurfaced 
periodically) because this was a union-driven initiative, but in the end they were far 
more extensively involved than in cither of the other two IC projects. Employer 
opinions were canvassed in extended interviews with two of the three sectoral 
employer organisations and with individual employers. In addition, the employer 
representatives participated actively in the Sick Fund Management Committee, the 
‘Ninc-a-Side’ Committee and the regional sub-committees. There were some very 
powerful employer figures, including the Chairman of the SFMC, a retired 
manufacturer who continued to play a very influential role in the Fund.2'1 The 
strong personal interest of the General Secretary of NICLI coloured the process 
and influenced its outcome. He facilitated the complex process of consultation and 
report-back, as well as access to Sick Fund information, both published documents 
(such as monthly and annual financial statements and reports) and unpublished 
information drawn from computerised records. His approach was mirrored in the 
co-operation and involvement of Council staff, who provided extensive 
background material on request, particularly on the administration of the Fund, and 
identified ways to streamline procedures and improve efficiency.
After the process of consultation, the task of synthesis loomed. Broadly 
speaking, the central recommendations (establishment of panel doctors and 
increased control over panel doctors) were not altered from my earlier reports to 
the SFMC. However, the presentation and motivation was informed by the *
2,1 He chaired the sub-committees for Pietermaritzburg and Durhan-Pinetown, which were 
responsible for setting up the clinics und dealing with clinic issues, and played an important role 
in the interactions with panel doctors.
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insights gained in the consultation process. The priorities in terms of action were 
strongly motivated in terms of the regions where the losses were greatest: at one 
stroke this placated TLATIU and put the NULW on the defensive, diluting both 
sources of opposition. Positive features which emerged from consultation were 
taken into account: for example, attachment to the panel doctor system influenced 
the decision to attract members into the clinic system by incentives, rather than 
coerce them to change. The depth of support for dependant cover was consciously 
used to elicit union co-operation: in the Report, the introduction of dependant 
benefits was explicitly tied to successful cost-containment through implementation 
of the recommendations.
4. Recommendations
The recommendations for re-structuring of the NICLI Sick Fund were done 
on a regional basis, determined by the patterns of utilisation and expenditure and 
informed by the responses in the first round of regional workshops and meetings. 
Action was prioritised for the regions where utilisation was highest. These 
recommendations were presented and discussed in a series of joint regional 
meetings for employers and unions, whose responses are summarised below.27
Clinics
The basic arguments for proposing the establishment of Sick Fund clinics as 
an alternative to panel doctors in certain areas were: cost-containment; improved
27 The General Secretary of NICLI and I conducted 7 report back meetings around the country, 
attended by 210 shop stewards and union officials and 33 employers. Only the central 
recommendations are discussed here.
quality of care and potential for monitoring both quality and cost; greater 
involvement by users. The criteria forjudging a clinic to be feasible and necessary 
in an area were: sufficiently large membership (at least 2,500); geographic 
concentration and heavy use of benefits. In terms of these criteria, I recommended 
the establishment of Council clinics in Natal, Pietermaritzburg and Cape Town, 
with a limited panel of doctors where necessitated by the geographic spread of 
members, along with clear incentives to use the clinic. These were three of the 
most problematic areas, as a result of high consultation rales, high proportions of 
chronic members and expensive chronic prescribing patterns.
South Western Districts posed a particular problem. Overall, it was the 
worst deficit area in the Fund, showing a loss of R92.35 per member in 1991 and 
average utilisation of more than 4 extra consultations per member. These figures 
were even more disturbing when disaggregated for the three small towns 
comprising the region. Two were lower than average in terms of utilisation. The 
losses were all due to the third. Great Brak. With only one factory and some 600 
workers, it was too small for a clinic of its own. Instead, I recommended that the 
Fund negotiate with local state health authorities for access to the clinic, using the 
panel doctor only for referrals (cases heyond the competence of the nursing staff in 
the stale clinic).2"
The recommendations were generally supported in all areas, except Great 
Brak, where workers expressed some reservations about the stale clinic and 
reluctance to change. There was a surprise reaction in Midlands/Border, where
" A similar arrangement was recommended lor liotshahelo, pending incorporation into the 
Fund.
trade union delegates from NULW expressed disappointment. Contrary to their 
position in the first workshop, they now wanted a clinic as a priority. On the
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SF-MC and ‘Ninc-a-Side’ Committee, the union representatives received the 
recommendations about clinics quietly. The TLATIU, safe from clinics in this 
phase, were untroubled by their implementation in other areas while SACTWU 
representatives masked their delight for strategic reasons. The NULW response 
was more surprising: the leaders on the SFMC had shifted from the oppositional 
position of the past, perhaps in response to the groundswell of support at the 
regional meetings. The decision to hold joint employer-union meetings in the 
regions to report back on the research and gather responses proved to be a useful 
check on the tendency sometimes exhibited by the NULW leadership to translate 
their members’ views rather freely.
Panel doctors
Clinics were not feasible in some areas, where the Fund would have to 
continue to rely on panel doctors. However, the panel needed trimming and more 
careful monitoring, given a history of irrational practice. The Fund actually 
appointed new doctors in 1991 in almost all areas, in a year in which membership 
decreased. While there was an argument for spreading the panel for ease of access, 
the problems of management and control increase with panel size. Management of 
the panel system would need to include measures such as the introduction of a
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formulary, regional peer review groups and Ihe developmenl of a new system for 
chronic drugs.2'*
Responses to the suggestions on managing the panel doctor system varied. 
In general, employers believed that the system was open to abuse and should be 
more tightly controlled, while union officials expressed more nuanced and complex 
opinions. NULW officials were often cautious in joint meetings, reluctant to be 
seen as condemning particular panel doctors and by extension the members who 
chose to consult them. TLATIU officials defended the Transvaal panel and 
attacked others, holding up the Transvaal as a model of control and economy. 
SACTWU, while strongly critical of the panel doctor system, also exercised some 
caution about expressing this opinion in joint meetings, to avoid antagonising the 
other unions and also to avoid exclusive identification with the clinic concept (and 
consequent opposition from the other unions). There was an attempt to 
accommodate Ihe wishes of rebellious SACTWU members at one Transvaal 
tannery described earlier, by extending the refund system to their area."1 This was 
offered to the tannery workers as a way to open access to non-panel doctors but 
the concession was not well received. Once the decision had been made to 
proceed with clinics in Pietermaritzburg and Durban, both NIJLW and SACTWU 
officials brought their detailed knowledge and information of problems and abuses 
to bear on the process of pruning the panels. (See Section 6 for discussion of panel 
doctor reactions.)
2‘* A formulary is a list of medicines for specified illnesses, often organised in terms of cost- 
cffectivcncss or cost. A peer review group, elected by the panel doctors in a region, would review 
(anonymous) case studies taken from Sick l-und records.
"* In ureas with no panel doctors, workers could consult non-panel doctors and were refunded at 
the panel rule, making up any shortfall themselves.
Factory doctors
The factory doctor system posed a special problem. It was only used in 
seven factories (with seven doctors) at the time of the study. The system was 
generally favoured by the employers concerned, because of convenience and 
reduction in lost time. Workers had a mixed response, recognising the convenience 
hut complaining that the doctors were particularly reluctant to give sick leave.
They attributed this reluctance to a desire to keep in with the employer and 
safeguard a lucrative arrangement. Payments to these doctors amounted to 
between 24% and 106% of contributions income for the factories in question, the 
lower proportions in factories which employed factory sisters, who screened 
patients before they consulted the doctor.11 Consequently, the recommendation 
was that the Fund should only allow factory doctors to operate where full-time 
factory sisters screened patients and that expenditure should be monitored, with a 
view to establishing an hourly rate rather than a fee per consultation.12 (See 
Section 6 for discussion on speed of consultation.)
Extension of benefits to dependants
This was a complex issue, made more difficult by a number of factors: the 
need for different recommendations for different regions; differences in use of 
benefits in different regions; and different attitudes towards ways to fund
" Members In factories served by faelory doctors also incurred other costs for the Fund: 
consultations with other panel doctors, sick pay and direct payments, as well as administrative 
costs.
12 In the absence of more comprehensive and sophisticated indices of quality of care, 
consultation speed is a crude but suggestive proxy.
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dependant cover. It was clear that benefits could most safely and cost-effectively 
be extended to dependants through clinics operated by the Industrial Council.
In areas where clinics were not feasible, the principal options were: co­
payment by the Fund to panel doctors; refund by the Fund of receipted accounts 
from non-panel doctors, to an equivalent level; or refund by the Fund of receipted 
accounts for state clinics, day hospitals or hospitals. However, all these issues 
were superseded by the overriding financial problem. All parties had agreed 
(though with reluctance on the union side) that extension of coverage to 
dependants would not be considered until the Fund was restored to a sound 
financial status.
The final plan of action agreed by the ‘Nine-a-Side’Committee prioritised 
Pietermaritzburg and Durban-Pinetown for the establishment of clinics and Great 
Brak for an innovative contract with the local state health authorities. Sub­
committees were established for the clinic projects and I was active in these and in 
the Great Brak developments until the end of 1994.
5. The sources and significance of workers ’ attitudes
The research process in this project provided unusually direct access to 
workers’ views on health care. These views and those of the other parties involved 
had to be considered critically in order to design and plan workable changes to the 
Sick Fund. During the active phase of the project, this critical analysis had a 
practical focus and was often not made explicit for reasons of strategy or tact.
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though it inllucnccd the way in which recommendations were framed and, 
particularly, implemented.
Experience and observation
The most obvious formative influence was personal experience. Each 
worker had a slightly different version, depending on family circumstances and 
health status, but generally incorporating exposure to some or all of the following: 
self-medication, use of over the counter medication and traditional remedies; 
traditional practitioners (fairly rare in the NICLI ease); factory services (in-house 
clinics, staffed by nurses, sometimes with a visiting doctor paid on a sessional basis 
hy the employer, generally confined to the larger factories); private practice, 
generally cash practice (where doctors charge a standard cash fee, which includes 
consultation and medicine) but occasionally standard fee-for-service practice on an 
account basis (where doctors charge separately for each service and for medicines); 
panel doctors; and stale services.
Workers would have been in any or all of these treatment contexts at some 
stage. They would also have observed and/or heard of the experience of others. 
For example, while wailing for treatment from a panel doctor, they would have 
observed the public aspects of the treatment given to medical aid patients and cash 
patients (waiting time, appointment system, attitude of reception staff), though 
they were not in the examination room and so did not observe the private aspect of 
the patient-doctor interaction. Experience in one context influenced attitudes 
towards others: for example, the more public services decayed as a result of under- 
funding and over-crowding, the more attractive the private sector became by
I OX
comparison. There was little health education in schools and little debate in 
accessible media about the nature of ‘good’ health care.”
The public-private divide provided material for aspiration, reinforced by the 
architecture of apartheid. Trade unions are naturally in the business of negotiating 
improvement in benefits and in the sphere of health care this easily translates into 
an assumption that improvement involves moving from public to private sector 
care. Equally, private health care was predominantly a white domain under 
apartheid and in the drive to redress the inequalities of the past it was easy to 
assume that equality must mean equal access to the private sector. These 
confusions were not helped by political uncertainty. This project started in 1992, 
before the change of government, though it was already clear that there would be a 
new government, which would institute changes in the national health system.
The influence of doctors
While there was a general (and often exaggerated) respect for the 
professional status of doctors as a group, it was also clear that workers applied 
ranking within the group. There was a general tendency to infer skill level from 
income, with the consequent assumption that private doctors were more skilled 
than those in the public sector. Equally, panel doctors were ranked below other 
private doctors because they accepted a lower fee. There was a general sense that 
a Council clinic could not attract a good doctor, given the constraints on salary 
level (and the fact that the joo was salaried, capping earning powei). This
"  Media exposure would generally he limited to television programmes such as ‘KR’ which 
reinforce a high-technology, hospital-hased and doctor-centred medical model.
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conviction was not restricted to workers: employers were openly sceptical, as were 
the panel doctors.
The influence of doctors was pervasive. For instance, panel doctors 
complained to patients that the low fees paid by the Fund meant that they could not 
prescribe ‘proper’ medicine, thus reinforcing the idea that ‘proper’ automatically 
meant more expensive. The power relations were quite clear: patients may have 
resented the actions of certain panel doctors in treating non-Fund patients First, or 
making them wait outside, or giving them different drugs, but on the whole they 
continued to go to them, to take the drugs they prescribed and to believe their 
diagnoses. They even signed the petitions drawn up by the panel doctors in 
Pietermaritzburg. It was striking that the two areas of highest utilisation in this 
study displayed an overt culture of sickness: workers in both Pietermaritzburg and 
Great Brak talked about living in ‘sickly’ areas and regarded their high utilisation 
as inevitable, quoting their doctors in support of this theory.'4
At a micro level, workers’ attitudes were also coloured and moulded by the 
structure of the benefits in their Fund. The obligation to provide a doctor’s 
certificate for all absences resulted in over-use (and consequent over-treatment, 
more precisely over-medication) for trivial ailments and encouraged ‘abuse’ in the 
form of token consultations to cover non-illness related absences. The absolute 
association of medication with treatment was entrenched by the system. It was far 
quicker and cheaper for a doctor to issue drugs than to discuss health status and 
lifestyle. The chronic benefit not only reinforced the idea that drugs were an index 14
14 These comments are drawn from my notes of meetings with NULW and SACTWU shop 
stewards in Pietermaritzburg, 9 June 1997 and Great Brak, IK June 1997.
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of good treatment, hut gave doctors a powerful incentive to over-prescribe. On 
the other hand, in the context of a working class practice it is unsurprising if 
doctors medicate where they cannot really treat, in terms of changing the 
conditions under which people live (in poor and overcrowded housing, in polluted 
areas, often far from their workplaces and subject to high levels of violence). 
Counselling and therapy are unthinkable luxuries for working class people, who 
have nowhere to go but general practice. A number of women talked with feeling 
about ‘living on my nerves’, a description which generally resulted in a display of 
assent from other women present."
The influence of trade union leaders
The inlluence of trade union leaders on workers’ attitudes towards health 
care emerged clearly when workers were asked about alternatives to the current 
benefit structure. In the case of TLATIU, shop stewards had been thoroughly 
briefed and had taken on the leadership opposition to the idea of clinics, seen as 
associated with a rival union, SACTWU, and therefore inherently dangerous.16 In 
the case of NIJLW members in Cape Town, this concern was more concrete: 
unlike TLATIU, they favoured a clinic, but were insistent that leather workers 
should have their own and not share with clothing workers. Their concern 
highlights one of the sources of SACTWU’s strength in NICLI: though SACTWU 
was competing for members, influence and legitimacy as a newcomer to the 
industry, it loomed large by virtue of overall size (when clothing and textile
" I did not observe the same response from the men. This may be due to peer pressure, 
militating against identification with a 'female' complainl, or il may he evidence of Ihe classic 
'double burden' of women workers.
SAC'TWU’s inroads in the Transvaal hit Ihe TLATIU (Ihe NUI.W did not operate in the area).
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members were ineluded), organisational strength (and consequent support to 
officials in negotiations) and to some extent through its affiliation to COSATU.’7 
This strength would be particularly obvious to the NULW in Cape Town. 
SACTWU is the largest union in the region, occupying and owning a substantial 
building, in which the clothing clinic was based, just up the road from the NULW 
office.
SACTWU exhibited an equivalent concern about the siting of the proposed 
Durban clinic. After an extended search for suitable premises, the General 
Secretary of NICLI raised the possibility of siting the clinic in the building owned 
by the Council in central Durban, where there was an empty floor which could be 
rented at preferential rates. SACTWU opposed this, arguing in meetings that the 
site was inconvenient, and in private that this was a less pressing problem than the 
fact that the NULW had their head office in the same building.
Members of both NULW and SACTWU in Port Elizabeth pushed for a 
medical aid scheme. The explicitness of this demand was probably related to the 
fact that there were several well known medical aid schemes in the town, with large 
worker membership (including, significantly, the motor industry workers, generally 
perceived as the local labour aristocracy).1" One of these schemes had developed 
an option designed for lower-paid workers, to which SACTWU’s clothing workers 
in the region belonged. SACTWU’s leather members had heard of this scheme and 
wanted to join it. In addition, the option was being heavily promoted by one of the
17 The other two unions were not affiliated to national centres.
111 Members of the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africu (NUMSA), they were well- 
organised, militant and comparatively highly paid. The 1994 minimum monthly wage in the 
automobile industry was KI ,X67, compared with K 1,24.1 in footwear and only R9X0 in clothing 
(Rees, 1995).
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employer representatives on the SFMC us the answer to workers’ needs.'1' The 
basic price was far more expensive than the NIC'I.I Fund, and the scheme was 
seriously mismanaged."1 Ironically, while leather members saw this scheme as a 
step up from panel doctors, clothing workers who belonged to the scheme were 
seriously dissatisfied and wanted to make the step up to a lull-benefit medical aid 
scheme.41
SAC’TWU members at a tannery in the Transvaal had been approached by 
brokers keen to sell an alternative medical aid scheme (on highly unrealistic terms). 
They were extremely confident about their strength at a plant level and wished to 
opt out of the Fund, believing that they could negotiate their way into a 
comprehensive medical aid scheme. SAC'TWIJ officials were embarrassed by this 
issue, considering that the shop stewards had raised an issue in an inappropriate 
forum, revealing dissension to employers and to the other unions. The union 
leadership in Johannesburg saw this us part of a more general rebellion against 
union discipline by this group of members and were unsympathetic to their 
complaint (hat panel doctors were refusing to see them other than on a cash basis.
In the Western Cape, changes in the clothing Sick Fund had been in the air 
since 1987, as described in the previous chapter. SACTWIJ members in the leather 
sector were also exposed to these discussions at local anil national levels: in shop 
stewards’ councils, meetings of ‘locals’, shop steward training and campaign
tic was also chief executive of the two medical aid schemes in question.
" I had previous contact with this scheme and was aware of the problems, which included 
obstructive use of union power by NtIMSA to block attempts to restructure benefits or increase 
contributions to meet rising costs.
"  I was adviser to SA(’TW l) in a company threatened with a strike as a result ol worker 
dissatisfaction with this medical aid scheme. Later, us a member of die Medical Schemes 
Council (MSC), I had further exposure to the scheme’s ongoing difficulties.
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meetings, as well as in national fora, sueh as preparations for wage negotiations. 
The general thrust of the approach (particularly the move away from panel doctors 
towards Fund-run health centres) percolated through the union.
The NIJLW had its own separate fund providing top-up benefits (a 
spectacle benefit and a small top-up for sick pay), to which their members 
contributed separately along with their union dues. This fund was a selling point 
for union membership and a point of differentiation from the other two unions, and 
the NULW defended it with great warmth and opposed incorporation into a 
generally improved IC-administered scheme. The NULW’s reluctance to change 
the chronic benefit in any way (even by eliminating the more obviously absurd 
conditions on the list) arose, I would argue, from the same source: the need to 
present itself to its members as a protector and facilitator of access to benefit. In 
the same way, NULW representatives on the SI-'MC argued for extremely high 
annual consultation limits, at 12 initial consultations and 12 repeats (plus unlimited 
chronic consultations). Given average utilisation in the CC'IC and in free choice 
medical aid schemes of around 6 consultations per annum, this is unnecessarily 
high. But the NULW clearly equated higher limits with better benefits and 
presented itself to members as both more protective and more aggressive than the 
other unions by fighting for a higher increase. The NlJLW’s general approach bore 
some similarities to the approach of the old garment union in Cape Town, with its 
stress on facilitating access to welfare benefits as a key union function.
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6. Implementation and assessment
By the end of 1994, three clinics were established, in Pietermaritzburg, 
Pinetown and Durban and the panels of doctors were reduced in these areas. In 
the Great Brak area, a breakthrough agreement with the local state health 
authorities was negotiated, controlling runaway costs for the Fund and also 
allowing members’ families to use the clinic facilities for the first time (though not 
at the Fund’s expense). The first moves were made towards establishing links with 
other Sick Funds, a slow process which later resulted in co-operative agreements 
allowing clothing workers in Pietermaritzburg access to the leather clinics and 
leather workers in Atlantis access to the clothing clinic.42 On the issue of chronic 
benefits there was little progress.
Lessons from clinics and panel doctors
Clinics were established in Pietermaritzburg, Pinetown (on the outskirts of 
Durban) and Durban. The process revealed a number of underlying problems. In 
Pietermaritzburg, the initial decision was to trim the panel of doctors, limiting them 
to one in each residential or working area. All chronic consultations were at the 
clinic, while for acute consultations members could use either the clinic or one of 
the panel doctors. As an incentive, there were no limits on consultations at the 
clinic.
42 The Pietermaritzburg development was necessitated by the refusal of all members of the 
Independent Practitioners' Association to treat clothing workers, because they were also members 
of SACTWU. The SACTWU official involved in negotiations was also refused treatment by his 
private doctor. Doctors in Atlantis had organised against a range of Sick Funds and medical aids.
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The panel doctors were given advance notice by the Sick Fund that the 
panel would he reduced, in conjunction with the opening of a central clinic.4' They 
held their fire until termination notices went out, at which stage they mounted a 
concerted campaign against the Fund. Some doctors drew up petitions which they 
asked their patients to sign, others protested in heated letters to the N1CLI General 
Secretary.41 *4 The recently established Independent Practitioners’ Association (IPA) 
threatened to expel any doctor who broke ranks and accepted a position on the 
reduced panel. The IPA demanded a meeting with the Fund, at which the doctors 
became extremely heated, taking strong exception to the ‘interference’ of non- 
medical people (specifically my involvement), and threatening a range of responses, 
including legal action (for breach of contract), reporting the Fund to the African 
National Congress (for interfering with workers’ ‘democratic right’ to freedom of 
choice of practitioner), and reporting SACTWU to COSATU (forgoing against 
‘COSATU policy’, which they declared was in favour of panel doctors).4' The long 
‘service’ of the panel doctors was repeatedly cited, along with their ‘charity’ in 
serving leather workers at rates well below standard consultation fees.4'’
41 On 19 January 1993, a memo went to all panel doctors and on I April, letters of notice went to 
doctors whose contracts were terminated.
44 In July 1993, the IPA submitted petitions signed hy 1,327 Fund members with a covering
letter asserting that members did not accept the Health Centre because they were not consulted 
about it and were not permitted to consult their own doctors. The IPA also circularised members, 
urging them to stand united against the changes and mentioning its intention ‘to negotiate a more 
reasonable lee’. (Circular letter from Dr A du Prcez to IPA members, I April 1993. Attachment 
to agenda, meeting with IPA, Pietermaritzburg, 5 May 1993.)
44 The Chairman of the Sick Fund, the NICI.I General Secretary, local employers, NIJI.W and 
SACTWU representatives and I attended this meeting. The IPA curried out its threat to write to 
the ANC, as reported with some amusement by a SAC’TWU official (who was on the branch 
executive of the ANC).
4'’ As in Great Uruk, the cash consultation fees charged hy panel doctors to non-Sick Fund 
members were generally around R30, compared with the NICLI fee of R.31.50.
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The Sick Fund delegation held firm and the process continued. Suitable 
premises were found and outfitted and staff were interviewed by a joint selection 
committee. Two highly competent and experienced nursing sisters with clinical 
training were appointed. Finding a doctor was more problematic. The first two 
choices on the shortlist declined the offer and in the end the committee had to 
make a compromise appointment, of an ex-panel doctor. This had certain 
advantages: he was elderly and highly respected in the town and was a popular 
panel doctor with long experience of the fund. The IPA could not attack his 
competence or experience. On the other hand, he carried with him certain 
entrenched practices and attitudes which were incompatible with the new situation 
into which he was going. The clinic had been planned on a health team model, 
with the clinical sisters screening patients and dealing with minor ailments, as they 
were trained and qualified to do. The doctor refused to allow this and insisted that 
they act in effect as receptionists. The sisters were hesitant to challenge him, but 
expressed disquiet and frustration to (he General Secretary of NICLI and to me.47 
Our attempts to discuss the issue with him were notably unsuccessful.* 4" lie flatly 
refused to countenance any change in his preferred style of practice, despite his 
high profile membership of the ANC, whose Health Plan is explicitly built on a 
primary health care model with nurses as first line practitioners (African National 
Congress 1994a). Because his final defence was medico-legal (that he would he 
liable for any malpractice or illegal extension of scope of practice by the nurses), 
we tried to track down legal clarification on this issue through a maze of
47 They reported angry outbursts sparked by questions which he had interpreted as 
'insubordination'.
4" hike the panel doctors, he attacked my competence as a ‘non-medical’ person, an attack 
characterised by trank sexism and paternalism.
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overlocking and sometimes contradictory laws and professional jurisdictions.4’' A 
meeting with the Department of Health in Pretoria failed to clarify matters and the 
doctor stood firm.5"
The second major problem was the doctor’s refusal to stick to an agreed 
list of drugs (formulary). When the clinic was established, the sisters ordered 
supplies of drugs according to an interim formulary as used in the Cape clinics.* 51 
However, he ignored the formulary and ordered other drugs at random. The drug 
bill rocketed.52 Tentative protests from the sisters only hardened his attitude. His 
prescriptions were collected and submitted to the Department of Pharmacy at the 
University of the Western Cape for comment. The response was that his 
prescribing practices were outdated, inconsistent and extravagant. He over­
prescribed and tended to favour ethical (brand name) drugs even when reliable 
generics were available at much lower costs. This was part of a pattern of 
establishing popularity with patients by lavishness which extended to time as well, 
resulting in a tortoise-like patient throughput and full waiting rooms (exacerbating 
the sisters’ frustration). It was notable that patient flow was much slower in the 
clinic (where he was on salary) than it had been for his panel practice (when he was 
paid per consultation).51
4‘' For example, the Nursing Act and Council, the Pharmacy Act and Council, the Medical and 
Dental Council, the Machinery and Occupational Safety Act.
511 The NICLI General Secretary and I met officials from the then Department of National Health 
in Pretoria on 15 April 1994, only 12 days before the election. They were both unable to clarify 
the legal situation and unwilling to commit themselves to interpretation so clt se to a change of 
government.
1 Revised by Dr Morar of the CC1C.
52 The average drug costs per consultation were 70% higher than in the CCIC’s Salt River clinic 
(Cornell 1994).
51 His average monthly panel consultation rate in 1992 was 490. The panel was only a small part 
of his practice, which also included other panels, cash patients and medical aid patients. His
average consultation rate in the clinic was 750, compared with an average monthly throughput in 
the CCIC clinics of 1,130 per doctor (1994).
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Patients complained (to their unions) about waiting time, especially when 
they clocked out from factories to visit the clinic. And the panel doctors in the 
vicinity of the clinic (most notably the clinic doctor’s ex-partner) experienced a 
boom in business. The Sick Fund sub-committee in Pietermaritzburg considered 
various means of tackling the problem, including terminating the contract of the 
central panel doctor. In the end, the decision was to limit access to this doctor to 
times when the clinic was not open.'4
The Pietermaritzburg experience informed the process of establishing the 
Pinetown and Durban clinics and decisions about the panel in the Cape. No doctors 
were retained in the vicinity of the Pinetown and Durban clinics. Formal job 
descriptions were built into the contracts of the doctors appointed in these clinics, 
specifying a health team approach with the use of clinical sisters for screening and 
consultation on minor ailments, and adherence to an agreed formulary and set of 
prescribing practices. The General Secretary of NICLI took the opportunity 
presented by the appointment of staff to the two new clinics to set up a general 
pharmacy workshop run by the UWC Pharmacy Department, which would include 
the Pietermaritzburg clinic staff as well. Even this attempt met with resistance: at 
the last moment, the doctor announced that he had a doctor's appointment on the 
arranged day.
The major lesson for the CCIC Sick Fund was that attempts to prune the 
panel would consolidate opposition to the re-structuring process and that as long 
as doctors remained on the panel, even with a shrinking patient base, they were less 
likely to mobilise against the Fund. As a result, the CCIC Sick Fund decided not to
M Personal communication, Kevin Perumal, SACTWU, Pietermaritzburg.
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reduce the panel until the clinic system was more extensive and all teething 
problems with dependant cover were sorted out, given the fact that panel doctors 
in Pietermaritzburg had seized on each hiccup in the new clinic as ammunition in a
propaganda exercise to patients.
Links with the state
The Great Brak area presented a different kind of problem. This is a small 
sea-side town, with one large shoe factory employing some 660 workers. It is 
about 450 kilometres from Cape Town and 300 from Port Elizabeth, the 
administrative centre of NICLI. Despite its size, Great Brak was a major loss area 
for the Fund. The pattern continued over a period of years. For example, in the 
period January to July 1994, direct expenditure (excluding administration) 
exceeded contribution income every month except one, despite the fact that the 
factory doctor system described below had been stopped. There was a high 
proportion of registered chronics and chronic costs were particularly high. The 
average cost per chronic consultation (including medicines) was nearly two and a 
half times the national average."
There were a number of explanations for the high utilisation. For a start, 
the panel doctor’s surgery was situated less than five minutes walk from the 
factory, on the direct route between the factory and the township where most of 
the workers lived. The convenience factor was heightened for a period by an 
arrangement whereby the doctor called at the factory for an hour a day and saw 
patients there. A discussion with the doctor revealed the difficulty of involving him
53 The national average was R99.45 in 1991, while in Great Brak it was R242.0S.
in devising a solution for the Great Brak problem and the membership base was far 
too small to justify a Fund clinic. So we took a different route, approaching the 
local authority which operated a clinic near the factory. Although there was no 
legal reason why leather workers should not have used this clinic themselves, given 
their income level, there had been a practice of excluding them and their families 
(for which there was even less basis, as they were not covered by the Fund: as a 
direct result the families were obliged to use the local doctors on a cash basis).
Even without this policy, there would have been the disincentive for workers of the 
clinic fee which, though low, was nevertheless double the paltry R1.50 levy for a 
panel doctor consultation (often waived in practice). Fortunately, there was a 
coincidence of interest between the Fund and the local health authority, the 
Regional Services Council (RSC). The clinic staff establishment was under threat 
because of low patient numbers and the official in charge of clinics run by the RSC 
in the area was fighting to retain posts. Over several meetings, we developed an 
agreement about access to the clinic, which was also thoroughly discussed with 
union leaders and the employer. Leather workers in Great Brak would be required 
to consult the clinic in the first instance, and would be referred to the doctor 
according to standard practice for anything which could not be handled by the 
nurses. The clinic would bill the Fund the standard slate fee per consultation 
(R3.00 in 1992). For cases referred to the panel doctor by the clinic, the Fund 
would pay the doctor a higher fee per consultation, in recognition of the more 
complex case mix.Vl Routine monitoring of chronics would be transferred to the 
clinic.
5ft The fee was K40 for each referral patient, compared with the standard panel fee of R.11.50.
mThe system worked reasonably well in practice, but required constant 
monitoring (by the NICLI General Secretary), especially in terms of the rate of 
referrals to the doctor, which tended to creep up, partly because of patient demand 
and partly because of intervention from the doctor.” The local authority was 
concerned not to antagonise the doctor unduly, as it was dependent on him for 
emergencies and referrals.
There were two major lessons from this experience. First, this deal worked 
because it was local: it was easier to negotiate a deal with the state at local level. 
We had strong indications that the deal would not have worked if we had tried to 
make it at a higher level. This was a difficult stage in health politics: there was a 
new government, with new faces in the national Department of Health, the 
provinces had been totally re-drawn (9 in place of the previous 4), the health sector 
was in the midst of major re-organisation and a flurry of policy exploration, and 
there was uncertainty all around. In the circumstances, there was understandable 
caution about precedents but it was possible to experiment at a local level.
Second, the work involved in negotiating and maintaining a deal like this one is 
substantial. In this case, the involvement of the General Secretary of NICLI and 
support of the employers (particularly powerful in the light of their position in the 
town) was crucial. 57
57 As in Pietermaritzburg, the sisters were uncomfortable about conflict with the doctor and 
tended to follow his instructions ruthcr than those of the RSC administrators, who were not on the 
spot to reinforce their authority.
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Chronic care
The system of chronic care in the NICLI Sick Fund developed haphazardly 
over the years in response to complaints and requests from panel doctors, who 
argued that they could not treat patients with chronic illnesses appropriately under 
the standard payment system. In theory, drug costs averaged out over a patient 
group, with some needing only short courses of cheap medication and others more 
expensive or extensive medication. In practice, doctors tended to look at the fee 
on a per-case basis, focusing on cases which needed more drugs or more expensive 
drugs than the average, and forgetting the cases which needed fewer or cheaper 
drugs.
The differential benefit for registered chronics refunded doctors for 
medication dispensed, at 85% of the recommended retail price, without 
restriction.'* The management committee naively believed that this meant that they 
were obtaining medication at a discount of 15%. In fact, dispensing doctors obtain 
medicine from pharmaceutical companies at heavily discounted rates, in addition to 
rebates for bulk buying and numerous special offers and giveaways. Their profit 
margin »in the NICLI arrangement would have been at least 70% and the incentive 
was therefore to prescribe both more, and more expensive, drugs.v' In addition, 
chronic consultations were not limited. These two factors entrenched the 
difference between the treatment of chronic and non-chronic patients and gave rise 
to resentment in the latter group, partieularly given the value placed on drugs as a
This was a particularly lucrative arrangement, compared with the CCIC arrangement, which 
was based on the wholesale price rather than the retail price.
Drug prices are marked up at each stage of the way from manufacturer to wholesaler to retail 
pharmacy to patient. Panel doctors obtain drugs at prices between the manufacturer's price and 
the wholesale price, plus additional discounts and rebates.
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marker of care by this group of patients. (When asked what they would think of a 
consultation which did not result in drugs, most workers were frankly derisive, 
with responses along the lines of: ‘What would you he paying for?’) The panel 
doctor in Great Brak exploited the value placed on medicines by imposing an extra 
(and illegal) payment, when he ‘had’ to prescribe more expensive medicines. 
Workers, he said, ‘understood’.6" The Fund’s list of chronic ailments was in no 
sense scientifically designed: it was neither comprehensive nor organised on 
rational medical lines, nor was there even a clear definition of chronic illness. It 
simply grew in an ad hoc way, with additions motivated by panel doctors or trade 
unions and approved by the Sick Fund Management Committee. Generally, the 
committee was uneasy about taking decisions they saw as outside their competence 
(there was no provision for obtaining independent medical advice) and they tended 
not to oppose proposals for additions to the list of chronic ailments and individual 
applications. In order to qualify for the chronic benefit, a member had to be 
examined and diagnosed by a specialist, an expensive process for the Fund and 
quite unnecessary for the majority of chronic ailments, such as hypertension, whose 
diagnosis is well within the competence of a general practitioner.* 61
In general, knowledge of the ‘chronic’ benefit was patchy. This is probably 
related in part to the way it developed, by individual application and motivation. 
The list included, for example, deafness, haemorrhage, heart failure, varicose veins, 
hiatus hernia and cancer. None of these should have been treated by general 
practitioners on an ongoing drug regime: some would need specialist investigation
611 Panel doctor, interview hy author, written notes, Great Brak. IK June 1992.
61 The average cost of registration per new chronic was KI 14 in 1992. This was ci|ual to the 
total contributions for one member for seven months (Cornell 199.1b).
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and management, others surgical intervention, others were simply not treatable (for 
example, noise-induced or age-related hearing loss).
The chronic issue - on the face of it, a simple ‘medical’ issue - proved to be 
extremely difficult to tackle. The SFMC requested independent medical opinion on 
the list, and then a second opinion. I wrote a document incorporating the medical 
opinions and outlining an approach to rationalising the benefit, but this too met 
with resistance, specifically from the NULW. If retention of the panel doctor 
system was the TLATIU’s stand or fall issue, the chronic list was NULW’s. Their 
leadership would concede on clinics, but not on chronics. The other unions 
caucused extensively with the NULW on the issue, but failed to convince them. It 
appears that the benefit was used more extensively by NULW members, though 
knowledge was not universal, which might indicate that a degree of patronage (of 
panel doctors as much as of members) was involved in supporting individual cases 
to the SFMC.62 Unfortunately, the national nature of the Fund made it difficult to 
develop a standard agreement on access to chronic drugs with the health 
authorities, which would have to be negotiated province by province. The chronic 
issue was unresolved at the end of my period of involvement with the leather fund.
There were suggestions from the other unions that the NULW’s vigorous opposition to 
rationalisation of the chronic benefit was proof of over-use (and abuse) of this benefit by their 
members, as well as rumours, which could not be substantiated, of collusive relationships between 
specific national leaders and panel doctors, I think it more likely that the NULW had presented 
itself to its members as key in accessing this benefit and was reluctant to lose face.
7. Assessment
The significance of this study lies in the insights it provides into the 
complex issue of union power. This project was as much about unions’ relations 
with each other and leaders’ relations with their members, particularly in a situation 
of competition between unions, as it was about health care. At one level, it charts 
a straightforward recruitment struggle, played out through a health care issue. At 
another, it reveals a struggle between different forms of unionism: a narrowly 
focused, economistic, defensive and relatively bureaucratised form (in NULW and 
TLATIU) and a broader, more political and participatory form (in SACTWU).
The three unions derived their power from very different sources and 
exercised it in distinct and contrasting ways, which shifted in response to a range of 
pressures and influences. The success of this project was due to SACTWU driving 
it. This was a role which might predictably have been taken by the NULW as the 
majority union, well established in the sector. However, the NULW was 
structurally divided in its approach, with differences between the national 
leadership (which was opposed to change, mostly passively, but sometimes 
actively) and regional and local leadership (which not only accepted the project 
after initial caution, but participated actively in implementation). Local officials’ 
attitudes were clearly coloured by members’ responses: they had to deal with 
member complaints, lived in the same communities and were often familiar with the 
doctors concerned.'’1 They also tended to have more pragmatic relationships with 61
61 Local officials - of both unions - also understood the community politics of their areas and 
were extremely useful in devising strategics for undercutting panel doctors' disruptive tactics.
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their counterparts in the other unions, especially in Natal, where endemic violence 
occasionally had a uniting effect. The consultation process had revealed 
widespread support on the ground for changes to the Fund, which were very 
similar to the feelings expressed by SACTWU members. Why, then, did the 
NULW representatives on the SFMC take the position they did? One of their 
reasons was probably concern about poaching of membership by SACTWU and a 
desire to create a bond with TLATIU by common opposition to Fund changes, 
thus strengthening the chances of merger. Part of the answer certainly lay in the 
relatively removed and unaccountable character of the national leadership, which 
was highlighted by an incident during the research process. The NULW General 
Secretary wrote to me querying the consultation process (2 July 1992). At the time 
of the letter, I had held meetings in every region, organised by his own officials. 
One of these had been in Durban, where the NULW has its head office, and was 
organised by the Assistant General Secretary (the main NULW representative on 
the SFMC). The General Secretary had been invited, but had not attended. It was 
clear from his letter and my subsequent meeting with him that he regarded 
consultation as meaning consultation with him.
The smallest of the unions, TLATIU, reacted defensively on the health care 
issue, opposing all change to the existing system. In the absence of positive policy 
on health care, this position appeared to derive from the assumption that low 
utilisation was an index of satisfactory service. Given the level and the static 
nature of membership, the future held either gradual erosion of members by natural 
attrition and decamping to the other unions, or a merger. In the face of these 
options, TLATIU’s strategy appeared to be to secure current membership as a
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counter in the merger talks. On the health care issue, they did this by defining 
others as abusers of the Fund. The leaders’ standard point of entry into debates 
was the low utilisation of benefits in the Transvaal. Support for the panel system 
was clearly dictated by the union General Secretary, with a vehemence directly 
correlated to his suspicion of SACTWU. The meeting with TLATIU shop 
stewards and officials was notable for the extent and forcefulness of the General 
Secretary’s intervention and his intolerance of alternative opinions. As a union 
style, this could not have been more different from SACTWU’s.
The strength of SACTWU leadership derived from other sources. The 
national leadership was heavily committed elsewhere and sufficiently confident to 
delegate representation on the decision-making structures in the Sick Fund and to 
allow delegates a considerable degree of freedom.64 SACTWU leather officials had 
an advantage over the other unions in the broader base of their union and their 
access to a more sophisticated range of services, both inside and outside their 
union.65 The union’s involvement in two similar overlapping projects (CCIC and 
NCIC), meant there was a broader reference group in the union at large with 
whom to discuss issues and develop strategy. The distinguishing feature of the 
SACTWU delegates was their strategic skills. The main delegate was Mark 
Bennett, from the national office of the union, an economist by training and head of 
the union’s collective bargaining department. His strategic leadership at the 
committee level was complemented by the involvement of a regional leader, Kevin 
Pcrumal, who was based in Pietermaritzburg and played an important part in the
64 leather was the smallest of the three sectors for which they were responsible. In addition, the 
national leadership were extensively involved in federation activities and national political 
developments.
M SA(TWU’s relationship with the Industrial Health Reseurch Group is a case in point.
implementation process. Strong opposition from NULW and TLAT1U to clinics as 
a ‘SACTWU’ idea caused SACTWU to make a strategic shift to promotion of the 
project as a joint union initiative, playing a deliberately low-key role in public, 
especially in the early stages of the project as the NULW somewhat hesitantly took 
the lead.h6 At the SFMC and ‘Nine-a-Side’ Committee, they built strategic 
alliances with the NULW, making use of union caucuses. As a result, the NULW 
often spoke for the union side, and laid claim to agreements which resulted. It was 
an index of confidence that the SACTWU officials felt no need for public 
recognition of their role.
This is a project which started with a modest and partial advance. Efforts 
were focused on particular regions, where a sustained commitment of the parties 
involved secured significant achievements, despite financial constraints and logistic 
challenges. Subsequently, the Fund made two major changes which affect all 
members. Sick leave benefits were improved, allowing for a shorter period of sick 
leave (10 days instead of 52) but at a much higher proportion of the wage (65% 
compared with 25%). Given the general pattern of utilisation, this is a major 
improvement in benefit. The Fund has also introduced a maternity benefit, paying 
33% of wages for three months. Most significantly, the process of development 
continues, especially in KwaZulu-Natal, the most troubled and turbulent of South 
Africa’s provinces. At the time of writing, the NICL1 Sick Fund operates a total of 
six clinics, two in Pietermaritzburg and four in and around Durban. This has 
enabled the Fund to dispense with the panel system in KwaZulu-Natal, except in 
the rural areas. A further clinic is planned for the Western Cape, in a joint venture
M This opposition is minuted at a series of meetings in late IWI. (Minutes SFMC 19 September
with the CCIC. The success of this project can be measured not only in the clinics 
and the satisfaction of the workers who use them, hut also in the style of unionism 
which shaped this outcome and was strengthened by it and which ensures that the 
process of development has continued. It is a style which carefully balanced 
solidarity and sectional interests: assessing the costs and consequences of alliance 
with or distancing from other unions and of confrontation with employers, either 
jointly or alone, but maintaining always the primary connection with workers which 
animates and informs an effective union leadership. The strength of that leadership 
is evident in the continued development of the Sick Fund during a period of major 
change in the health sector, conditions which halted progress in a similar scheme in 
Natal, the subject of the next study.
1991. Minutes executive meeting 27 November 1991)
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Chapter 6. Natal Clothing Industry Sick Fund
1. Introduction
The third study focuses on failure and is a counterpoint to the previous two. It 
explores the difficulty of transferring a model from one situation to another, 
specifically from one region of a national trade union to another. Like the two 
previous studies, this was a project aimed at restructuring a Sick Fund run by an 
Industrial Council. As in the Cape, the industry was clothing and the union was the 
South African Clothing and Textile Workers’ Union (SACTWU). With so many 
common features (union, industry, organisational structure) and two prior examples of 
restructuring, this seemed an ideal situation in which to apply a model, honed by 
experience and adapted for the local situation. Nevertheless, it failed, primarily 
because of the differences underlying the apparent symmetry of the projects.
National unions are not monoliths, especially where they have grown from 
mergers. The process of merging two or more trade unions requires adaptation both 
within and between regions. The new identity cannot be imposed, but must develop 
organically. While the new leaders may speak with one voice nationally on matters of 
policy, it is harder to homogenise style and approach at the regional level and these 
may continue to distinguish (and potentially divide) regional branches, especially when 
they are geographically remote from each other and thus not subject to the influence of 
proximity and the necessity to develop a reasonable working relationship.
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The bargaining structure for this industry was, on the face of it, the same as in 
the two previous studies. The Industrial Council had a main Council, with subordinate 
committees to manage the affairs of the various Funds operated under the Council’s 
auspices (each with equal representation for employers and union), plus an 
administrative staff to carry out the decisions of the Council and committees and run 
their affairs on a day to day basis. However, the form of representation and degree of 
engagement of the parties in the different committees differed markedly from the other 
studies, as did the support provided by the administrators, with implications for the 
outcome which are explored later in this chapter.
An industry is also not a monolith, particularly a marginal industry such as 
clothing, which is highly sensitive to external factors such as shifts in government 
policy on tariffs and protection, as well as to elasticity in demand, which in the case of 
clothing is directly related to general economic conditions. Most significant were the 
differences resulting from the two year time lapse between the projects in the Cape and 
in Natal.1 The clothing industry in Natal was substantially smaller than in the Cape, 
but with the same pattern of an overwhelmingly female workforce in scattered 
workplaces, many of them small. More significantly, employment levels were very 
unstable in the period of the study and afterwards. In 1994, membership of the NCIC 
Sick Fund hovered around the 33,00() mark, after a period of contraction, in which 
there had been retrenchments, factory closures and widespread short-time working.
The resultant insecurity (for both employers and workers) was compounded by the
1 Though the NCIC project was first mooted in late 1992, it did not get under way until early 1994.
prospect of reduced tariff protection. Employers felt threatened and defensive and this 
coloured their approach towards change.
The time lapse also situated the project squarely in the middle of fundamental 
political change. Natal (now KwaZulu-Natal) was (and remains) the most politically 
riven of South Africa’s provinces. It was the power base of Chief Mangosuthu 
Buthele/.i’s Inkatha (subsequently the Inkatha Freedom Party - IFP), radically (and 
indeed violently) opposed to the ANC and any organisations associated with it, 
including COSATU-afllliatcd unions. Given the power exerted by the IFP, union 
activism in COSATU-affilialed unions took on an especially dangerous edge in Natal. 
This was particularly the ease for African workers, given the IFP’s strength in African 
residential areas and their hold over the rural areas, where many workers’ families 
lived.2 Nevertheless, trade unionists were heavily involved in political work in the 
lead-up to South Africa’s first democratic election (Buhlungu 1994a). The approach 
of the election exacerbated tensions in Natal, which was swept by a tide of violence 
(Lcsufi et al. 1995; Silas 1995; Clark 1996). This small project struggled to gain a 
foothold in the eye of the storm, and failed.
Many amenities were linked to II P membership, including access to housing and pensions. As a 
result, many people t<x>k out membership, even when they supported the ANC’. The IFF created its 
own union, the United Workers' Union of South Africa (UWUSA). With the IFF, UWUSA was 
linked to many violent incidents against members of COSATU-afliliated unions (Baskin 1991: 70-72; 
126; 327-342).
2. Another province, another union
The Sick l umi project in the Cape was part of a broader process whereby a 
new leadership transformed lite union, while in Natal the established leadership was 
securely rooted in a militant tradition and did not have to prove itself by transforming 
the institutions within which it operated. In short, the Sick bund in Natal held neither 
symbolic resonance nor challenge for the union leadership.' Nevertheless, the CCIC 
and NICI.I projects both had ripple effects on the Natal region of SACTWIJ. The 
single Council policy was extensively discussed at high levels in the union in the early 
IWOs and the process included detailed comparison of the various agreements and 
their associated funds and benefits, in order to facilitate amalgamation. Union leaders 
(both officials and shop stewards) in other regions and in the third sector, textiles, 
heard about Sick bund developments in national forums. Nevertheless, knowledge 
about the CCIC and NICI.I developments was neither detailed nor accurate in the 
union til large. This vagueness allowed a dangerous unreality to develop, especially 
about the costs of change, as well as tin unspoken assumption that research alone 
would accomplish change and that the model developed in the Cape could simply lx 
imported into Natal. Union officials directly involved in the other projects were not 
infected by this unreality, but they were thin on the ground.
' The dismissive attitude nl Natal leadership is clear in the following comment: 'According In 
( 'npelyn |then ( icncral Secretary ol A( TWIISA|, the (¡WII(WI’) lias an obsession with henuly 
contests and hcnclits ... which detracts from wlial a trade union is all aimin' (Markham IUX7) 
Traces ol this altitude are still discernible in die Natal branch.
Tin- industry
Durban was the centre for cheaper clothing, which heightened the local 
industry’s dependence on protection from imports (Nctshitomhoni 1995). The 
industry started to expand again in 1995, with membership of the Fund growing to 
37,(KX> by mid-year, but subsequently shrunk quite dramatically, to a low of 29,000 in 
January 1997.4 *This instability confirmed the conservatism of employers, concerned 
about their own survival in a threatened industry and nervous about any new financial 
commitments. The shrinking of the industry reduced both the income and the 
expenditure of the Fund, though not proportionally, given the fixed costs involved in 
running the clinics and administering the Fund. In addition, the rules allowed free 
access to certain benefits for contributors who became unemployed, which was a 
significant potential burden for a poor Fund in times ol large scale redundancies.'
Wage levels were similar to those in the ('ape, differentials between Councils 
having narrowed in the last few years." The workforce was and remains predominantly 
female, as in all areas in the clothing industry. In Natal, there was a majority of Indian 
workers, with the rest made up largely of African workers, with very few coloured 
workers and a minuscule number of while workers.7 By general consensus, the
4 Interview wiiti If Harrison (Secretary ol the Industrial Council) and If Nyuger (SACTWIJ 
official), Durban, 21 January 1997.
' The entitlement was tree medical services lor a period of (i weeks lor I year's service, up lit a 
maximum of 24 weeks lor It) years service. Members with 20 years service who retired due to ill 
health or old age, were entitled to tree medical service lor lile.
" In 1994, Iherc was only R 2 SO difference in the cash wage between the ( 'ape (R2h1 per week) and 
Natal (R26.V50) (South African Iarbour liullelin 1994).
' Registrations with the Industrial Council in 199.1: Indian workers hf>%, African workers 11%, 
coloured workers 1% and white workers less than 1% (total 21) (letter from l)r Mall. March 199.1).
proportion of Af rican workers in the industry was growing." These demographic 
patterns had implications for planning. As in the Cape, the predominance of women 
highlighted the need to develop services to tackle women’s health problems.1' Tile- 
large number of Indian workers was pertinent because of the high rate of diabetes in 
the South African Indian population."’The entry of African workers into the industry 
is accompanied by a shift in the pattern of dependant residence, as a proportion of 
African families continue to live in the rural areas while the primary member works in 
town.
Unfortunately, while there was anecdotal evidence about the demography of 
the Fund, it was not supported by reliable data. The Council started the process of 
computerising its records only shortly before this study was undertaken and was 
unable to provide reliable information on such factors as age, sex, number of 
dependants and residence (of primary members or dependants)." The only reliable 
geographical information related to the distribution of workers by factories, which 
were clustered in the central Durban area. The Council was supposedly in the process 
of updating its records, via the Provident Fund (which also needed dependant names 
and addresses, as beneficiaries).
" This trend was commented on hy all parties, hut could not he verified hy reference to systematic 
records.
' It was clear from the Cape study that it was important not to limit women’s services' to 
contraception and pregnancy related services. Many older women complained that they were 
forgotten once they stop|>ed hearing children.
Or Mall confirmed this pattern in the clinic population, hut was unable provide measurable data, 
given the manual record-keeping system.
11 When workers first entered the industry, their addresses were registered with the ( ouncil, hut 
there was no reason to update these records unless they left the industry and then re-entered, (liven 
the length of service of many workers, there was a strong likelihood that addresses were out of dale.
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The union
The impetus for the NCIC project came from a union official fully aware of the 
dangers of a simplistic approach. Mike Murphy had also made the initial approach 
about the leather fund. At this stage, I was heavily involved in the implementation of 
the recommendations of the leather study, and in compiling the Cape Clothing Sick 
Fund Report, so I had a great deal of contact with the union in all centres and at all 
levels.12 He was aware of membership dissatisfaction with the Fund and concerned 
about the way the union had responded, specifically the way that Sick Fund-related 
demands had been added to the annual list of demands for negotiations without serious 
consideration, and as easily dropped from the list at the first check in negotiations. He 
had first hand experience of the SFMC and identified union neglect as one of the 
fundamental problems with the Fund, along with ineffectual management and 
reluctance on the part of both employers and workers to increase contributions, which 
he attributed to ignorance of the real costs of health care and of the tight constraints 
under which Dr Mall (the Principal Medical Officer of the Sick Fund) had been 
running the medical services. He argued that Natal needed its own Sick Fund 
investigation, in order to develop realistic plans. In his view, the project needed 
bilateral backing from the SFMC to lend it legitimacy and should include a survey of 
dependants, in order to provide reliable data, which would hopefully deflate employer 
perceptions of the size of black families (and the consequent cost of cover), involve a
12 This section is based on my notes of a series of informal discussions with Mike Murphy during 
1992.
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broader group of union officials and give litem a slake in the project, and conned with 
the membership
The lack of broad involvement in Sick fund matters by trade union officials 
and leaders was mirrored, to a degree, in the membership. A number ol factors 
combined to alienate members. In the first place, there had been a great deal ol 
confusion alter the wage negotiations of IW2. The union had gone into these 
negotiations with demands for a new maternity benefit and sick fund benefits for 
children, influenced at least in part by developments in the Cape. It was a lough year 
for negotiations and the eventual deal was a maternity benefit and agreement on the 
¡mndplc of dependant benefits (Keel IW3; Von lloldt IW3h). It suited both 
employers and union to allow a certain vagueness on this issue, the employers claiming 
generosity and the union a victory on the list of demands. Not unnaturally, many 
workers understood this as agreement to include dependants immediately, especially 
given the concurrent contribution increase." The fact that the maternity benefit was 
lieing largely funded from reserves (and therefore could not survive indefinitely 
without additional funding, requiring a further contribution increase) was also glossed 
over. The unfortunate legacy was serious dissatisfaction from workers, unrealistic 
expectations and reluctance to stomach any further increases.
This wits the background to my early involvement with the Sick l-'itml. At the 
request of Mike Murphy, I prepared an outline ol the proposed research, which was 1
1' The system changed I rum a Hat rule to a |iercentage (0.7%) ot the wage law mucliinisls this 
meant an increase from l< I It) lo l< 1.54. The increase was generally viewed as veiy large and quoted 
nr percentage terms. However, die base was extremely low and the new rate was still cheaper than a 
packet ol cigarettes.
submitted to the SFMC in April 1993 and subsequently expanded at tlteir request to a 
Draft Proposal in June 1993. In the event, the rcseareh was delayed for a further six 
months bceause of the outcome of the wage negotiations in mid-1993. Mike Murphy 
recognised explicitly that the project would face the obstacle of undoing some of the 
problems of the past, especially the unrealistic ideas about the costs of extended cover. 
At the beginning of the process, I met with hostility when I spoke to mass meetings 
about the financial situation of the Fund and the contribution levels that would be 
nccessary to fund better benefits for members and coverage of their dependants. 
Resentment continued even alter Mel Clark (who took over when Mike Murphy 
moved from the Sick Fund) tackled the issue head on and publicly accepted that the 
union was responsible for this problem, having not come clean about the financial 
implications of the agreement struck around the maternity benefit.14
Unfortunately, the residual membership dissatisfaction and suspicion was 
sparked into new life by an incident during the project, when the membership survey 
described in Section 6 below was administered by Industrial Council staff.1' In 
addition, the process of investigation of the scheme was shorter and more 
concentrated, with less time for members to absorb the issues and take on a leadership 
role in the changes. The lack of a survey was not balanced, as happened in the leather 
study, by extensive (and relatively unconstrained) contact with the membership. It was
14 The delay between the Draft Proposal and the beginning of the formal project meant that Mike 
Murphy was no longer directly involved in the Sick l urid, having moved full lime into national rather 
than regional union work.
"  lly comparison, the CCIC survey was administered by researchers with the co-operation ol tlie 
union, rather than hy Council staff.
very difficult to establish anything like the degree of contact with members that I had 
developed in both the CCIC and the N1CLI projects. Although I developed a 
relationship with the shop stewards’ council and, particularly, with the task group 
appointed to assist in the Sick Fund project, conditions around the time of the election 
resulted in severe disruption of normal union activities (Buhlungu 1994a; 1994b; Sitas 
1995).
When Mel Clark became involved (from March 1993), he took a particular 
interest in the issue and was the guiding union figure and my major contact. However, 
this was only one of his responsibilities: his job description was fluid in the extreme, 
with new tasks added to his remit throughout the period of this project.* 16 While other 
union officials expressed friendly interest in the process, few became actively involved. 
Clearly, the Sick Fund was neither a high priority nor an attractive involvement, 
especially in comparison with the mainstream political issues of the time. There was 
also a great deal of confusion concerning ‘nationalisation’ of health care, with a 
number of officials sharing the widespread belief amongst workers that health care 
(read ‘private health care’) would be ‘free’ after an ANC victory, in which case energy 
spent on reforming the Sick Fund would be wasted.
Mel Clark's abilities were obvious in the decision by union leadership to assign him several lull 
time responsibilities at once, despite his relative newness to the union. For example, he had the 
overall responsibility lor recruitment, organisation and co-ordination of monthly paid workers. The 
union was on a drive to increase its membership amongst this group of workers, who were 
particularly demanding of organisers. The responsibility he was given did not, however, translate
into hacking by the leadership for his activities in another sphere, namely the Sick Fund. He came 
into the union from university, moved to the Trade Union Research Project at the University of Natal 
and then to the KwaZulu-Natal Regional Economic Forum.
3. The Industrial Council: bargaining and administrative structure
The NCIC Sick Fund was not established in terms of a separate legal 
agreement (as in the CCIC and NICLI), but was a part of the main Industrial Council 
agreement. This dependent status is mirrored in the organisation of meetings:
Provident and Sick Fund meetings were scheduled to follow one another on the same 
afternoon, which resulted in rushed meetings. There was minimal employer 
engagement in the SFMC and this was mirrored in the research process, during which 
contact with employers was limited to a number of brief contacts with the secretary of 
the Natal Clothing Manufacturers’ Association (NCMA) and attendance by a broader 
group of employers at the workshop at which the recommendations were presented 
and discussed. Dr Mall sat on the SFMC, but did not have a vote. The employers 
were generally proud of the ‘economy’ of their Fund, expressing the view that this was 
one area where they outdid the otherwise stronger Cape Clothing Industry. The 
regional employer organisations were made increasingly aware of the developments in 
other areas as a consequence of their regular meetings in connection with negotiations. 
By this stage, SACTWU had made some progress towards its aim of a single national 
Industrial Council for the clothing industry. The clothing ICs now combined for 
negotiations, though the separate councils remained. The union operated with a single 
negotiating team, composed of regional representatives and national officials, while the 
employers caucused together but did not field a single team.17
17 Each union region drew up demunds, which were combined into one national set of demands. The 
settlement was an overall offer for the whole country, divided slightly differently in each region. A
The Natal employers’ belief in their Fund’s ‘economy’ was founded on Dr 
Mall’s efforts to hold costs to a minimum."* He, in turn, believed that his success in 
containing costs would incline the Committee to agree to his proposals to expand 
certain benefits.1'' However, far from recognising his efforts, the chairman of the 
employers’ association believed that there was still some ‘fat’ in the system and urged 
me to seek additional savings on the drug bill.2" Ironically, the task of restructuring 
would have been easier had Dr Mall been less successful in keeping costs down in the 
past: contributions would have continued to rise with wages and there would have 
been savings to make, which could have been applied to improvement, offsetting part 
of the total cost of the restructured benefits.
The Fund was poorly managed, with particularly weak financial and statistical 
information systems. There were serious problems with the extent and accuracy of 
Sick Fund documentation, other than that obtained from the medical director (see 
below). The medical information was not computerised - in fact, little of it was 
processed, given the nature of record-keeping in the clinics. (Much of the information 
was provided in the form of handwritten notes.) This made for difficulty in analysis, 
particularly in terms of tracking trends over time. The Secretary of the NCIC was a 
particularly problematic figure. He was unreliable on deadlines and slow in responding 
to requests for information or assistance, failing to carry through certain crucial agreed
region might decide to put more of the increase towards the provident fund or sick fund, to reduce the 
gup between itself and the ‘leading’ region.
"* Interview with I.cn Smart, director of the NCMA, Durban, I April 1993.
For example, Dr Mull had submitted a proposal to improve the lamentable dental benefit, which 
was ignored.
J" Interview with I.en Smart, director of the NCMA, Durban, I April 1993.
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tasks. His position was under threat throughout this period, particularly from the 
union, and his insecurity expressed itself in unco-operativencss.21 This created great 
difficulties during the research process, especially given my Cape Town base.22 A 
more fundamental problem only emerged after he left the Fund in mid-1995, when it 
was discovered that he had grossly overestimated real income.2' He had premised all 
budgets on l(X)% collection of contributions, though the collection rate was only 50- 
60%.24 In addition, he failed to take account of short-time (relatively widespread 
during this period) and employment records were seriously out of date which, in a 
shrinking industry, resulted in a major over-estimation of income due. As a result, the 
budgets made no sense at all and the likelihood of implementation of the 
recommendations of the Report dwindled.
The production and presentation of information is key to decision-making by 
the SFMC. The CCIC and NICLI produced substantial agenda documentation, 
including standard reports on utilisation and exception reports, and detailed financial 
reports (comprising monthly and year to date actual expenditure against budget, 
revised projections and cash flow analyses). They also produced semi-verbatim
21 For example, in a crucial research trip to Durban in February 1994, he was repeatedly unavailable 
to meet with me, though the trip was planned in advance and lasted a week. He spent the final day at 
a cricket match.
22 Distance is not in itself an insuperable problem, as was obvious in the NIC'I.I study. The leather 
1C is based in Port Fli/aheth, some 750km from Cape Town and the study also involved work in 
Durban, Pietermaritzburg, Johannesburg and Great Hrak.
21 He resigned from the Council, under some pressure, particularly from the union. (Interview with 
Berlin Nyager, Durban, 23 January 1997)
24 The low collection rale was a further indicator of poor administration. All ICs have trouble 
recovering fees due, especially from small companies, but this recovery rate was so low as to cripple 
the Fund.
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minutes.2' The eustom in Natal was to run a series of meetings on the same day, 
dealing with Siek Fund, Provident Fund and other issues. (For a while, the union 
proposed merging all the committees, hut settled on a policy of using the same 
delegation to all the committees.) As a result, there was a palpable time pressure. The 
NCIC documentation was extremely skimpy, with no regular financial reporting of 
actual expenditure. Minutes were short, recording decisions only, without record of 
debate.2'' Meetings too were short, considering the importance of the issues, and were 
frequently postponed or cancelled.27 In a well-run Fund, minimal documentation and 
short meetings might have indicated streamlined efficiency, in a weak Fund they hinted 
at lack of knowledge and control.2*
An active Sick Fund Management Committee (SFMC) would have identified 
the Secretary’s administrative weakness and taken steps to counteract it. Hut neither 
party engaged sufficiently: the history of union neglect has been described above and 
the employers on the management committee, though managers themselves, appeared 
to focus exclusively on authorising and tracking expenditure to the exclusion of other 
management issues, including even the basic one of checking income.
'  The meetings were taped and verbatim records called up in times of disagreement.
2,1 The new Secretary, Mr Harrison, expressed satisfaction at his ‘efficiency’ compared with the 
ponderous procedures of the other Councils, citing the brevity of his minutes and agenda 
documentation (Interview with Mr WII Harrison, Durban, 23 January 1997).
! ’ Anecdotal reports from union officials about the brevity of SI-'MC meetings was confirmed when 
Mr Harrison became involved in August 1995 and instituted a system of recording meeting times. 
Most meetings were completed in less than an hour, at a time of major financial crisis for the Fund. 
(Minutes o f .SFMC meetings, 1995 and 1996.)
’* The other Funds were probably ovcr documcnlcd, though this was, of course, immensely helpful 
to a researcher. The standardised nature of reporting, in particular, facilitated analysis.
The mandate for (his study was to investigate the extension of medical benefits 
to the dependent children of members. While the union (or more specifically, the 
union leaders who spearheaded the project) wanted a fundamental examination oft lie- 
whole benefit structure, the employers had insisted on the narrow remit which became 
my formal brief. I attempted to manage this conflict by blandly assuming consensus on 
the statement that recommendations for cover could not be made in isolation: while 
the primary focus was on provision of cover for dependent children, the framework 
would be the existing provision for primary members and this would inevitably he 
subject to analysis and, where appropriate, recommendations for re-structuring. With 
hindsight, this was a serious mistake: avoidance of the underlying conflict did not 
dissolve it and it came back to haunt the project. Employer resistance compounded 
with worker resentment to form a potent barrier to change.
4. A summary of the project
The introduction of the unfunded maternity benefit alter the IW2 wage 
negotiations depleted the Fund’s reserves to such an extent that other developments 
were rendered unfeasible without major re-structuring.2'' In the IW3 wage 
negotiations, the Sick Fund once again lost out to other demands. The only
The deficit was more than K7(X1,(XXI in IW2 and more than KdtXl.tXX) in IW.V
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development was a further contribution inerease.'" This heightened the resentment of 
the membership, who believed that they had already paid for improved benefits and 
even dependant cover and were now being further burdened, while the promised 
improvements seemed as far away as ever. Unfortunately, the increase was nowhere 
near large enough to fund improvements. In fact, it was not even sufficient to restore 
the reserves, slashed by 70% in one year. Once again the project was deferred, this 
time by six months. The formal study was completed in the period January to June 
1994 and the Report was submitted in time for the mid-year wage negotiations.
From the start, the raw material of this project was unpromising. The benefit 
structure was similar to that of the other 1C Funds, with a few features which 
exacerbated the difficulty of transformation, especially the payment system for panel 
doctors described below. The financial constraints were stark: a very low contribution 
base, shrinking reserves and unrealistic expectations from both members (expecting 
major improvements with no further increases) and employers (expecting further 
savings from a very lean fund). Given the financial position of the Sick Fund, the hope 
of cost-free change of a positive nature was unrealistic in the extreme. Like the other 
Sick Funds, it operated on a low funding base but it also had certain peculiar 
problems. Contributions had not been increased fora number of years, thus losing 
ground against inflation. The NCIC faced the prospect of re-structuring with shrinking 
reserves, unlike the CCIC which had the useful buffer of the Dependants' Fund.
The 1993 increase was from 0.7% to 0.95% of the weekly wage (from K1.54 to K2.2X pw lor 
machinists).
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To make matters worse, two other sources of finance were also ruled out.
First, it was still locked into paying sick pay." In the Cape, moving to BCEA sick pay 
had released substantial funds for redirection, at the cost of a negotiated reduction in 
the wage increase for one year. A similar deal was ruled out in the NC'IC, because of 
employer resistance (fuelled by reports from Cape employers of the inflationary impact 
of the change to BCEA sick pay) and economic conditions, which rendered unlikely a 
wage increase large enough to make a once-off reduction (in return for the changeover 
in sick pay system) acceptable to workers.
Second, the nature of the panel contracts in the NCIC meant that there was no 
potential to save by moving patients to clinics. Eike the CCIC, the NCIC operated 
two clinics alongside a panel system. Members had to register with either a specific 
panel doctor or a clinic.'2 Some 13,000 of the total membership of 33,000 chose to 
register with one of the 14 panel doctors who were contracted by the Fund at the time 
of the study. The NCIC panel was paid on a capitation basis (a fixed fee per member 
per month, regardless of usage), whereas the CCIC and NICEI funds paid their panel 
doctors on a contracted Ice for service basis and could make substantial savings by 
moving to clinics. Moving NCIC panel patients to clinics, while it could improve 
quality of care, would actually be an extra cost rather than a saving. Nearly half the
" Sick leave conditions fell between the CC'IC and NICM, paying 50% of wages for 40 days a year. 
The first two days were not paid, even in a longer illness. Sick pay accounted for 36.4% of fund 
expenditure in 1992 and 2K.2% in 1993, total payout falling by 1.3%. The decrease was probably 
largely related to a drop in employment during this pcritxl and reluctance to take sick leave in times 
of high retrenchment. Though retrenchment procedures are negotiated, worker anxiety persists and 
there is a tendency to avoid being conspicuous in any way.
12 In the Cape Clothing and heather funds members could consult any of the panel doctors and/or 
the clinics.
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membership were servieed by private doctors at a remarkably low rate. Unlike the 
panel doctors in the CCIC and NICLI, doctors could not become rich from this Fund. 
The limited number of doctors on the Natal panel (14 compared with 96 in the C'C'IC' 
and 325 in NICLI, which had a similar membership) was due in pail to Dr Mall’s close 
management of the system but rather more to the financial arrangements (the CCIC 
and NICLI had a constant stream of applications from doctors wishing to join their 
panels)." On the other hand, their risk was limited (as the Sick Fund supplied drugs to 
them directly for dispensing) and quantifiable (as they controlled access to their own 
patient lists). They had, on the whole, been persuaded into joining and remaining on 
the panel through religious connections, as a charitable gesture." The payment system 
and level had both negative and positive spin-ofls: though the artificial cheapness of 
the system meant that switching to a clinic system would increase rather than reduce 
costs, the Natal doctors were highly unlikely to undermine the re-structuring process, 
as it posed no threat to them but rather relieved them of the burden of charity. 
Unfortunately, the Sick Fund was built on the basis of this uneconomic model, which 
had enabled contributions to be held at unrealistically low levels for many years.
" In the C'C'IC', the highest earning panel doctor made K44,(MM) from the Sick f  und for October 
1992 (Cornell 1993). In the NIC'I.I, the panel doctor in Great Hrak earned K2X(),(XK) from the Sick 
fund in an IX month period from January 1991. X.59C more than the total eontrihution income from 
the 650 workers on his list (Cornell 1992).
"  The SMO is a devout Muslim and confirmed to me in discussion that he approached doctors on the 
basis of community duty.
The methodology for this study was constrained by time limits, a limited 
research budget, access to reliable data and distance." Trips to Durban had to be 
carefully scheduled and were relatively inflexible, which made postponement or
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curtailment of meetings (markedly more frequent in the time around the election) more 
problematic. This also increased my reliance on the Secretary, unfortunate in terms of 
his efficiency and reliability. The problems of administration were highlighted in the ill 
fated dependant survey, undertaken when the Council’s updating of Provident Fund 
records was delayed indefinitely. Instead, a sample survey was planned, and failed 
spectacularly. Because of time and budgetary constraints, the survey had to be 
designed to be administered by Council staff, who normally visited factories in the 
course of their duties. The process was simplified to reduce the possibility of error. A 
briefing was provided for the Council agents, together with a list of factories to visit, 
stressing particularly that they must involve the shop stewards in each factory and 
explain the purpose of the exercise to workers in order to gain their co-operation. The 
Secretary was responsible for informing employers, briefing the agents, keeping them 
to an agreed timetable, and overseeing data entry. However, Council staff ignored 
instructions to involve shop stewards in administering the questionnaire, a vital 
condition given the history of member dissatisfaction with the Sick Fund and a 
prevalent reluctance to provide personal information to sources regarded as official."'
"  There was a great ileal of pressure to complete the Keport helore the IW4 negotiations (mill-year). 
This was the only project in which a cost limit was imposed from the start. This would have been an 
even more serious constraint had donor funding lor the IIIKfi not subsidised the consultancy fee.
Suspicion of ofticial questioning goes far beyond Ibc Sick Fund: the South African census has 
always suttered in accuracy as a result.
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As a result, the process aroused hostility and suspicion amongst members 
(which was fuelled by rumours that current contributions would be multiplied by the 
number of dependants), and the apparently straightforward aim of gathering 
information on dependants and residence was frustrated. Mel Clark embarked on a 
damage-limitation exercise, issuing a series of explanatory pamphlets, a poster and a 
letter to accompany the questionnaires to each factory.'7 The issue was also discussed 
in a number of union fora, in order to dispel misunderstanding amongst the 
membership, and a task group was appointed, with one shop steward from each local 
branch, to assist in the process. Despite this involvement, the membership survey 
could not be rescued and the information it yielded revealed a number of flaws, which 
meant that it could not be used to project dependant patterns to the membership as a 
whole. As a result, a survey of tax records was undertaken in four large companies and 
this was used as the basis for calculation of dependant numbers. Progress was also 
impeded by the crudity of the record-keeping systems employed (with no computer 
records at all for the period leading up to the project), the paucity of information from 
the Council (and some doubts about the quality of such information as was available) 
and the lack of backup from the Council itself (in direct contrast to the attitudes of the 
CCIC and especially the NICI.I administrators).
17 The letter addressed the tears of members, explaining the need for die inhumation and ending in 
classic union style: ‘forward to treatment for tile children!!!! forward to a bcllci Sick fund lor all” ! 
Drug live SA("I’WU, l.ong live!!!' (Circular letter to members, SA("TWII, Durban, February IW4.)
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Despite the problems of the research, a Report was produced and presented to 
the Industrial Council for consideration (Cornell and Lewis 1994). The central 
recommendations were:
• upgrading of the existing clinics
• establishment of a network of neighbourhood clinics
• retention of a limited panel system
• incorporation of dependants into the clinic system
It was six months before a joint employer-union workshop was held to discuss 
the recommendations in the Report, in December 1994. By this time, another round of 
wage negotiations had been completed, again without agreeing an increase in 
contributions sufficient to fund any real improvements. At the workshop, the 
employer response could be described as polite stonewalling: they approved the 
approach in broad outline but referred all decisions with cost implications to wage 
negotiations. As wage negotiations happened mid-year, this put implementation on 
the back burner again. This was a time of shrinking employment in the sector, which 
inevitably compounded a reluctance to change, which was then further justified by 
reference to uncertainty about state policy on health care and its funding (Dobson 
1996; Rossouw 1997). The only issue on which there was some progress was moving 
the clinic downstairs: Dr Mall was instructed to investigate the costs in detail. It was 
clear that the employers saw no further role for me: I had completed the investigation 
and implementation was not my concern, an assumption which was not forcefully
challenged by the union. Though I had further informal contact with the union and Dr 
Mall, it was clear that the process had ground to a halt.
This impression was confirmed by a follow-up visit in January 1997, when I 
interviewed the new Secretary of the Council and the union official who had taken 
over responsibility for the Sick Fund from Mel Clark. There had been very little 
progress in the intervening two years. The Gale Street clinic had moved downstairs 
into expanded and upgraded premises, though these were not fully used, due to lack of 
funds. For example, there was now an well-equipped dental surgery, including 
facilities for an oral hygienist, but the dentist was still employed on a sessional basis, 
offering an unchanged limited service, and the oral hygiene surgery had never been 
used. The proposal to move the Lome Street clinic to a residential area had died a 
slow death. Dr Mall was clearly trapped in an unchanged position: all the work of 
administration of the clinics fell on him, but his role was still undervalued. The new 
secretary spoke slightingly of him as being ‘overpaid’. This was an interesting 
perception, as Dr Mall was being paid less for a full-time clinical and managerial role 
than the Secretary was making in a part-time contract post. The new Secretary had 
been appointed to modernise the Council’s operation and, in the case of the Sick Fund, 
to stage a rescue operation. However, under his management, the Sick Fund had not 
only wiped out all its reserves but accumulated a debt of R3 million. His response was 
to present a rescue scheme to the SFMC meeting in November 1996. This 
'management plan’ contained a number of recommendations, designed to improve 
income and curb expenditure.
The recommendations were, in summary:
• improvement of collections (R75(),(XX) was owed)
• marketing of services to other Sick Funds (for example, the leather and laundry
industries)
• shelving dependant cover (cost projections had now risen to R3.Km)
• limiting (he maternity benefit
• limiting or eliminating chronic medicines
• further restricting sick pay
• restricting or eliminating free care for retirees
• imposing a levy for medicines (R5)
• considering closing the Lome Street clinic and retrenching staff
Though he proposed suspension of the maternity benefit for six months, the 
Secretary calculated that it would take at least two years to repay the debt (during 
which time there could be no improvement in benefits) and he assumed that the 
suspension would be permanent. It was clear that the paralysis which afflicted the 
Fund had continued and worsened. Instead of expanding, the Fund was considering 
contracting and cutting benefits, even the maternity benefit. Though this drastic step 
was not taken, it was startling that it was even suggested, in a largely female industry. 
The Secretary put a figure to usage, saying that ‘only’ 3.7% of the membership drew 
maternity benefit in a year, and used this to back his argument that this was the most 
sensible target for economy. The SMC) had always been somewhat ambivalent about
the maternity benefit, arguing that it was too expensive, absorbing resources which 
could better have been applied to improving the dental and other benefits for all
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members.’8
Minutes of SFMC meetings in 1996 reveal the employer representatives 
distancing themselves from responsibility for the state of the Fund or attempts to 
rescue it. In February, ‘It was noted again that the economics of an extension of Sick 
Fund services were to be established and considered for inclusion on the agenda for 
annual negotiations.’(SFMC Minutes February 1996) Given the history of Sick Fund 
demands in negotiations, this was likely to result in no action at all. In March, the 
employers reiterated their support for extension of services, but on condition that these 
were ‘self-funding as much as possible’(SFMC Minutes March 1996). This was an 
entirely new proposal and out of place in a joint structure: if workers were to fund the 
benefit extensions alone, employers clearly had no right to be involved in decisions 
about benefit structure. There were no meetings of the SFMC between March and 
August, largely because of an industry-wide wage strike.1'' When meetings resumed in 
August, the employers once again urged that a decision be taken once and for all, but 
only on a self-funding basis. The union was understandably reluctant to follow this 
route and, in the event, the question became irrelevant in the face of the financial crisis, 
which was considered seriously for the first time. It is unclear why it took so long,
18 He expressed particular resentment ut the fact that he had motivated his staff to accept low salary 
increases on the basis that the increased reserves would be used to establish a new clinic in the 
residential aiea of Clairwood and these reserves had been ‘blown’ on maternity pay. (Notes of 
meeting with Dr Mall, Durban, 2 April 1993)
'* The union settled for 8.5% on wages and 0.5% on bonus, plus an increase of 1% in the employer 
contribution to the provident fund (Collins 1996 ).
given Ihe fact that the fund had been losing steadily for the past 6 years. The new 
Secretary had been in office for more Ilian a year at this stage, sufficient time to 
uncover the real financial situation. Against this background, it was highly 
inappropriate for the union to take sole responsibility for rescuing the Fund.
7. A ss e s s m e n t
Delays and shifts in the timing of research are standard in union-generated 
projects, but in this instance they had particularly negative effects. In the Cape, Ihe 
major delay (in implementing the change to statutory sick pay, via the HC'FA) had 
been balanced by the establishment of the Dependants’ Fund, which massively 
strengthened the Sick Fund’s financial viability and capacity to accommodate change. 
In Natal, the delay was due to the impact of the unfunded maternity benefit, which 
drained reserves and significantly weakened the Fund’s viability. All the while, 
members’ unrealistic expectations, undamped by the union, fuelled a growing 
dissatisfaction. Most significantly, Ihe delay shifted the study into IW4, with political 
change looming.
The political climate influenced this study in marked ways. The imminence of 
the first democratic election, set for April IW4, had a pervasive effect: big change 
both overshadowed and threatened little change. In the face of galvanic national 
political change, it was difficult to engage officials, shop stewards or workers in the 
process of re-structuring something as small-scale as a simple sick fund. While Ihe
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CCIC study had its roots in the apartheid era, when the state’s reluctance to upgrade 
health services for working class people challenged the union and presented it with a 
clear field for action, the NCIC study began in a radically different time. By early 
1994, with a new government in the offing, worker expectations were at a high pitch, 
but they were focused on government for once, rather than the union (Ginsburg et al. 
1995; Torres 1995; Isaacs 1995). At the same time, employer fears about the electoral 
alliance of the ANC, COSATU and the SACP and its influence on the economic 
policies of a future government reinforced their caution about any change with 
financial implications. This caution was underlined in relation to the Sick Fund by a 
belief (shared with union leaders) that the new government was likely to impose some 
new legal requirements in terms of health care for workers - National Health Insurance 
was often mentioned by employers and unionists - and employers were reluctant to 
commit themselves to expansion until they knew what government would impose on 
them.
The election period was particularly complex and extended in Natal, where the 
levels of violence were such that predictions of full-scale civil war did not seem 
exaggerated. In the end, the election had to be postponed in this province and there 
were widescale reports of intimidation and fraud, alongside the endemic violence. The 
union had extensive commitments in the run-up to elections, with some leaders 
seconded to the Independent Electoral Commission, and a great many officials and 
shop stewards involved in programs associated with the elections (Buhlungu 1994a).4"
411 John Copelyn, long-time general secretary of SAC'TWU (and previously of NIJTW) was one of ihe 
COSATU ‘list’ of official trade union candidates, submitted to the ANC as part of the electoral
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This meant that meetings were more erratic than usual, and a number of key figures 
were absent. The absence of key worker leaders had a ripple effect - not only were 
they not drawn in as a conduit to and from workers, but when they did return to union 
life from election activities, some were suspicious about processes which had gone on 
in their absence. The meetings which did occur were infected with the uncertainty, 
anxiety and excitement of the time and it is not surprising that the Sick Fund issue 
failed to ignite widescale commitment, or even interest.
This chapter underscores the significance of the genesis of a project. The 
contrast with the way the Cape Clothing Industrial Council (CCIC) project arose is 
particularly marked: that project was grounded in years of work and discussion inside 
SACTWU and its precursors, before a formal study was ever undertaken. Though the 
same union was involved, the Natal Sick Fund lacked the historical and political 
significance that the Cape Sick Fund exerted in relation to union role. As a result, 
action to restructure it was less powerfully motivated, more narrowly focused and 
more easily derailed. Despite the energy and involvement of at least two key union 
officials, the Fund failed to engage the interest of a broader group of union officials in 
Natal. The legacy of worker disillusionment and dissatisfaction made the Sick Fund an 
unpopular issue, without powerful supporters among the union leadership at the 
branch level. As a result, though Sick Fund-related issues were placed on the list of
alliance deal. In addition, many other unionists (both officials and workers) stood for election on the 
general parly list. In the process, the union movement lost a cadre of experienced leaders to 
government, a process which has continued since the election. Voter education was a particular 
priority for the union. The electorate was expanding from whites only to the whole adult population, 
so there was a massive group of first time voters, including SACTWUs entire membership. To add to 
the task, the voting format hammered out in negotiations was complex.
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demands for bargaining every year, they were the first to he sacrificed when the horse- 
trading began. The lack of interest at negotiation time was a mirror of the 
discontinuity of responsibility for Sick Fund issues within the union and the low level 
of involvement in SFMC meetings. The SFMC’ system was cumbersome, but it offered 
some potential to exert influence (il not absolute control) over finances and the nature 
of services provided. The union did not use the potential powers of the SFMC' 
structure, leaving financial management to the Secretary of the Council and medical 
management to the medical director of the Fund.41
This study also highlights the way in which research relationships impact on the 
outcome. In comparison with (he CCIC and NICLI studies, my involvement with this 
Fund was very limited. There was minimal contact prior to the study itself and during 
the study there were major problems with both the extent and the regularity of contact 
at different levels in the union. These factors combined to produce a significant 
divergence between the stated purpose of the study and the realistic scope for 
intervention. The notional task was to meet the expectations of both workers and 
employers for dependant cover and better benefits for existing members without 
further increases in the base contributions. Realistically, the most that could be hoped 
for was to restore financial viability to the Sick Fund in its present form and to 
persuade the parties that substantial change would require real increases in 
contributions and real involvement in managing the affairs of the Sick Fund. In the 
event, the project failed to meet even this scaled-down aim. There was a model,
" For example, the union hail tailed to examine f inancial statements critically, assess the standard 
reports presented to the committee, or respond to l)r Mall's proposals and pleas.
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developed and refined by experience, and the project was backed by at least two 
committed union officials but it was not grounded in the relationship between union 
leaders and members. Though there were external reasons for failure (including the 
timing and style of the research process, the state of the industry and events on the 
national political stage), and internal reasons (including the structure, staffing and 
financial basis of the NCIC and the Sick Fund), the crucial Haw was in the union’s 
relationship with the project.”
The final study in the next chapter examines the issues of joint management in 
the context of a far more complex situation, in which ten very different unions are 
drawn into a Board of Trustees to save a much larger and more elaborate scheme from 
disaster.
42 Continuing problems of political violence and economic restructuring face the trade union 
movement, which has also been weakened by the ongoing leadership hrain drain. See for example 
Huhlungu ( I994h), Silas (1995), Lesufi el al. (1995) and Clark ( I99fi).
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Chapter 7. Transmed
1. Introduction
This chapter reports on a study of a trade union project in which both 
process and outcome were coloured by a complex and shifting balance between ten 
very different trade unions. The project of restructuring a medical scheme was one 
of the arenas in which a much broader struggle between unions played itself out. 
Inter-union relationships were characterised by a tension between solidarity and 
sectionalism, giving rise to strategic alliances, fragile truces and significant silences. 
This study raises questions about the implications of union involvement in a multi­
union context where the workforce is very diverse, and reveals the possibility that 
union solidarity may mask and even compound inequality. It also draws attention 
to the attenuated relationships that may develop between leaders and members on 
an issue like health care.
The project was the restructuring of Transmed, the in-house medical 
scheme of Transnct, the state-owned transport conglomerate.' The company 
(previously the South African Transport Services - SATS) had commercialised in 
1990, as a first step towards corporatising on the basis of divisions, and the longer 
term aim of privatising (SALB I992c; Makgetla 1995; Ray I997). The company 
had no history of bargaining about health care, and the creation of a structure in
' Transnet incorporates Portnet (harbours), Spoornct (all rail services except local passenger 
services), Autonet (road freight from ports), PX (parcel express), Transwerk (maintenance). 
Petronet (oil transportation), Metro (local passenger rail services) and Transtel (cellular 
communications).
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which to tackle the issue was an integral part of the project. The Transnet 
workforce was extremely diverse, as was the range of trade unions operating in the 
company. There were thirteen unions in all, ten of which had representation on the 
Board of Control (the others were very small). At one end of the spectrum was a 
union for pilots; at the other a union whose membership base was largely manual 
labourers. There were major differences in organisational style and resources, 
bargaining style and skills, and political affiliation within the range of unions. 
Though all ten unions declared themselves non-racial, in practice membership 
broke down roughly on a racial basis reflecting the division of labour prevalent in 
South Africa prior to the change in government: three unions organised largely 
unskilled and semi-skilled workers (two with overwhelmingly African membership 
and the third with a largely coloured and Indian membership); the other seven 
unions organised the rest of the workforce and had overwhelmingly white 
memberships. I was drawn into the project by SARHWIJ, the largest union in 
Transnet. SARHWlJ’s membership was larger than all the while unions combined. 
Recognition by the company followed two bitter and bloody strikes in the l9X0s, 
which established the union as the radical voice of black workers, in contrast with 
the compliant unions which had previously been recognised for the purposes of 
negotiations (Baskin 1991; Green 19X6).
On the whole, the unions operated within natural constituencies, with little 
overlap.2 The competition between them was not for members but for resources. 
Transnet, as a commercialised state company, was facing conflicting demands. On
2 The while unions hud agreed on a delineation of recruitment and membership and did not 
overlap with each other at all. SAKIIWlt's base was unskilled workers, hut it had started to 
recruit across skills levels and business units as employment practices shilled in the company and 
hluck workers started to enter other areas of work.
Ihe one hand, the centrality of transport to economic development meant that there 
was great pressure from government to streamline Ihe company, increase efficiency 
and cut costs. These were also seen as necessary steps towards privatisation, for 
which Transnel was being seriously considered (Wackernagel 1997). On the other 
hand, as a state-owned company under a new government it was under pressure to 
shake off its racist past and redress the deep-rooted inequalities which 
characterised its labour practices. The provision of health care benefits for its 
employees and ex-employees was one of the areas of discrimination: current 
employees were in five different medical ‘Plans’ with very different benefits and 
some 25,(XX) current employees, almost all black, had no cover at all. 
Discrimination amongst pensioners was even more extreme: while some 50,(XH) 
while pensioners enjoyed sophisticated full benefit medical aid funded by the 
company, at least 14,000 black pensioners had no cover at all.'
This study opens up a number of crucial and uncomfortable questions about 
the differential uses and effects of union solidarity. Where there are significant 
material differences between union constituencies, it may be counter-productive to 
submerge sectional interests (especially those of the least advantaged group) too 
soon or too completely. The contrast with the leather project is striking: though 
that was also a multi-union situation, Ihe workforce was homogeneous and there 
was a single medical scheme with uniform benefits for all workers and union 
solidarity benefited all workers equally. This was not Ihe case in Transnel, where 
the different unions represented constituencies with very different wages and
' Pensioners who retired helore 1991, when Ihe company was commercialised, were funded 
KXWf by Ihe compuny, with the exception of a voluntary top-up plan ('re-insurance').
222
conditions, who had access by virtue of their income to very different health care 
arrangements. Given the economic constraints, developments which improved the 
situation of the lowest paid workers threatened the position of unions whose 
members had enjoyed more elaborate benefits. These unions invoked union 
solidarity to block changes which threatened to erode their position, thus 
preserving an unjust situation and effectively pursuing a sectional agenda.
The themes of threatened loss and need to redress injustice which 
characterise this project echo the larger project of national restructuring in South 
Africa. The Transnet workforce (present and past) is a microcosm of South 
Africa’s heterogeneous population, with all its class divisions, coloured by a history 
of complex racial distinctions. As in the national process, this project involved 
restructuring health service provision in the context of a financial deficit and 
redistribution between groups, concurrent with the development of new structures 
for decision-making and involvement of the users of health services. Unlike the 
Industrial Council studies, there was no pre-existing structure for decision-making: 
a new structure had to be developed to accommodate a far more complex set of 
employer-union relationships and this had to be done rapidly, given the major 
financial implications of delay.
The project faced difficulties of a different order from those of (he relatively 
simpler Industrial Council studies, with their limited and uniform benefits and 
modest budgets. The 1C projects involved improvement of benefits from a very 
low base, working ‘upwards’ as it were, while the Transmed project involved, in 
essence, a narrowing of choice for members: those who had ‘lost’ were aggrieved 
and those whose access to benefits had improved were also not satisfied while
differentials remained. The suspieion was heightened by the re-design of benefits, 
which made preeise comparisons of entitlement between the old and new scheme 
difficult and added uncertainty to the sense of loss experienced particularly in the 
white unions.
Transmed, with its multiple tiers of benefit and mix of private and public 
sector health care, mirrored the problems facing the Department of Health in 
developing a strategy for the country us a whole. The sheer size of the problem in 
Transmed was daunting: with 15 1 ,(XX) principal members and nearly half a million 
beneficiaries in total, this is one of the biggest medical schemes in the country, even 
before incorporating the substantial group without cover. The scheme’s income 
lor January to September 1996 was R636 million. While the Board of Trustees 
struggled to come to grips with the problems involved in restructuring both 
benefits and contributions, monthly losses rose as high as R20 million a month, 
three times the annual income of the Natal Clothing Sick Fund. The enormous 
difficulty of restructuring one element of welfare provision in one company (albeit 
a large national company in a sector central to the economy) highlights the 
complexity of nationwide change and the problem of generating and implementing 
a model to suit all situations, while retaining union involvement.
2. Background
History cast a long shadow over this project. There were two previous 
eras of medical benefits in Trunsnct. In the first, differentiation was on explicitly 
racial grounds. Medical benefits were originally introduced as part of a policy of
protecting white labour. The railways was one of the last enclaves of protection 
for the white working class (mining was another), anil was characterised by low 
wages, but job security and good benefits for retirement, disability and illness.
While workers’ families were included in the social security net and the railways 
had a tradition of family employment which still survives. The medical scheme 
provided for these workers initially bore some resemblances to the Industrial 
Council schemes, with relatively simple benefits and - crucially - a panel of doctors. 
Over time, these limitations were removed and the scheme developed into a full 
scale medical aid scheme, with no direct provision of services with the exception of 
the network of 57 Transnet pharmacies. I lowever, though the while scheme was 
developed, the scheme offered to black workers (the so-called ‘blue card’ system) 
remained crude. The blue card entitled black workers to very limited benefits, 
basically consultations with contracted ‘railway’ doctors and simple medicines 
dispensed by them. Workers’ families were excluded from even this simple benefit, 
revealing clearly the institutional racism which permeated the transport sector, 
especially the railways.
The second era of benefits was ushered in when Transnet was 
commercialised in I WO. This time explicit racial differentiation was abolished and 
replaced by economic differentiation. Transmet! ‘modernised’ the design of the 
scheme, introducing live different benefit options (’Plans’) to replace the earlier 
stark division between the ‘while’ and ‘black’ schemes. The live Plans varied 
dramatically in the kinds of benefits offered, financial limits on coverage and 
contribution levels. Plan I was the lowest level, in its initial form incorporating
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only primary care benefits and no hospitalisation. It was intended as an equivalent 
benefit to the ‘blue card’ system. Plan 2 was slightly broader and more generous in 
limits. Plans 3 to 5 became progressively more generous and elaborate.* 4 *Though 
the five Plans were open to all, affordability created a barrier to access to the 
higher benefit schemes which was almost as impermeable as the racial barrier of the 
past.
When the five new Plans were introduced in 1992, all employees were 
asked to nominate their choice of Plan. The vast majority of black workers did not 
do so by the deadline. In an attempt to force their hand, Transmed threatened to 
close down the ‘blue card’ system and transfer all members who had not nominated 
a choice to Plan 1. This move aroused considerable dissatisfaction and deepened 
the suspicion with which black workers and their unions regarded the medical 
scheme. At this stage, the South African Railways and Harbour Workers’ Union 
(SARHWU) asked me to assist in negotiations with Transmed. They also drew 
into the process the two other black unions, the Black Labourers and Allied 
Trades’ Union (BLATU) and Transport and Allied Trades’ Union (TATU).4 In the 
end, it was impossible to design a rational scheme from first principles (because of 
lack of information and company attitude), so we fell back on a compromise, using 
union muscle (the company was nervous of another strike) to force through some 
basic design changes in Plan l.6 There was a deadlock on the question of equity,
4 Members of plans 3 to 5 could opt for ‘re-insurunce’: in return for a set monthly fee per family, 
certain limits on benefits were removed.
4 SARHWU involved the other unions for both practical and political reasons: practical, because
many of their members were also in the ‘blue card' system, political, to strengthen alliances with 
the other unions (with which they hoped to amalgamate).
'' In the event, we could have been far more radical, given this nervousness and their remarkable 
lack of figures to back their costings, but I advised against driving contributions lower on the
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with Transmed management arguing with remarkable naivete that the new design 
was equitable because all the schemes were open to all employees. The black 
unions, on the other hand, saw that whites had a long history of very highly 
subsidised generous medical aid coverage in a single scheme and that at the 
moment when membership was opened to all workers there were suddenly five 
Plans with very different costs and benefits. For a price close to that of the old 
white scheme, they were now offered far lower benefits. The resentment 
engendered by this unfairness coloured the attitude of union leadership towards the 
scheme. Though SARWHU managed to head off the Transmed proposal to 
transfer all ‘blue card’ holders to Plan I, by default, members clearly indicated their 
dissatisfaction and distrust by staying out of the medical scheme in large numbers. 
This background is important, compounding as it did the general suspicion on the 
part of the black unions towards the operation of Transmed.
The white unions were also dissatisfied with the Transmed Plans and 
showed this by taking legal action to prevent Transmed raising contributions 
‘unilaterally'. There was an existing structure for collective bargaining in the 
Transnet Industrial Council, established in 1991 after a period of bitter industrial 
strife. However, instead of referring the Transmed issue to the bargaining 
structure, the company decided to establish a new and different joint body and 
assigned a senior manager in the Finance Department of Transnet, Jacques 
Schindehutte, the task of writing a constitution for a joint employer-union Board of 
Trustees for Transmed. The legal injunction lent urgency to the process as the
grounds that at some stage they would have to he made more realistic, and this would then 
involve a larger and more unpalatable increase lor members.
scheme could not survive without some mechanism to implement member 
contribution increases.7 *10 However, the prospect of drawing together in a decision­
making structure ten very diverse trade unions, management representatives from a 
company in the process of dramatic restructuring and medical scheme 
administrators unaccustomed to accountability, was a daunting one. I was engaged 
as a consultant to this process, formally as a consultant to the employer and all the 
unions, but with an understanding that my primary connection was with labour."
3. The interested parties and their agendas
The trade unions
Transnet was a multi-union employer and all the unions operating in the 
company, with the exception of the South African Railways and Harbour Workers’ 
Union (SARHWU) were company-specific.’ The unions largely recruited from 
different groups, though there were some minor overlaps.'" The result was a very 
complex inter-union relationship, with a shifting balance of common and conflicting 
interests. The relationships of the different unions with the employer shifted 
dramatically in the period of the study: black unions’ access to management
7 As Ihe ‘employer’ contribution was a percentage of wages il increased automatically with 
salaries and wages.
" My role is discussed in some detail in the methodology appendix.
v SARHWU organised workers in two domestic airlines aside from SAA and in the Airports 
Company. An impending merger with the Transport and (ieneral Workers' Union (TCiWU), set 
for early 1998, will bring together public and private sector transport in one union (Interview 
with Tsidiso Moshao, London. 21 September 1997).
10 This is markedly different from Ihe leather industry, where the three unions competed for 
members.
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increased, as did movement of black employees (sometimes trade unionists) into 
management, creating an interestingly nuanced set of relationships."
The unions involved in the medical scheme project were:
• SA Railways and Harbour Workers’ Union (SARHWU), affiliated to 
COSATU, organising predominantly labourers, open to all but with a largely 
African membership base: 37,074 members1 2
• Black Labourers’ and Allied Trades’ Union (BLATU), affiliated to NACTU, 
organising predominantly labourers, with a largely African membership base: 
7,076 members
• Transport and Allied Trades’ Union (TATU), unaffiliated, organising mostly 
artisans, with a coloured and Indian membership base: 1,971 members
All of the following unions admitted black members, but were overwhelmingly 
white:
• Salaried Staff Association (Salstaff), affiliated to the Federation of Unions of 
South Africa (FEDUSA), organising mainly administrative workers and more 
recently middle managers: 10,253 members
• Tegnicsc Werkers Unie (Technical Workers’ Union - TWU), affiliated to 
FEDUSA, organising mainly artisans: 11,122 members
• Voetplaat Werkers Unie (Footplate Workers’ Union), affiliated to FEDUSA, 
organising train drivers: 7,933 members
11 For example, the President of the union took a management position in the company during 
the course of the project.
12 SARIIWU had some while members (and at least one white official), but experienced the 
common problem of assimilating white members into union activities (X.ikalala IW3u; IW3h).
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• Engineering Union of South Africa (EIJSA), affiliated to FEDUSA, 
organising the lowest skills levels among white workers: 5,037 members
• South African Airways Pilots’ Association (SAAPA), unaffiliated: 142 
members
• South African Airways Flight Engineers’ Association (SAAFEA), 
unaffiliated: 1,909 members
• South African Airways Engineering and Artisans’ Union (SAAEAU), 
unaffiliated: membership unknown"
My first task was to produee a commentary on the draft constitution for the 
unions. This commentary was circulated for responses, after which I ran a 
workshop for representatives from all the unions (attended by all except TATU) in 
which the issues were discussed, co-ordinated the responses into a single document 
and sent this as a labour response to the employer. The constitution went through 
many further adaptations, to accommodate changes in design, to meet the legal 
requirements of the Registrar of Medical Schemes and to fit with administrative 
procedures in the scheme." At this early stage, the principal issues from a union 
point of view related to:
• representation for unions: proportional or equal? (proportional 
representation would have favoured SARIIWU and might have forced some of 
the smaller while unions to join forces for representation)
1' The SAA unions arc not party to the 1C. They operate a joint closed shop for the defined job 
categories and have their own bargaining forum. SAKIIWU has members in SAA and 
negotiates wages lor these members in the 1C, taking only division-specific issues like stalling 
levels to the SAA bargaining forum.
"  The final version was only signed in July IIWfi.
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• division of the membership into different ‘risk pools’ and different Plans and 
consequent allocation of reserves and resources
• decision making: the nature of a quorum (simple majority or majority of each 
party) and decisions by simple majority or by larger majority for some issues
• the role and powers of ‘experts’ and of Transmcd administrators on the 
Board of Trustees
• the powers of the Board, the Executive Committee and any sub-committees
• dispute resolution
• voluntary membership, withdrawal and re-joining
• definition of pensioner members
All ten unions had equal representation on the Board of Trustees. The 
minority (white) unions supported the position of (he Transnet manager who 
drafted the constitution on this issue. Though his motivation was to establish the 
character of the Board as a non-bargaining forum, they clearly envisaged a 
bargaining forum and feared that proportional representation would weaken their 
position, given their size. Though SARIIWIJ and the other black unions initially 
proposed proportional representation on the pattern of the Transnet 1C, they 
eventually conceded. Like the while unions, they took their own agendas into the 
Board. Their fundamental scepticism about the medical scheme resulted in a 
conditional altitude towards the Board and they held in reserve the strategy of 
withdrawal if involvement did not produce tangible benefits for their members.
The white unions benefited from an undivided mandate: all their members
belonged to the medical scheme, as did their ex-members. All had enjoyed high-
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level benefits at very low direct cost and had no fundamental problems with the 
scheme as it was: their mandate was to retain existing benefits and hold 
contributions down." For the black unions, the situation was much more 
complicated and they operated with an unstable mandate. Unlike the white unions, 
their experience of the medical scheme was recent. A significant section of their 
membership had not opted for membership, was highly suspicious of Transmed as 
an institution and strongly opposed to any compulsion to join the scheme. On the 
other hand, union members who had opted for scheme membership were 
dissatisfied: the majority were in Plans 1 and 2 and were dissatisfied with the low 
level of benefits. The minority who had opted for Plan 3 were satisfied with the 
benefits but unhappy with the cost. The general mandate from black scheme 
members was not retention of the status quo, but rather return to the past 
(specifically to the highly subsidised, high benefit system previously open to whiles 
only). The S ARHWU leadership structures repeatedly questioned decisions of the 
Board, rejecting compromise and demanding that their trustees maintain a hard-line 
sectional position. This vastly complicated their task.
The employer representatives
One of the fundamental differences between the Transmed project and the 
Industrial Council projects was in the nature of employer involvement. In the 1C 
projects, the employer representatives on the Sick Fund Management Committees 
had a direct economic interest in the outcome: some were factory owners, others 1
11 The majority of white employees and pensioners were in Plans 3-5, the high benefit plans. 
Plans I and 2 had very few white members.
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managers directly answerable to owners. Those who came from the employer 
organisations were mandated by their members and answerable to them. In 
Transmcd, on the other hand, the ‘employer representatives’ were simply 
employees themselves. Only one person from the employer group, the Chair, had 
more at stake, having effectively staked his personal prestige and perhaps his future 
with the company on the ‘success’ of the project: securing a deal, holding the 
unions to it and getting Transmcd onto a sound financial footing."’ The real power 
on the employer side lay outside the Board of Trustees, at the most senior 
management level in the company, which was going through dramatic shifts in the 
period of the project. The change of government in 1994 had accelerated the pace 
of a process of change already begun in Transnet. At the most overt level, this 
involved a program of affirmative action in appointments and promotion in a 
company whose major section (the railways) had been a bastion of ‘civilised’ 
(while) labour. Less obviously, it resulted in a shift in company culture, with a 
great stress on ‘transparency’ and inclusivcness.17 Industrial relations had been 
professionalised relatively recently and experience of the new system was restricted 
on the employer side, with a residue of distrust and discomfort among the non-IR 
managers around the style and tactics of bargaining. During 1996, the 
management structure of Transnet was revamped. A new layer of executive 
directors (six black appointees, mostly from outside the company) was created, 
with responsibility for divisions and some overarching functions, such as finance.
He is no longer Chair of the Hoard of Trustees, a rotating position which has passed to the 
General Secretary of the SAA union. He has recently been appointed Principal Officer of 
Trunsmed, reporting to a new Chief Executive.
17 The company t<x>k some time to shake off the old culture of secrecy: in 1992, acting for 
SARHWU, my difficulty in extracting routine information from Trunsmed was only overcome by
Some of these appointees were uncomfortable with the structural implications of 
their position in management, especially in relation to the black unions."1 During 
the course of this project the position of the managing director changed 
fundamentally: at the beginning, he was still in power and was approached directly 
by the Board with a request for financial assistance, later, though he retained 
nominal power, real power shifted to the heir apparent to whom subsequent 
requests were directed. The company was committed to a policy of affirmative 
action, attempting to transform a traditional white-dominated structure to a 
‘rainbow nation’ workforce. These changes were visible to some extent in the 
choice of employer representatives for the Board of Trustees, including a number 
of black managers. However, there was some distance between the new 
management and the Board members supposed to represent them, which 
manifested itself at several decisive moments, described below. The employer 
representatives were chosen for a range of reasons, including experience in fields 
regarded as relevant to the business of the Board (for example, legal and 
accounting expertise). They were neither formally mandated with an employer 
position, nor did they report back to management structures. In effect, they acted 
in their individual capacities. The imbalance in power and accountability between 
union and employer representatives was a repeated source of frustration to the 
unions.1’
the intervention of the head of the IR department. In 1996, information was often equally 
difficult to obtain, even with the authority of the Board of Trustees.
1,1 Most of the new black managers would have been ANC supporters. This, and a shared 
experience of racial segregation, made the black unions closer to them.
”  The lack of employer mandate continues to he a problem, raised explicitly on the Board. The 
ex-Chair has suggested that employer representatives should confer with the Executive Director 
(Finance) for their mandate (Interview, Tsidiso Moshao, London. October 1997).
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The administrators
In the past, the medical scheme had been part of the larger bureaucracy of a 
government Department, the South African Transport Services (SATS). When the 
company was commercialised in 1990, Transmed was defined as a separate division 
and required to function as a commercial company. The separation was, in fact, 
more notional than real, as the ties and overlaps between Transmed and the rest of 
the company survived, along with the operational style of the past. Technically, 
the administration company could have been replaced by a commercial 
administrator (many of whom offered lower rates), but practically, the change 
posed enormous difficulties. In addition, the staff of Transmed were organised by 
the unions which operated in the rest of the company, who were consequently torn 
between their desire for competent and competitive administration and the need to 
protect members’ jobs.
Rumour and alarm were quite as powerful and disruptive amongst 
Transmed staff as in the scheme’s membership. It was a large organisation with an 
extensive hierarchy. In the course of the project, there were a number of meetings 
and workshops with staff. The company policy of affirmative action was far less 
obvious in Transmed than in some other divisions and it retained the traditional 
white Afrikaner-dominated staff pattern well into the project. Towards the end of 
my involvement, there were some changes, including the appointment of a black 
woman as chief executive and the promotion of black staff in a few key positions.
The lack of engagement in, and enthusiasm for, the project was 
problematic, given the major administrative tasks involved in a fundamental change
in benefit design. Lack of commitment went to the top of the organisation, with 
the Executive Manager announcing his resignation and rapid departure two months 
before the launch of the new scheme.2" An exception to this lacklustre rule was the 
computer division, which seized on the challenges with relish.
Outsiders at the table
The analysis and re-structuring of the Fund necessitated expert actuarial 
consultants. The process of appointment prefigured the joint operations of the 
Board (which had not yet been constituted). The manager who had drafted the 
constitution proposed a company with which Transnet had an existing consultancy 
relationship. The unions were suspicious of this relationship and questioned the 
consultants’ independence. In the end, several consultants were pul through a joint 
vetting process, at the end of which Old Mutual Actuaries and Consultants 
(OMAC) were appointed, with Heather McLeod, an actuary specialising in health 
care, as principal consultant.
As in the 1C projects, my involvement in this project was rooted in a longer 
term relationship with a trade union, then extended to include a broader group of 
unions and a parallel relationship with the employer party and, in this case, with 
other consultants. However, my role was substantially different: I was a watchdog, 
interpreter and mediator, while OMAC did all the analysis and produced designs 
and costings. This project was notable for the complexity of the Board’s 
relationships with ‘experts’. Unlike the 1C projects with their simpler parallel 20
20 Ironically, he lelt to take up a post in managed care for the largest mcdicul scheme 
administrator in the country. His departure was something of a relief, hut did nothing for staff 
morale.
relationships (formal with both parties via the SFMC, informal with the union 
outside this structure), Transmed could more easily be characterised as a web. 
Besides the relationships between OMAC and the various parties, and myself and 
the parties, there were other more shadowy experts around, in the form of 
consultants drawn on by the white unions at various points, or nourished by 
different (white) pensioner groups. 21 OMAC’s task was, in the first instance, to 
unravel (he workings of the administrator, in order to track income, utilisation of 
benefits and expenditure by each of the five Plans. Usage and expenditure was 
then broken down further by age, income and family size, and by category of 
expenditure. All of this information fed into the design of a new benefit structure 
and proposals for restructured contribution tables.
The Working Group
A Working Group was tasked with the ongoing work of restructuring, 
meeting as necessary and reporting to the Board. The core group consisted of 
Jacques Schindchuttc, Heather McLeod from OMAC and me (to represent labour) 
and others were drawn in as necessary.22 In the course of the project, we met 
about once a week on average, with the intensity and frequency of meetings 
gaining momentum as the implementation dale for the new scheme approached. 
Alongside these meetings, there was a process of contact and work with the 
administrators, the pharmacy network, the Registrar of Medical Schemes, the
21 In addition, it emerged in time that the Chairman had engaged the consultant he originally 
nominated on a retainer basis, for additional advice.
22 Others who attended the Working (¡roup meetings from lime to time included, for example, 
other OMAC and Trunsnet staff, accountants, legal experts and so on, as well us the Tran silted 
Executive Manager and computer staff.
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national Department of Health, lawyers, managed care companies and other 
suppliers, in which I was involved. In addition, OMAC staff were engaged in 
ongoing analysis, design, projections and costings, which had to he constantly 
adjusted as the problems in the data supplied hy Transmed emerged. I reported on 
developments in the working group to the labour caucus which became accepted as 
a standard feature, preceding each Hoard meeting. Labour caucuses were also 
called during Hoard meetings, when issues became explosive. On one crucial 
occasion, exasperated by contradictory opinions from employer Trustees, labour 
insisted on an employer caucus.2'
3. The Task
In 1996, the new Hoard assumed responsibility fora discriminatory scheme, 
running at a deficit which the poor financial systems made it hard to estimate 
accurately. It was, however, clear that the scheme, with no reserves, could not 
survive without additional income. The Hoard's first task was to pul together a 
rescue package to keep the scheme afloat, a task which tested its fragile 
equilibrium and revealed some of the tensions which would bedevil the whole 
process. The difficulty of the decision was exacerbated by the knowledge that this 
was merely a first step, to shore up the scheme while it was re-designed from 
scratch. The knowledge of fundamental change to come hardened the resistance of 
the while unions to any increase in contributions, which they saw as the first step in 21
21 This invi with puzzlement and initial resistance troni die Chair I Iclt die riami willi talami 
and die oilier consultants hut was called hack in (and cheerfully dispatched hy the unionists) to 
assist in clearing the line.
the dilution of their benefits. In the longer term, the unions were faced with the 
inevitability of fundamental change in benefit design and the likelihood of change in 
the structure and size of the employer subsidy. In crude terms, this meant that at 
least some members would probably pay more for less. The basic options for 
funding were stark: either new resources had to be found or existing resources 
would have to be redistributed. The first option was unlikely, considering the cost 
of extending to the whole workforce the very high levels of subsidy afforded to 
white workers in the past. The new government wanted a leaner transport sector 
which would be attractive to private buyers and was concerned about the ripple 
effects of increases in transport costs. The second option - redistribution - 
fundamentally threatened the security of the membership base of the white unions.
It was met with strong resentment, heightened by the company’s history of non- 
market related salaries, which had been justified to workers on the grounds of 
compensatory security of employment and good benefits. A sense of frustrated 
entitlement and broken promises permeated the white unions’ responses 
throughout the project.
The black unions also called up the past, in their case to highlight the extent 
of the company’s historical debt to them resulting from low wages and minimal 
benefits, as well as broader discrimination on issues such as training and 
promotion. They also resented the cheapening of the medical benefit, precisely 
when they finally had access to it: what they wanted was what whites had had in 
the past, not a diluted and devalued version. Their constant theme was a need for 
positive discrimination to redress past injustices. The background of threats of
privatisation (either wholesale or by division) and additional downsizing raised the 
temperature and (he stakes even higher.
The tasks that laced the Board were: devising an interim rescue package to 
keep the scheme afloat pending fundamental change; creating a viable and equitable 
benefit structure for the future; and accurately costing the benefits, taking into 
account company policy on subsidy and possible changes in the future.
Membership
'I'he medical scheme had four categories of members: current employees of 
Transnet; Transnet pensioners (retired after company formation); South African 
Transport Services (SATS) pensioners (retired before company formation); private 
members (previously employed by divisions of SATS/Transnet, lost in the process 
of rationalisation).24 The table below indicates the spread of membership.
Table 2: Transmed membership (December 1995)
( 'ategory Total membership %
membership
Working members 89,969 58%
Transact pensioners 13,961 9%
SATS pensioners 49,638 32%
Private members 1,55 1 1%
Total: 155,119 100%
iA SATS: the pre commercialisation name.
This lable reveals several of the underlying problems in Transmcd. At 
41%, the proportion of pensioner members is strikingly high, largely as a result of 
downsizing (which sheds current employees, but not pensioners). Also, there were 
two categories of pensioners, SATS (retired before the company commercialised) 
and Transnet (retired after commercialisation). The subsidies were very different 
for these two categories, with SATS pensioners subsidised l(X)%;. All of these 
pensioners were white.
Though all Plans were notionally open to any employee, the costs of 
contributions combined with the employment pattern in the company (especially 
when the project began) to produce a clear racial gradient in membership. The 
overwhelming majority of black members were in Plans I and 2, which had very 
few white members. Equally Plans 4 and 5 were almost exclusively while, while 
Plan 3, which had the largest membership, was predominantly white, with a small 
proportion of black members. Approximately 25,<MX) current employees (almost 
all black) had not opted for membership and approximately I4,(XX) black SATS 
pensioners did not have cover, because they retired while the ‘blue card’ system 
was in operation. In addition, a smaller number of black Transnet pensioners also 
had no cover, because they had not opted for membership before retirement.2'
Data
One of the major problems throughout this project was the quality of uata 
from the administrators. At the time when the project started, the Fund’s accounts
”  Very lew black workers joined the scheme when they were close lo retirement age.
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were opaque in the extreme. As the medical scheme of a state enterprise, Transmed 
was exempt from the requirements of the Medical Schemes Act. This had far 
reaching effects on the scheme, particularly in two respects: first, it was not 
required to report to the Registrar of Medical Schemes and, as a result, an 
accounting system had developed which caused great difficulties in the process of 
restructuring the scheme; second, it was not required to hold financial reserves and, 
as a result, it was vulnerable as soon as the state ceased to act as unofficial 
guarantor of losses
Accustomed to functioning in a non-commercial environment, the Fund 
managers were not geared to many of the routine operations of a commercial 
administrator, such as projecting the use of various benefits and costing benefit 
packages accordingly. They were initially bewildered by requests for a clear 
statement of the financial situation of each of the Plans. Indeed, it emerged that 
they did not keep separate accounts, but simply combined the income and 
expenditure figures of all Plans. A basic principle of legislation governing medical 
schemes in South Africa is that benefit options should be accounted for separately, 
so as to avoid cross-subsidisation between options (particularly in cases where 
members of a low benefit option subsidise a high benefit option, whose benefits are 
barred to them).
The style of accounting practised in Transmed had specific effects on the 
project: because the schemes were all combined, the contribution tables were not 
directly related to benefit costs, liven if no fundamental re-structuring were 
undertaken, the pricing of schemes would have to go through a major shake-up.
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with some schemes becoming cheaper and others more expensive. There had been 
no contribution increase for 18 months when this project began and would be none 
until the unions agreed, with the result that the Fund was plunging into the red, 
with some schemes losing far more than others and only the lowest benefit schemes 
(Plans 1 and 2) breaking even. The ‘re-in su ranee’ was grossly underpriced, 
resulting in massive losses (and cross-subsidisation by the surplus-making Plans). 
To re-structure on top of this unstable base was to attempt to build in an 
earthquake zone.
Subsidy
Adding to the problems caused by the opaque accounting, there was an 
extremely complicated subsidy system. Conventionally, contribution tables for 
medical schemes have two variables, income and number of dependants, and 
employers pay cither a percentage of the total contribution, or a fixed amount 
towards it. The Transmed contribution tables showed only the member share of 
the contributions. Member contribution did not vary by income and the variation 
by number of dependants was unusually small. The company subsidy was 
unrelated to the contribution table and did not vary according to the number of 
dependants. Rather it was related to wage: 9% of (basic) wage up to a ceiling 
level.2'’ The company subsidy was invisible to ordinary members: it did not appear 
cither on their pay slips or on the medical scheme contribution tables. As a result, 
they were unaware of the real cost of their coverage. In practice, the company
2,1 The subsidy ranged from R126 (on the minimum wage of R1,4(X)) to R323 pm. If an 
employee chose not to take up the option of medical cover (only possible for black employees) 
s/he lost the subsidy.
subsidy worked out at 60-80% of the total eost, compared with a market norm of 
50-66%. The white unions, in particular, argued that the company owed this to 
workers (and by extension, pensioners) because of the non-market related salaries 
of the past, which had been justified by job security and good benefits. Security 
had already been eroded by down-sizing, and erosion of benefits was simply 
unacceptable to the trade unions.
It was clear that in the longer run, the contribution table would have to be 
re-designed to show the full cost of membership of each Plan (leaving the division 
of the cost to negotiation) and to allocate the costs reasonably between family 
sizes.27 The basic principle was that cross-subsidies should be relatively transparent 
and acceptable to those whose contributions were loaded. This shift could not be 
made in one move, especially on top of a general increase.
The situation was made more complex by questions of tax structuring. 
Under South African law, employers may offset contributions to medical schemes 
against lax, a concession not available to employees. Some companies pay the 
whole contribution pre-tax, on a salary sacrifice basis, and Transnel was prepared 
to do this, especially in order to soften the impact of contribution increases. The 
company was, however, concerned that this would lead to cost inflation by further 
blurring members’ consciousness of the real cost of medical cover. In addition, the 
lax treatment of medical scheme contributions was likely to change within the next
"  Dependant contributions were fixed in ¡111 eccentric fashion, charging the same rale lor adull 
(spouse) and child dc|K-ndanls and selling Ibis at die very low rale ol 25% of die principal 
member conlrihulion (compared with an industry norm of 90-100% lor an adult and 30-50% lor a 
child). This extra payment applied only to the member contribution resulting in radically 
insufficient funding for dependants.
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couple of years.2* However gradual the change of lax Ircalment, there would he an 
inevitable impact on members, resulting in a demand that the company make good 
the difference. Management, in the process of introducing bargaining based on 
‘total cost of employment’ CI C'lv), frequently responded that the division between 
employer and member contribution was artificial, as the so-called ‘employer 
subsidy’ was merely a part of the overall wage package. This argument was 
received with stubborn scepticism by most unions, who continually referred to their 
historical rights.2''
The opacity of accounting and the disparity between the price and the real 
cost of medical benefits was a recurring problem in the project. The unreliability of 
the figures produced by the administrators, especially relating to the calculation of 
losses (which varied wildly from one Board meeting to the next), was particularly 
problematic. Both parties were unsettled by this uncertainly, which exacerbated an 
already difficult task and constantly eroded hard-won ground.
4. Multi-unionism in action
This project became a series of leadership negotiations at Board level. 
Members were not active participants, either on or off the Board. All the unions 
included senior national officials among their representatives and when members 
were also representatives, they tended not to Ik  very quiet lit Board meetings. The
The loss to the liseus occasioned hy the lax deduclihility ol contributions lor private health 
cure cover is estimated ut approximately H 1.5 to K2 trillion pci annum (I’rice el al
The one exception was the pilots' union which had negotiated a separate salary deal with a 
range ol salary sacrifice options. As the highest paiil unionised group, they stood to gain most hy 
reducing taxable income
Board of Trustees was technically a non-negotiating body. Though trustees were 
elcctcd/nominated by specific constituencies, once on the Board they were 
expected to act impartially, in the interests of the stability and survival of the 
scheme as a whole. The constitution limited the Board’s remit to deciding on 
benefit structure and approving appropriate contribution tables. The conflictual 
task of dividing the costs between the parties was to be left to existing negotiating 
forums. The fundamental flaws in this notion rapidly revealed themselves. In the 
first place, there was an imbalance between the expectations of union and employer 
representatives. The union leaderships were expected to bind their members to 
(often unpopular) decisions, while the employer representatives, with the exception 
of the Chair, had no power to commit the company to any action. Their responses 
were inconsistent: sometimes they took the ‘larger’ view (by arguing for measures 
necessary to the survival of the scheme) and sometimes they responded simply in 
terms of their own scheme membership (reacting to perceived threats in the 
proposed changes). This made for some unexpected alliances, generally, but not 
always, on racial lines.
A second Haw was in the notion of common interest. In fact, there was a 
direct conflict of interest on two levels. First, between the union leaderships, 
whose members hud very different benefits. Given the context of limited resources, 
unions could only defend the status quo (in the case of the white unions) or 
advance their members’ benefits (in the case of the black unions) at the cost of 
other worker groups. Part of the ‘dcpoliticising’ of the Board had been the 
insistence on equal rather than proportional representation for unions. This 
rendered the white unions disproportionately powerful in relation to their numbers.
though there were some eheeks on this power: inter-union relationships in other 
fora, some of which had proportional representation (for example, wage 
bargaining) constrained the degree to which the white union leaderships could 
disregard the impact of their actions on black unions, as did the climate of company 
change which made overt racism unacceptable. The other conlliet of interest was 
the fundamental one between the employer and the unions (in terms of 
apportioning the cost of cover and responsibility for the deficit). The lack of 
power of the ‘employer’ trustees meant that this could not be tackled directly. The 
Board’s decisions were rendered conditional and there was a real disequilibium. 
Removing (he employer-union conflict from the ambit of the Board unnaturally 
highlighted the inter-union conflict, which could not be kept consistently private, 
despite the use of caucuses. When union tensions erupted, the ‘employer’ trustees 
were turned into spectators, with little at stake, watching with interest. This was a 
source of some irritation to the union trustees.
The third flaw was in the notion that division of the costs could be left out 
of the Board’s ambit. In fact, this was impossible. It was naive to believe that 
benefits could be designed in isolation, without consideration of budgetary 
constraints and the impact of increases in benefit funding on the amounts available 
for wage bargaining."' Two questions hovered: first, the amount which the 
employer would make available against the deficit (the estimated size of which 
varied wildly from time to time), and second, the financial implications of the 
extension of benefits to the substantial number of employees (present and past)
The impossibility nl insulating the Hoard Ironi the rough amt tumble ot negotiations was 
clearly experienced in the wage negotiating season in 1997. It was a haul year lor bargaining and 
the bitterness intecled Hoard meetings and made it particularly dillicull to get decisions (Dobson 
1996).
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without cover. It was a case of cutting a coat for a body of uncertain proportions 
according to a cloth of unknown size. The process was exhaustive and extensive.
The Hoard
The first formal meeting of the Board of Trustees followed directly on the 
Trustee training. The training was one of OMACs first tasks and was done in a 
peculiarly South African setting, a private game park, to which 45 people retired 
for a week." This was a difficult period. OMAC were unused to the industrial 
relations context and to worker education, as was the leader of the employer group 
(who was also Chair of the Board). OMAC’s major problem at this early stage 
was an inability to read the nature of the Board correctly. In their view, the fact 
that trustees were drawn from union or management ranks was a technical question 
which fell away once the Board was constituted. The Chair shared this view and 
was consequently initially reluctant to allow caucuses, which he feared would shill 
(he Board towards industrial rclations-style negotiations. The unions fiercely 
opposed both OMAC and the Chair, whom they suspected of wanting to use them 
to rubber-stamp contribution increases and other unpalatable changes to the 
Scheme.
OMAC were, indeed, desperate to reach a point by the end of the training 
where the Trustees would approve what was, in their view, a ‘reasonable’ increase 
in members’ contributions: one that would keep the Scheme solvent during the 
process of re-structuring. OMAC’s task was greatly complicated by the Byzantine
" The group included the members of the Hoard, a number of people from the administration 
company (Transmed), a group from OMAC! und myself.
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ineptitude of the accounts. The unions used this confusion as an additional reason 
to oppose increases, arguing that it was impossible to motivate their members to 
pay increases to cover a deficit whose size was still uncertain. At this stage, the 
process almost broke down completely. After extended labour caucuses, a 
compromise labour position was hammered out: labour agreed to the closing of 
Plan 5 because of the scale of its losses and offered an increased co-payment (30% 
instead of 25%) for members of Plans 2-4 until such time as the re-structuring was 
complete.12 Even this concession was delicately balanced, with serious opposition 
from two of the unions to any change whatsoever. In return, the unions demanded 
a commitment from the employer to a cash injection to stabilise the fund, to match 
the projected income from the increased co-payment.
The Chair was unhappy but eventually persuaded that the only way to 
maintain labour involvement in the Board was to accept the outcome of a fragile 
labour truce. OMAC was very unhappy and inclined to persist with arguments 
about ‘reasonableness’ until this line was sharply cut off.” The question of 
employer response raised clearly for the first time the recurrent problem of the 
imbalance of expectations: the employer trustees had no power to make a 
reciprocal offer and the financial request had to be referred to management 
channels outside the Board.
12 Plan I had no co-payments, as a result of the 1992 negotiations between the black unions and 
Transtned.
"  By me, on behalf of the labour caucus, hacked by the Chair, who agreed to the compromise for 
the sake of progress.
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Meeting the MD
The second example highlights the myth of common interest. On two 
occasions, the Board sent joint delegations to top management to request cash 
injections from the company to stabilise the medical scheme during the process of 
restructuring. The long-established (white) MD agreed to an amount of R40 
million. Then the delay in implementation of the new schemes opened up a further 
deficit. The new demand was for a further R70 million. This time a larger 
delegation met with the new (black) MD. SARHWU and BLATU were 
deliberately lukewarm in the meeting, which led to angry accusations of lack of 
solidarity from the white union leaderships in the next Board meeting. Given the 
fact that the cash injections went to wipe out the losses of plans with 
overwhelmingly white memberships, this was an attempt to employ union solidarity 
for sectional purposes.
The MD’s final offer was strategically constructed: the company offered 
R70 million, held the subsidy cap and raised the minimum subsidy, substantially 
narrowing the gap.14 This was a powerful compromise: the black unions had 
pushed for equal subsidy at the higher rate immediately (but settled for a major 
increase in the minimum and an explicit commitment to narrow the gap further in 
subsequent years); the white unions had pushed for removal of the cap and did not 
win this demand (but on the other hand, were the major beneficiaries of the R70 
million).
14 The minimum subsidy was R223 p.m. (up from R 126) and the cap was held al R.325 p.m.
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The way forward
The Board faced a major problem in terms of the way forward: the scheme 
was structurally flawed as well as underfunded. In order to function in the future, 
it was not sufficient to tinker with the benefits and increase the contributions. The 
scheme had to be fundamentally restructured. This was very threatening to many 
trustees, who regarded the changes as interference with their freedom of choice, 
feared a drop in quality and clung to the benefits they knew. Rumours of change 
were widespread in the company, resulting in considerable pressure on union 
trustees from their members. The task was made more difficult by the timing - the 
newly constituted Board was immediately faced with financial crisis (had indeed 
been established because of this crisis) and asked to take unpalatable decisions. 
There was no gentle run-in, giving trustees a chance to explore their roles in a 
routine situation.
The options for change were complex. The initial training of Board 
members was fleshed out as the months went by, by extensive exposure to issues in 
both Board and sub-committee meetings. This centralised knowledge in them, 
with contradictory effects: on the one hand, they were ‘empowered’, on the other, 
they were drawn into a level which alienated them from their members. They were 
uncomfortable with the speed of decisions, which reduced the possibility of taking 
decisions back to members for ratification - or challenge. Even the most 
sophisticated of the unions expressed sonic concern about their ability to explain 
issues accurately to their members. As a result, they were unusually dependent on 
outsiders to communicate with their members: OMAC was largely responsible for 
the education sessions in the regions at which members were introduced to the new
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scheme and the choices which they had to make, and produced the video and other 
media for use in this campaign. Interestingly, several unions asked the Chair of the 
Board to write for their newsletters. There was a pervasive sense that (hey were 
being drawn into an operating style at odds with their usual practices. The 
problem was intensified by the scattered nature of the Transmit workforce, 
particularly in the railways. The Trustees tended to come from the head offices of 
unions, which were mostly in Johannesburg. A few unions elected representatives 
from other regions, but given the limited numbers, this could not result in anything 
like regional representation. As many trustees were also national officers, with 
many other responsibilities, the problem of feedback and contact with members 
was acute.
5. Outcome
After nearly a year’s intensive work, the new bund came into operation in 
October 1996. Members had a choice between three benefit options, the primary 
difference between them being in the facilities for hospitalisation (and consequently 
cost), 'file first (and cheapest) option allowed access to state hospitals, the second 
to a network of contracted private hospitals and the third (and most expensive) to 
all private hospitals. All hospital care, except for emergencies, had to be pre­
authorised.11 As the network contained almost all private hospitals in the country, 
the ‘own choice’ option was included only in order to allay (exaggerated) fears of
11 In the slate I’lan, members were subject to the stale referral system. In the other options, 
treatment was subject to pre-authorisation by a managed care company contracted to Trunsmed.
restriction on the part of some trustees.1'’ The new minimum employer subsidy 
brought membership of the state scheme well within range of the group currently 
outside the scheme, 25,(XX) low income members, but did not make the next step 
(from the state package to the network package) possible to significant numbers.’7 
Non-hospital benefits were divided into two: chronic medicine (on a pooled 
basis) and day to day primary care (on an individual basis). Medicine for chronic- 
conditions, often expensive, was available to all members from Transmed 
pharmacies, with a smaller co-payment. Like hospitalisation, this was subject to 
monitoring and approval by an external medicine care manager, contracted to 
Transmed. The chronic medicine benefit was of particular importance to members 
of the ‘state package’, giving them access to a significant new benefit. All other 
care had to be covered from a ‘personal medical savings account’, to which part of 
the monthly contribution was directed. The amount available varied according to 
the hospital option chosen and the number of dependants. Members submitted 
accounts and were refunded at 70% o f the agreed tariff.1*
The Fund also included a further benefit, available free to all members: 
personal health care information from an audio health library and nurse helpline. 
This was intended to assist members in using their personal accounts optimally and
Members of the ‘own choice” Plan were responsible for the difference between the actual fees 
charged hy the ‘own choice' hospitals and the tariff of reduced fees negotiated with the network 
hospitals. The expectation was that in time this option might wither away, as members observed 
the network in action and lost their fear of it.
17 Only workers earning below R2.300 per month benefited from the increased minimum 
subsidy: single people in this group might choose to pay extra for the higher level of cover (R 100- 
150 per month, depending on income), but few with families could afford the additional amount 
(R 156-407, depending on income and family size).
'* In 1997, the Board decided, after extended wrangling, to change the rules to allow refund at 
100% of tariff. The black unions in particular hud objected to the co-payment, which 
disadvantaged members who did not have the cash in hand when they needed treatment (personal 
communication, (iectesh Solanki, 1997).
reducing unnecessary consultulions with doctors. ( They were also reminded that 
they had access by right to clinics in the national health system. Though it was 
highly unlikely that members oT the private hospital options would make use ol this 
facility, members of the state hospital option were likely to have had more 
experience of the clinics in the past and to be prepared to use them if and when 
their personal accounts ran out.)
The involvement of two external managed care companies (for the hospital 
and chronic medicine benefits) was one of the most contentious issues m the 
Hoard. Many members (both employer and union representatives) feared their 
intervention and a great deal of time was spent exploring extreme scenarios. The 
administrators were also unenlhusiastic, claiming that they could undertake these 
functions in house (for an additional fee).''' The Hoard was unconvinced, given the 
difficulties experienced with routine administration, but agreed to relatively short 
term contracts with the managed care companies as an incentive to Transmed to 
improve its efficiency. (The terms also put the companies on their mettle, 
particularly as they had to gear up to accommodate a scheme as large as 
Transmed.)
Two additional elements were added to the major medical services 
immediately prior to implementation of the new scheme, in order to break a 
deadlock on the Hoard. Considerable unease had been expressed about members' 
ability to fund dental and optical expenses from their ‘|>crsonal medical savings 
account', lixlra limits were allowed for these, at one stroke increasing the day to
n ('(intruding managed cure operutors lias cost implications, though in each case the size ol 
Trunsincd served as a uselul lever in negotiating charges well below the i|uoled levels. ( onlructs 
specified monitoring of savings to the scheme and renewal was made subject to satisfaction with 
the level ol service and ol savings effected.
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clay account by half over the first year of operation, without any increase in 
contributions. This move illustrated clearly the non-neutral nature of the Board. It 
did not make financial sense to add extra benefits to a carefully costed package 
without increasing contributions. It was a decision made to break a deadlock and 
induce the unions to agree to implementation of the package. The unions held one 
invaluable weapon: each month’s delay meant an increase of approximately R20 
million in the deficit. The Chair considered it expedient to concede in order to 
avoid costly delay."’
The question of subsidy for Transnet pensioners and for SATS pensioners 
was still undecided when I left the project. It was raised at certain strategic 
moments hy the white unions, particularly when sabre-rattling was called for. Two 
factors intensified feelings on this issue: some of the unionists were close to 
retirement or anticipated taking retrenchment packages in the event of further 
down-sizing, and many Board members, including the Chair, had parents or other 
family who were SATS pensioners. Nevertheless, there was a tacit 
acknowledgement that decisions would be deferred until the new scheme was in 
operation.
Once the scheme was designed, agreed and costed, it had to be explained to 
members, so that they could make their choice of option. Tor a substantial 
number, there was no real choice involved: there was a predictable split between 
the state Plan and the others along income lines, and in general only the highest 
income members (for example, pilots) chose the ‘own choice’ Plan, (iiven the size
4" In the event, this concession proved expensive: at the time of the January l‘W7 meeting, the 
new fund showed u deficit very similar to the extra amount allowed lor dental and optical 
benefits.
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of the company and the nature of its operations, the process of publicising the new 
schemes was a daunting operation. Existing media such as the in-house radio 
station and newsletters were used, in addition to a video, posters, mailouts to 
scheme members and special member packs on the new schemes. The trustees and 
other union nominees were trained to take part in the publicity process to facilitate 
contact and trust. Another, implicit but powerful, reason for their involvement was 
in order to identify them with the new design and remove the potential for them to 
undercut the changes by disassociating themselves from the process.
Links with state
This project managed to develop a highly significant relationship with the 
state health sector. This was achieved against some odds, given the uncertainty of 
policy (with Social Health Insurance pending). Transmed was a medical aid 
scheme (rather than a Sick Fund), at a time when the Department of Health tended 
to sec medical aid schemes as the preserve of the privileged. The challenge for the 
Transmed team was to persuade the Department to accept a more nuanced 
approach, differentiating public hospital fees according to the income levels of 
scheme members. Initial discussions were held with the Chief Director responsible 
for pharmacy in the national office, exploring the potential for linking the Transmed 
pharmacies in to the state tendering system for buying pharmaceutical products 
and/or for developing an agreement on chronic drugs, along the lines of the CCIC 
agreement in the Cape. At the time, the drug policy of the Department was in a 
state of flux, as proposals in the NHI Commission Report had been routed by the 
pharmaceutical industry (Sidley 1996). The Chief Director was sympathetic and
interested in exploring options for co-operation, particularly if the Transmed 
pharmacies could he made accessible to non-Transmed members. Discussions are 
still ongoing at the time of writing.
Progress on the hospital question was more concrete. The process started 
with a number of discussions with key people in the national Department, who 
agreed with the general approach.41 Because of the structure of the health sector, 
the national Department could not impose a policy on hospital fees on the 
provinces, so the proposals had to he negotiated separately in each of the nine 
provinces before they could be implemented. There were strong arguments for the 
proposals. First, the income level of the members of the State Plan was low. 
Outside a medical scheme, they would be entitled to use state services at very low 
tariffs. Now Transmed was proposing to pay the State for them at a negotiated 
rate between these tariffs and the higher ‘medical aid scheme’ tariff. Second, 
Transmed guaranteed payment (a significant incentive given the history of low fee 
recovery rates in the state sector). Consolidated billing to a scheme was also 
administratively simpler - and therefore cheaper. Third, the scheme aimed to 
exlentl cover to some 25,(XX) workers (and their dependants) previously without 
cover (and thus dependent on state services for all their health care).
The problem of undifferentiated rates is that they are a disincentive to 
schemes to provide hospital cover for the low-paid, or indeed to include the low- 
paid at all. Given the stresses under which the public sector was operating, we 
argued that it would he useful and productive to develop an approach which 
encouraged extension of hospital cover to as many employed people as possible.
41 This aspect of the project was taken over and expanded hy (ieetesh Solnnki after I left.
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located this provision in the public sector and recovered its costs on a rational 
basis.
Implementation
In January 1997, I returned to South Africa briefly. After four months, 
progress was palpable. Contrary to expectation, the new schemes had been 
implemented for current employees and Transnet pensioners in October 1996 
without disaster.*2 Fine tuning and dealing with teething problems had occupied 
the Board and the sub-committees (dealing respectively with finances, service 
providers and applications forex gratia assistance) in the interim. OMAC 
continued to be heavily involved in the process and their contract was renewed for 
a further year. The major areas of involvement for OMAC outlined at the January 
1997 meeting were the introduction of the new scheme for SATS pensioners and 
the lightening up of Transmed administration. Others not mentioned, but equally 
important, would include the revamping of the Transmed pharmacy system and 
exploration of links with the state in the area of pharmacy. These were the 
responsibility of Gcetesh Solanki, who had recently joined OMAC. He had a 
background of health sector activism and had recently returned from studying in 
the U.S. When I left the project to come to the U.K., I had discussed his role with 
the unions, tentatively exploring whether they would use him as a labour resource, 
hut was roundly told that they would make their own decisions about replacing me. 
By the January meeting, it was clear that he hud developed good working 
relationships with the unions.
*2 The vexed issue of SATS pensioners remained unresolved and is likely to put inter-union 
relationships under acute strain when it is finally addressed.
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Attendance at Board meetings was good and consistent, with few changes 
in representation since I had left. Involvement was intense and demanding (two 
day monthly Board meetings and one day fortnightly sub-committee meetings), 
particularly as many of the trustees were senior union officials with a range of other 
responsibilities. This was clear evidence of the priority of the issue for the unions 
concerned (in direct comparison with the last study). In the case of the white 
unions there was a strong sense of the need to defend their members’ benefits from 
erosion and worse, and on the part of the black unions a sense that the demand for 
equity was finally on the table, with a real possibility of improving their members’ 
benefits at last.
6. Assessment
The political context in which the project evolved differed from the IC 
studies, most markedly from the CCIC and NICLI studies, as this project happened 
only after the South African election of 1994 and the installation of the new 
government. It would be an understatement to say that this project unfolded in a 
politicised environment, which coloured both the nature of the process and the 
technical possibilities of the project.4’ The characteristics of the industry, the 
nature of industrial relations, the scope of the project and the issues raised contrast 
strongly with the earlier work, especially the central study of the CCIC.
41 My role was also fundamentally different from the one I had played in the IC studies, a shift 
which may be definitive in the future, highlighting potential new directions for a non­
governmental organisation like the IHRG in a new political dispensation.
Unlike ihe 1C' studies (especially (lie Cape study), involvement in the 
Transmed project offered unions a poisoned chalice: (lie potential gains were 
neither obvious nor unmixed. Most of the union leaderships were involved in order 
to minimise potential losses for their members. To complicate matters further, they 
could potentially lose ground both to the employer and, more insidiously, to fellow 
unions. The first danger evoked union solidarity, the second stimulated 
sectionalism. Involvement in the Board of Trustees also involved a potential loss 
of face with members, through identification with an unpopular product (the new 
scheme) and accusations of softness or closeness to Ihe employer. When the while 
union leaderships invoked union solidarity, they did so for sectional ends: they 
wanted a united front fora demand that the employer carry the deficit accumulated 
in Ihe scheme. As this had been accumulated almost entirely by while scheme 
members enjoying superior benefits, the black union leaderships were 
understandably reluctant to respond.
SARIIWIJ was hampered by the representational basis of the Board and by 
the style of its operation, which diluted two of its traditional weapons: Ihe size and 
militancy of its membership, liven so, Ihe black unions could have been much 
more demanding, in terms of Ihe inequity of Ihe past, but restricted mention of this 
to certain key moments when the white unions were lieing intransigent and 
blocking progress (usually by insisting that Ihe company ‘owed’ them and should 
take all responsibility for Ihe debts of the scheme and the increases necessary to run 
without loss). At moments like this, Tsidiso Moshaodhe SARI I Wl I assistant 
general secretary and a line diplomat) would mildly mention Ihe historic debt owed 
black workers and leave Ihe implication of the impact of correcting the inequity
hanging in the air. Faced with the potential of sharing the existing benef it with a 
much larger group, or - more frighteningly - requiring the group which had 
accumulated the losses in the scheme (predominantly whites) to repay those losses 
by way of loaded contributions, the while unions would subside.
The union leaders had common cause in their mistrust of the administrators, 
though for different reasons: the black unions perceived them as tainted by racist 
habits and attitudes, some of the white unions thought they could find more 
efficient (and cheaper) administration in the commercial market. The tensions 
between solidarity and sectionalism persist, exhibiting most clearly in recurrent 
proposals by different groups to pull out of Trunsmcd altogether. The most 
serious proposals came from the two poles of the union grouping: on the one hand, 
the South African Airways group of unions, whose members are the most highly 
paid of the unionised workforce, were consistently frustrated by the limits imposed 
on their members’ consumption of expensive health care, which they could afford; 
on the other hand, SARIIWU was constrained by association with the white 
unions, a relationship which had not produced much to show a membership 
distrustful of Trunsmcd and vocal in demands for a medical scheme to meet the 
high (though vague) demands aroused by the new political dispensation. Both 
groups, though they participated in the joint project, held in reserve the possibility 
of withdrawal to advance sectional interests.
One of the central issues arising from this study is the meaning of equity. 
The current and past workforce of Transnet is divided into three groups, with 
different health care benefits. Theoretically, there is freedom of choice: in practice, 
this is severely constrained by income and subsidy level. In the end, the workforce
is still divided roughly according to income and the question is whether the project 
has simply reinforced a class-based differentiation in access to health care, whose 
lines were blurred by the appeal to trade union solidarity. Frank admission of the 
material base for the sectional interests of the different unions and their history of 
privilege, though it would have impeded progress in the Board of Trustees, wotdd 
have been both more honest and more productive.
Chapter 8. Implications for trade unions
1. Introduction
The studies in this thesis highlight eertain features of the form and praetiee of 
trade unionism, whieh are explored in terms of their influence on the process and 
evolution of the studies and the implementation of the recommendations which (lowed 
from them. Some features are specific to South Africa, such as the complex 
interrelationship of racial and class oppression, others apply to any society in transition 
to democracy, yet others are more general, such as the gender composition of the 
unions and their leaderships and the nature of the relationships with employers.
2. Members
One of the fundamental differences between the studies was in the composition 
of the groups involved. It emerged that one of the pre-requisites for success was 
relative homogeneity in class terms, a narrow income range and a marked degree of 
shared experience. The Industrial Council schemes met these criteria, most notably in 
the Cape clothing case. They were compulsory, with uniform benefits for all members, 
so all workers had experienced the same system (though their actual use of the benefits 
would, of course, have varied). Income differentials were low, with the overwhelming 
majority of workers in each Council in the machinist/opcrator category, on a single
wage. In two of the schemes (Cape and Natal clothing), all workers were members of 
one union.
This uniformity was tempered by two factors: the racial and gender 
composition of the memberships. Segregation drew lines not only between white and 
black, but also between different groups within the black population. African workers 
lived in separate areas, often separated from their families (many of whom remained in 
the rural areas). Schools separated African children from coloured and Indian 
children. The labour market was stratified, with African workers on the bottom of the 
pile, even after the formal removal of job reservation in the late 1970s. Influx control, 
until its removal in 1986, subjected African workers to stringent controls on their right 
to seek and take urban employment. Coloured and Indian workers were not subject to 
influx control, and had indeed been advantaged by it in the past, especially in Cape 
Town, which formalised this advantage in the ‘Coloured Labour Preference Policy’. 
These factors, of separation and relative advantage, made for some unease within the 
union, especially after the merger into SACTWU, which brought relatively a-political 
coloured and Indian workers from the unions which merged to form GAWU (whose 
experience of active and militant unionism was very recent) into contact with highly 
militant African textile workers from the NUTW wing of the merger. At the project 
level, this uncase did not manifest strongly, perhaps because the proportion of African 
workers in the clothing industry was, though growing, still small.
The gender composition of the IC studies certainly influenced their outcome. 
Maternity benefits and family cover evoked a powerful response from the
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overwhelmingly female membership in the clothing sector. Typically, it is women who 
stay away from work to care for sick children and take them to doctors or clinics. 
They bear the brunt of children’s illness and have the most to gain from easier access 
to affordable services - and from reform of the sick leave system, which penalised one 
day absences by paying nothing for them, but nevertheless insisting on medical 
certificates. (The statutory sick pay system has a provision for self-certification for one 
or two day illnesses, which gives some leeway for taking time off for children’s 
illnesses. Though this is technically termed abuse, it must surely be classified as both 
undcrstandahlc and socially necessary.)1
Interestingly, in the leather study, though there was vocal support for family 
benefits, there was also a great deal more concern about the issue of funding them, and 
a clear discomfort with the basic principle of cross-subsidisation, which would favour 
those with larger families, or sicker dependants. Some dissent also emerged on a 
cross-generational basis in all three studies, with the solidarity of older women 
distinctly tinged with resentment for the lack of support that had characterised their 
own child-rearing years.
The gender composition of the clothing and leather workforces is sometimes 
identified as one reason for their relative quiescence (compared with greater militancy 
in the male-dominated unions such as SARHWU), given the barriers to union
1 SACTWU has managed to negotiate a breakthrough agreement in the Cape Clothing Fund in 
terms of which workers may draw on their sick leave to care for sick children (personal 
communication, Ronald Bernickow, October 1997).
involvement for women.2 Other commentators locus on the racial question, claiming a 
gradient in militancy from coloured and Indian to African workers (Antra 1993; 
Coetzee 1993; Valodia 1993; Zikalala 1993a). The fact that racial tensions in the 
trade union movement and in the progressive arm of the political movement tend to 
have been unexpressed does not diminish their potency and disruptive effects. All 
COSATU unions espouse the fundamental principle of non-racialism, but it is a 
monumental task to develop a practice consistently based on that principle in a country 
scarred and deformed by institutional racism.
The Transmed project was at the opposite pole: there was absolute 
heterogeneity in class terms, a vast income range and minimal common experience, 
even of health care. There were many unions (some of which had overlapping 
constituencies), from very different traditions of unionism and political affiliation. A 
rare feature of the project was the presence of the (embattled) while working class. 
There was an uneasy, partial and conditional alliance across racial lines on the simple 
class divide between worker and employer, which blurred but did not erase the racial 
lines, with all their attendant history of privilege, exclusion and repression. It had 
taken two of the bloodiest strikes in South African history to force the company to 
recognise a non-puppet union for black workers, only five years before this project 
began. New, inclusive structures and policies of ‘transformation' had not yet 
dissolved the basic distrust with which the membership of SARIIWIJ regarded both
2 Sec, for example, liuskin (1991 58; 354 7; 369-83; 457), September (1992) amt Nyman (1996) on 
women in COSATU. Nyman (1996, .32) notes that nine years alter the issue ol women's participation 
was pul on the agenda at COSATU's first congress in 1985 there was still no progress.
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the management (which was not visibly altered until late in the project) and the unions 
which had been party to the old structures, acceptable to the old management and 
(with the exception of the two token black unions, one for coloureds and Indians, the 
other for Africans) in the same camp in terms of racial privilege.
The lack of common social experience was underlined by the range of health 
care experience. SARHWU had members outside and inside the medical scheme, with 
those inside spread across three Plans. As a result, SARHWU trustees had to operate 
throughout the project with an insecure and shifting support base, subject to 
contradictory pressures from different groups of members. The problem was 
exacerbated by the attitude of the union’s National Executive, which was dubious 
about the scheme and the Board, and suspicious of all agreements resulting from it. 
Interestingly, the fact that members who moved from the ‘blue card’ system could 
include their dependants for the first time had made little impression. This may have 
been because this advance weighed little against the negative comparison with the 
higher Plans, which were unaffordable. The gender composition, with its very high 
proportion of men, may also have had something to do with it. Clearly unions with 
minimal female membership arc more likely to overlook their perspective when 
priorities arc ranked.
The regional schemes were at an advantage over the national schemes in the 
degree of contact between members and their physical closeness to the administration 
of the scheme. The Cape study had a concentrated population, which facilitated broad 
involvement in the project. Though developments were gradual, there were visible
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changes in the central clinic, which were witnessed hy a fairly broad circle of members, 
including those who visited the building for reasons not related to the Sick Fund, such 
as attending union meetings. This had a ripple effect, as shopslewards spoke to fellow 
workers back in their factories. The Sick Fund decision-making structures were 
deliberately linked to broader union structures, with worker representatives reporting 
to shop steward council meetings on developments. A few key members, such as Miss 
Jasmine Abrahams (universally and respectfully known as Auntie Minnie) gave the 
project their stamp of approval, which was an important feature in worker acceptance, 
especially among older workers. Some workers heard about the Sick Fund project in 
union education courses and others through the weekly union newspaper Chillies Line, 
which regularly raised issues about the Sick Fund from as early as 1‘JX‘J.' Support was 
consolidated through the membership survey, which reached beyond activist members, 
taking the project into the factories and interviewing randomly selected workers, who 
then went back to the floor and talked about the experience. There is strong anecdotal 
evidence about social networks in the clothing industry: many workers slay in the 
industry for life, moving between factories, taking time out for childbirth and rearing. 
Many have family members and neighbours in the industry, often in the same factory.4 
Word of changes would also spread via these social networks. The multiple and
' ('lollies Line ran a series of features in June 1989, with the instruction 'Members must discuss the 
billowing proposals at factory general meetings, and at all local meetings.' The union proposals lor a 
health centre-based Sick f  und were outlined, along with live steps to achieve these objectives 
KiAWlJ 1989).
1 (liven the importance ol the clothing industry in the Western Cape economy, it is not surprising 
that many people have some link to it: the national Minister ot f  inance, Trevor Manuel, is the son ol 
a clothing worker, as is the Western Cape Minister ot Health, lihrahim Kasool
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overlapping routes of contact gradually developed a web of support for the Sick Fund 
proposals and the demands which had to be made in negotiations to secure them.
The same should have been true of the Natal clothing project, which involved a 
similar scheme and a similarly concentrated membership. Its failure was due to a 
number of factors, including the different relationships between union leaders and 
members, the timing of the project and consequent disruption by election activities, 
and the narrower range of contact with members. The Sick Fund structure was not 
tied in to other union structures and there was no flow of information from the 
Management Committee back to union leaders, let alone workers. Worker members 
of the Sick Fund Management Committee attended erratically, participated minimally 
and had no special attachment to the Fund. Membership disaffection with benefits was 
compounded by disappointment when contribution increases failed to result in 
improvements and dependant cover. Most of the planned contacts with members were 
problematic: a shop steward council angry about the fact that a contribution increase 
had not resulted in delivery of all the Sick Fund demands (maternity pay, improved 
medical benefits, coverage for families); other councils so occupied with election- 
related crises that the Sick Fund item was cut to a gabbled report; and the disastrous 
mal-administration of the simple member survey, which re-sparked the smouldering 
suspicion and resentment among members. The only successful contact with members 
was with a small focus group of leading shop stewards, who came together to assist in 
the rescue operation.
In Ihc leather study, involvement of the membership in the research process 
weakened the opposition of officials of one union and bolstered it in another. In the 
NULW, far from confirming the line taken by their leaders in SFMC meetings, 
members supported the idea of clinics with enthusiasm and a curiosity which implied 
that it was new to many of them. In TLATIU, only a few workers were brave enough 
to venture tentative support for clinics, a position immediately and forcefully 
repudiated by the General Secretary. The real feelings of the membership remain a 
mystery.
The problem of a dispersed national membership was even more acute in 
Transmed than in the leather industry. Though there were some concentrations of 
members in urban areas, others were scattered throughout the rest of the country, in 
every tiny town with a railway station. To make matters more difficult, some 
members, in rail and road transport, were constantly on the move. It was almost 
impossible to reach members consistently. The major contact with workers came after 
the scheme was designed and negotiated, when OMAC', the Board and management 
pul together a national roadshow, explaining the new scheme and the options to 
groups of workers around the country, so that they could make their choice. Before 
then, there was no direct route to members for the project team. The union trustees 
were the conduit for worker views: if unions could not, or did not choose to, consult 
with their members, there was no way to bypass them and contact members directly.
In the case of SARIIWU, my primary union relationship in this project, there was a 
slightly different problem. The union had grown very fast (see Chapter I ) and battled
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lo consolidale ils growth. Il operated from a spartan rented head office in 
Johannesburg, with minimal resources and equipment. The Cape Town and Durban 
offices, the only other ones I visited, were equally minimalist. None of them had large 
meeting spaces, unlike SACTWIJ, which owned substantial buildings in Cape Town 
and Durban. II contact was difficult forSARIIWIJ officials, especially national 
officials trying to reach members throughout the country, it was near impossible fol­
lile. I never bumped into a worker (other than the President) in a SARIIWII office 
and have met only a handful either in specially organised meetings or on the Hoard 
(two of the three SARIIWI) trustees were workers).
3. Leaders/officials
The most successful of the studies involved a new leadership committed to 
transforming union structures and practices to reflect principles of worker control and 
democratic accountability. When the project started, it was essentially a regional 
union, and the leaders were local people, strongly rooted in the area. They were 
young, many with a background in youth and student activism. During the project, 
more worker leaders moved into full-time official positions. Of the two key union 
figures supporting the project, one was an ex-youth activist, Ronald Hernickow, the 
other an ex worker, Wayne van der Kheede, who had started out its a shop steward at 
one of the biggest Cape Town factories, then became a full-time official ('organiser' in
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South African parlance) and later Regional Secretary.' Their involvement 
consolidated the sense that this was a ‘union’ project, though it was organised through 
the bilateral Industrial Council, and their association with this issue both increased its
credibility and linked theirs to its success: this was certainly a factor in their tenacious 
support for Sick Fund demands in internal union battles during wage negotiations.'’
In the leather study, there were three key figures in SACTWU. Mike Murphy, 
who initiated both this project and the Natal clothing project, was based in 
SACTWU’s head office, with broad responsibilities. Mark Bennett was the major 
representative on the SFMC and central to the strategic development oflhe project 
and steering the union caucus through negotiations, lie was also based in head office 
in Durban, but as head of collective bargaining had wide national responsibilities and 
travelled constantly. Kevin Perumal, a regional official from the Pietermaritzburg 
branch, was centrally involved in implementing the proposals in Pietermaritzburg. The 
leather project had both strategic support from the union leadership at a national level 
and grounded local backing from regional leadership. It is clear that this form of 
leadership is a condition for success, perhaps particularly in a national project, 
administered by a distant head office. None of the other regions has thrown up an 
official or worker leader in the leather sector with similar commitment to the project, 
which has been a crucial factor in the continued development of the Fund in KwaZulu- 
Natal in particular.
'  Support from other worker leaders, such as Connie September, a clothing worker who is now Vice- 
President ol'COSATU, was also important (Gabriels 1991; Harrell 1993; Collins 1996).
Ronald Mernickow is now l.ahour Allairs Manager lor the Clothing Industry Bargaining Council.
The NIJLW had a centralised structure, which concentrated power in the hands 
of officials, who represented the union in all structures. The officials were supported 
hy a substantial administration. The task of organising the project meetings fell largely 
to the administration and was cfficic“* ';', :rf J. As a result, a broad swathe of 
shop stewards had the opportunity to connect with (he project directly, rather than 
through a remote leadership. Though never openly expressed, there was some 
competition between the NIJLW and SACTWIJ about the size of the separate regional 
union meetings called as part oft he project. The NIJLW drew larger numbers, whose 
response diverged markedly from their leaders’ line in Sl'MC meetings. This same 
divergence was clear in the attitudes of regional officials in both Pietermaritzburg and 
Durban, a factor in the decision to devolve implementation to local sub committees. 
The third and smallest union, TLATIIJ, exhibited the lightest control on members, 
facilitated by the fact that it only operated in one region. The General Secretary 
actively controlled the meeting with shop stewards and was the only TLATIIJ 
representative I ever heard speak on the SL'MC.
One of the many reasons for the failure of the Natal clothing project was lack 
of leadership support. Despite the early involvement of Mike Murphy and the energy 
and commitment of Mel Clark, who took over responsibility, the issue never attracted 
support from a broader group of full-time officials. Lew officials wanted to be 
associated with an unpopular issue, especially at a time when the election period 
offered far more exciting options for involvement.
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The leadership of SARI IWU was drawn from different sourees, with a strong 
emphasis on worker leadership. The Assistant General Secretary, Tsidiso Moshao, 
who was my major union contact in this study, had returned from exile to join the 
trade union movement and was a skilled negotiator, courteous and strategic, lie was 
also tough, though he only revealed this on rare occasions: when he did, the Board 
was electrified and deadlocks rapidly broken. For more than a year, he was engaged 
for at least a day a week on average on medical scheme matters. The union’s decision 
to commit such a senior official to this task is indicative of both the suspicion in which 
the SAKIIWU executive held the Board, the administrators and the management, and 
the shortage of skilled negotiators in SAKIIWU. The executive was particularly 
dubious about involvement with other unions in the process, believing that this would 
compromise their own demands. They saw Moshao’s role as being a watchdog for 
their interests and that they failed to understand that his presence inevitably required 
him to participate and that a totally uncompromising attitude was impossible in the 
circumstances. Their attitude added an extra complication to the strategic role he 
played on the Board.
Interestingly, all of the key union officials in (he four projects were men. This 
is largely due to the very small proportion of women in leadership roles in South 
African unions. Though 36% of COSATU members were women in 1996, only K% of 
national office bearers were women, a position unchanged since 1994 (Filita 1997).
At regional level, there was more change, with the proportion growing from K% to 
15% over the same period (ibid.). With an overwhelmingly male membership, it is
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unsurprising that there are virtually no women leaders in SARMWIJ (3, all at regional 
level).' However, this argument cannot hold for SACTWIJ, with its predominance of 
women members but a minority of women leaders." Male leaders responded to 
‘women’s issues’ in different ways. In the Cape study, the new young officials 
appealed to female members, first by securing a new maternity benefit and then by 
articulating a demand for family health care. Given the high proportion ol women 
headed households, this was a sure vote-winner. In the Natal study, the leaders failed 
to ensure that the maternity benefit was properly funded, which resulted in deficits in 
the Sick fund and hampered further developments.
4. Inter-union relationships
The studies reveal that it is simpler to work with only one union in a union 
health care project. Where there was more than one union, the inter-union dimension 
sometimes cut across and complicated the primary union-employer relationship. The 
problem was markedly more acute when the unions organised very different groups 
who were in direct competition with each other for resources, as in Transmed, rather 
than for members, as in the leather case.
In the leather study, the major conflict was between SACTWIJ, the new 
entrant to the industry, and the NIJI.W, the established majority union. The third
' Interestingly, ilie SAKHWU team on llic lioanl of Trustees always contained a woman worker, for 
a while, this was a while woman, one ol the small group ol white SAKIIWtl members 
" In I Wti, women comprised 3(1% of regional leadership and 13% of national leadership (filila 
IW7).
union was rarely a factor and the other two unions easily agreed to dc-prioritise 
changes in the Transvaal region to placate the Transvaal union. Because the 
membership was highly homogeneous, the unions were not competing for resources. 
Any improvement to the Sick Fund would benefit all members, rather than one group 
at the cost of another. The only element of competition was for the political credit of 
the advances. SACTWIJ drove the process, but could not be seen to be doing so, for 
fear of consolidating resistance from the other two unions. This required strategic 
work in the union caucus, resulting in a higher profile for the NULW in the SF'MC and 
the occasional impression of ventriloquism: it was the NULW representative who 
formally proposed my appointment, for example, though SAC'TWU had first mooted 
me as their private consultant.
The SACTWU negotiators’ strategic skills were also obvious in their support 
for the Transvaal union’s insistence that the process of investigation include separate 
regional meetings for each union, to avoid bias. SAC'TWU officials realised that the 
‘clinic option’ had become associated with SAC'TWU. The separate union meetings 
would allow this option to be raised in a neutral fashion (by me, as the ‘researcher’ 
from outside), without the accusation of domination by SACTWU. The meetings 
would also give me access to ordinary members' views, rather than merely the official 
version.
The multi-unionism of the Transmed case was far more problematic, with 
competition for resources as well as for status There was a distinct tension between 
solidarity and sectionalism, which played itself out in different ways. The while union
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leaders made constant appeals to union solidarity, directed specifically at the black 
unions. Demands were carefully couched in terms other than racial, but they were 
nonetheless sectional and would result in a continuation of white privilege at further 
cost to the black majority in the company. The black union leaders, entirely aware of 
this process, nevertheless had been building a working relationship with the white 
unions, particularly in the central negotiating forum of the Industrial Council. Open 
antagonism was largely avoided. On the surface, relations were polite, often amicable, 
but underlaid by a solid core of mistrust. Alliances formed and shifted according to 
the issues involved. The basic division was racial, with SARIIWU and BLATU firmly 
in one camp, the while unions in the other and TATU (with coloured and Indian 
membership) rather tentatively based in the black camp. TATU representatives were 
notably uninvolved, attended more erratically and very seldom spoke in meetings.
Both BLATU and TATU were in merger talks with SARIIWU, but there was little 
progress with TATU, while BLATU and SARIIWU drew closer over the period of the 
project.1' On occasion, there was evidence of a tenuous alliance which cut across the 
racial division, when the hlack unions and the white unions organising artisans would 
unite in defence of low paid workers, to defeat a proposal by the airways unions. This 
was easily done (given their combined strength) and as easily shrugged off by the 
airways unions, engaged in separate consultations with the company outside of the 
Board, with a view to creating either an independent scheme or a dedicated option 
within Transmcd to suit their members. Ironically, the unions at the two extremes
' The merger between SAKIIWII amt HI.ATI) is expected to be completed by the end of 1997. 
(Interview with Tsidiso Moshuo. London 21 September 1997.)
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(SARHWU/BLATU and the SAA unions) were similarly semi-detached from the 
process: it was the unions of the (white) middle ground which had the most to lose and 
were therefore most defensive and embattled. Various groupings of unions caucused 
and had their own advisers outside of the Board. The white union leaderships also had 
private lines of contact with Transnet management and the Transmcd administrators, 
which were disrupted in the course of the project when the new (black) executive 
directors were appointed, and the (white) managing director was replaced. In a 
sudden inversion, it was the black union leaderships who had privileged access to 
senior management and the whites who felt excluded and threatened.
Though SAR1IWU had the same number of seats as other unions, it had a 
great deal more power, when it chose to use it. The ultimate weapon was the threat to 
pull out of the process, which would have undermined the credibility of the Board, 
probably fatally, given the company’s commitment to ‘transformation’, in terms of 
which a whites-only Board and medical scheme was an unthinkable option. The Hip 
side of this power was the credibility which SARIIWlJ’s presence lent to the Board 
and the process of restructuring the medical scheme and, from SARIIWlJ’s point of 
view, the association of the union with an outcome which was likely to be a 
compromise and unpopular with their members. The tension between abstention and 
involvement was a constant feature of the process. Ultimately, I believe that 
SARHWU gave more than it gained by the process. Whether it can build on the 
limited gains and manage to check the demands of the white unions, so that in time the
gap disappears and there ean he one scheme for all Transnet employees and ex­
employees, remains to be seen.
5. Unions and employers
The three Industrial Council projects were in private sector manufacturing 
industries. The last project was in the service sector, in a publicly owned company.
All of the projects took place in the context of institutionalised relationships between 
unions and employers, long established in the case of the Industrial Councils and much 
more recent in the case of Transnet. In the Industrial Council projects, the relationship 
took the same form as the primary relationship: it was a bargaining relationship. The 
Sick Fund Management Committees were subordinate to the ICs, to which major 
decisions had to be submitted for ratification. In the Transmcd project, the 
relationship was fundamentally different. The medical scheme was removed from the 
sphere of negotiations in the Industrial Council (in itself a relatively new structure, set 
up only in 1991) to a Board of Trustees (brand new, set up in 1996), which was 
explicitly not a bargaining structure. In addition, the employer representation was 
constituted in a very different way from the representation on the ICs.
Employers in the clothing and leather industries belong to various employer 
bodies. Each of the regional clothing councils had one or more corresponding 
employer bodies. The dominant employer body in the Cape, the CCM A, represented 
large and medium-sized employers and was well-resourced. The newer and smaller 
GMA represented small enterprises, generally so-called ‘cut-make-trinf operations at
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the most marginal end of the industry, highly sensitive to increases in the cost of labour 
and with highly personalised labour relations. The NCMA was similar to the CCMA. 
Up to 1991, regional wage negotiations were held entirely separately. In 1992, at 
SACTWU’s initiative, as part of the union’s drive to create a single national Council, 
negotiations were held together for the first time (SALB 1992b). The union fielded 
one negotiating team, with representatives from each region, while the employers had 
separate teams. By the time of the third project, in Natal, the employer side was more 
unified, though some rivalry remained, as evident in the NCMA’s explicit pride in the 
‘economy’ of their Sick Fund, compared with the Cape Fund. On the whole, the 
CCMA was better organised. They had taken some convincing of the need to change 
the Sick Fund, but had had much longer to get used to the idea, from first sight of 
union proposals in 1989 to the start of the research process in 1992. Their involvement 
in Sick Fund management was more rigorous than in Natal, where mismanagement of 
the Fund was not picked up by employer representatives on the SFMC. This would 
not have happened in the Cape, where accounts were far more closely scrutinised and 
questioned, and nor would the introduction of an unfunded maternity benefit. The 
Natal employers’ lack of engagement with the Fund and failure to invest in the process 
of its restructuring mirrored and compounded the union’s disengagement in this 
region.
The threat to the clothing industry posed by the reduction of tariff protection 
drew the employer organisations and union into a tripartite forum with government, to 
develop a strategic plan for the industry. The plan involved phased reduction of
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protection, alongside ‘supply-side measures’ to protect against job loss (SACTWU 
1993, 30; Altman 1994). In the event, this proposal was rejected by government, 
which gave the unions some cause for concern about the efficacy of tripartite 
institutions (Collins 1996, 17).
In the leather industry, there were three employer organisations, the Footwear 
Manufacturers’ Federation (FMF) being the most powerful, with a full-time secretariat 
based in Port Elizabeth, near the Industrial Council head office. FMF members (and 
especially their secretary) dominated the employer side in (he SFMC. Interestingly, 
the other two sub-sectors (tanning and general goods) were represented on the SFMC 
by non-members of their industry, with very different results. The tanning 
representative (from the local Chamber of Industry and Commerce) was highly biased 
by his own position in a large local medical aid scheme and was generally scornful of 
the modest proposals for the Sick Fund. It was generally accepted that his 
interventions were neither mandated by the tanners nor likely to be acceptable to them. 
Ilis obstructiveness was alleviated only by the fact that the exasperation he provoked 
in employer and union representatives alike precipitated decisions. The general goods 
section of the industry contracted an industrial relations consultant, Theo Heifer, to 
represent them on the SFMC. His interventions were independent and often 
enlightened.'" His opinions were probably also at variance with those of the
Theo llclfei had an interesting history, having defended the unions' right to take up political 
issues in the volatile climate of the Eastern Cape in the l9X()s: ‘Are there any non-political unions?' 
he asked ‘Is a union that wants to preserve the status quo less political than one which want to change 
it?’ (Friedman 19X7, 237).
manufacturers he represented (often struggling small companies) hut they were far 
more positive than those of the tanners’ representative.
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The ‘employer’ trustees on the Transmcd Board should more accurately he 
described as ‘non-union’. They were individuals from the ranks of management, 
nominated to serve on the Board. They did not caucus, and were neither mandated by 
nor answerable to top management. They attended more erratically than union 
representatives, which caused problems with quorums for decisions and sparked 
accusations from the unions that management did not take the issue seriously. The 
Chairman was the only person from management with any power, though this was 
eroded in the course of the project, as his own position as a manager in Transnet came 
under threat precisely because of his links with the while establishment. In the early 
days of the project, he had a direct line to the managing director and his privileged 
knowledge put him in an anomalous position as a supposedly ‘neutral’ Chairman. The 
unions rapidly sensed that he knew more than he made public and resented this.
6. Unions and politics
The development of the South African trade union movement in a highly 
politicised context was outlined briefly at the beginning of this thesis. The connection 
between shopfloor issues and political issues operated in both directions. Focusing on 
the studies, the two-way influence between trade unionism and politics is seen in a 
number of ways. The Cape study started in the period of political transition, after the
release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners, continuing through the period 
of constitutional negotiations. The implementation process was well under way before 
the elections of 1994, with the first new clinics opening just three weeks before the 
election. The leather study happened in the same period, spanning 1992-1994. The 
leather Sick Fund managed to maintain the momentum of developments, establishing 
three clinics in Natal by the end of 1994, because planning was well under way before 
the election period and the initial research and meetings with members had been 
completed in 1992. The only direct impact of the election on this project was the 
relative difficulty of organising meetings, given (he political commitments of trade 
union officials, and the decision to close the Pietermaritzburg clinic early in the 
evenings because of the danger of violence to staff and patients, travelling after dark. 
Both the Cape and Natal projects benefited, ironically, from falling in this period under 
the old regime, when the general hostility of the state to workers was somewhat 
tempered by the approaching change, but remained sufficiently institutionalised to 
leave unchallenged the union’s role as protector of its members in the absence of a 
reliable welfare safety net.
The stasis in institutions and policy direction had dissolved by early 1994, the 
time of the third study, which was subject to a powerful combination of political 
uncertainty, economic instability and violence. In the circumstances, it is hardly 
surprising that it was impossible to ground and develop a new project in health care.
The Transmed study was permeated by the lingering aftereffects of apartheid. 
This project laboured under a major difficulty in trying to restructure and redistribute
al once. Though il started nearly two years after the election, health policy was still hy 
no means clear. This had a real impact on the acceptability of the new ‘Stale package’ 
in Transmcd, designed to link in to Stale hospitals at negotiated tariffs, in order to 
make hospital cover affordable for the lowest paid workers in the company.
The structure of the Fund, in which bipartite control is premised on joint 
funding, raises the question of ownership. As the Industrial Councils increasingly 
moved towards global bargaining, the notion of joint funding (and consequently right 
to control) became increasingly hollow. In global bargaining, all wage related costs 
arc included in the equation and agreement is reached on the total amount available. 
Though some ground rules may be agreed (for example, the total cannot Ik- taken in 
cash wage, without deductions for social security benefits), in this system the union 
has far greater control over the eventual distribution of the increase. ( nnlrihulinns to 
Itenefils such as the Sick l-und or I’rovidcnt Fund are not optional extras, negotiated in 
isolation from wages, hut an intrinsic part of the deal. It is arguable in this context that 
formal joint control of the benefit Funds is no longer appropriate and that unions ought 
to assume sole responsibility for the management of benefits which are part ol the 
social wage. However, the prospect of increased responsibility is unlikely to attract 
the union in Natal, given its lack of engagement in the past In the nflermnlh ol 
unpopular decisions, joint structures allow a face saving slnll ol blame, used by both 
parties in the course of the project and - to a startling degree by the employers al a 
later stage, as revealed in the follow up visit In the leather industry, the involvement 
of the employer parly shifts the focus away from inter union rivalry and, on occasion,
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serves as a spur to union unity. It is only in the Cape, where there is a reasonably 
sound financial basis and development is fairly advanced, that the advantages of 
assuming solo control and therefore responsibility for the management of the Sick 
Fund might outweigh the dangers for the union.
The projects had very different results, with a number of factors interacting to 
inlluencc the outcome. One thread runs through all: the relations between union 
leaderships and memberships. Leaders can be involved in a health care project without 
taking their members with them into the process. This can be because they have little 
interest in the issue themselves, as was the case with some of the union representatives 
in the Natal Clothing Sick Fund. Sometimes the structures make it difficult to relate to 
the members on the issue, as in the Transmcd case, where meetings were so frequent 
as to make it difficult to report back to members and impossible to represent them on a 
properly mandated basis impossible. A certain gritty persistence on the part of key 
leaders is vital, as in the KwaZulu-Natal region of the leather scheme, which has far 
outstripped the other regions, despite regional characteristics which daunted the Natal 
clothing fund.
The next chapter moves on to consider implications for health care, arising out 
of the studies. It is important for unionists involved in health care projects to keep 
abreast of developments in health policy, in order both to ensure that union experience 
is taken in to account in policy formulation and to develop a strong interface between 
union-supported medical schemes and the public sector.
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Chapter 9. Implications for health care
1. Introduction
This chapter focuses on health eare as a prism through which to reflect on the 
relationship between trade unions and politics. The influence of the political context on 
the outcome of these studies has been referred to in previous chapters. The focus here 
is narrowly on the implications for health care. In the last years of the apartheid 
regime, health policy had been generally directed at de-regulation of the private sector 
and ‘encouragement’ to the employed to use private sector facilities, leaving the public 
facilities for the unemployed, elderly and indigent (Naylor 1988; Price 1988a; I988b; 
Price and de Beer I988). Black membership of medical schemes grew dramatically, 
though from a low base, as trade unions moved beyond recognition battles and wage- 
bargaining, into the arena of conditions of work and benefits. While private sector 
expenditure expanded, public sector expenditure was relatively static, especially 
considering the fact that, despite the growth in black membership of medical schemes, 
the vast majority of the population (including many in employment) were dependent 
on public sector services.
It was clear that the government was not going to make the kind of investment 
in the public sector that would result in acceptable services. This concentrated the 
minds of union leaders, obliged to take the initiative. The early stages of political 
change opened a gap to secure deals with sympathetic officials in the state health
bureaucracy (as seen in the Cape and Leather studies). The disruptive violence and 
policy uncertainty of the election period closed this gap, with disastrous effect in the 
Natal study. After the election, the new government’s understandable concentration 
on building up the public sector, along with a long-drawn out confusion about policy 
direction on the private sector, NIII and the public-private connection, bedevilled the 
process of changing Transmed and poses ongoing problems for undertaking the 
restructuring of any further schemes.
2. What do the studies show?
Specialisation
Workers were increasingly distanced from the process of change in the />rivate 
health sector. This tendency is obvious in the studies, most starkly in a comparison of 
the Cape Clothing and Transmed projects. Increasing complexity, financial scope and 
deficit si/.e lend urgency to the need for change and increase the dependence on 
professional assistance (Broombcrg et al. 1991; Brcximbcrg 1991). There is a 
burgeoning market for health care consultancy in South Africa, as more and more 
schemes are hit by levels of medical inflation which threaten their membership base in 
the short-term and their survival in the longer term. Alongside this growth, there has 
been a growth in companies specialising in various interventions aimed at curtailing 
both the unit costs of various health services and the underlying problem of ongoing 
increases in utilisation of health care. These interventions go by the collective name of
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‘managed care’ and are being heavily sold to medical schemes (Broomberg el al. 1991; 
Veliotcsct al. 1993; Kinghorn 1994).
‘Managed care’ introduces new professionals to the process of restructuring, 
with their own vested interests, increasing the pressure on trade unionists, required to 
assimilate new systems, rules and jargon and to choose between competing companies 
with little track record. Most unionists feel uneasy about explaining managed care 
operations to their members and this compounds their reliance on the professionals 
(the health care consultants and the scheme administrators) for member information 
and education. The entry of managed care has also antagonised existing vested 
interests, particularly the medical profession, who may use their direct influence with 
members to foment resistance to new measures, and may go so far as to refuse to treat 
members.
The process of change in the public health sector has equally excluded trade 
unions. There is no mechanism to involve trade unions, as the largest organisations of 
health care users, in the process of decision-making and policy development. The two 
major commissions on health financing were made up of members chosen on the basis 
of their individual expertise, not as representatives of particular constituencies. This 
was a problematic formulation, not least because there were unionists with a particular 
expertise in the management and development of schemes for low-income members, 
whose experience would have been valuable, given (he low coverage of this group.
Degrees of success
There is ¡1 clear gradient in llie ‘success’ of the studies, with the later studies 
less sueeesslul than the earlier ones, judging success by not just the extent ol 
implementation hut also the degree of involvement ol unions and their memlrers. flits 
gradient was unexpected, given growing experience with the model, and national 
political change, which might have been expected to ease the problems and increase 
the chances of success. A number of factors interacted in complex and sometimes 
contradictory ways to produce the different outcomes. At the most basic level, the 
raw material of the studies differed markedly, especially their financial soundness. The 
Cape Clothing fund had strong reserves relative to its size and scope and these had 
been markedly strengthened by the l)c|>cndunts' fund, which served as a buffer against 
the uncertainly of change, diluting employer resistance and enabling the union to push 
through major developments. The Leather fund had diminishing reserves and a 
serious problem with over-expenditure in some regions, notably Durban and 
Pietermaritzburg, but was able to cross subsidise these areas from other ‘profitable’ 
regions. More significantly, the parties recognised the crisis in the f  und and were 
prepared to take the step of increasing contributions fairly dramatically in percentage 
terms (though from a low base) in order to stabilise it, pending restructuring. The 
increase was softened by the national scope of the f  und, as it was spread across 'loss’ 
and ‘profit’ areas. Resistance from the major ‘profit’ area , the Transvaal, was diluted 
by the fact that it came from the smallest union, which had no presence in tiny ol the
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other areas. The Natal Clothing Fund was seriously underfunded, with diminishing 
reserves, inaccurate budgets and income forecasts, and resistance from both employers 
and the union to the increases necessary to stabilise it, before expansion could be 
considered. Transmed had the same problem, on a massive scale. With no reserves at 
all, the scheme was battling to contain a mounting deficit, pending major restructuring 
of both benefits and contributions.
All three IC schemes had a clear subsidy policy, with matching contributions 
from employers and workers, which created a certain parity about financial decisions, 
as they were equally funded by the two parties. Transmed, however, had a fixed 
contribution from the employer, which was related to the wage level, rather than the 
actual cost of the benefit. This contribution rose only with wage inflation, which is 
substantially lower than medical inflation. Consequently, the impact of any increase in 
medical scheme costs above wage inflation was felt only by the members. This was 
particularly problematic in a situation where the benefits had been substantially 
underfunded and there had been no contribution increase for a year and a half. 
Restructuring of the benefits and of the subsidy range (with no increase in the 
maximum subsidy) added further uncertainty. The resultant imbalance mirrored the 
imbalance in responsibility on the Board of Trustees.
Transmed also differed from the three IC schemes in containing multiple 
options, raising complex questions of equity. This case highlighted the problem of 
attempting to design a health scheme to meet health ‘needs’. It is complex enough to 
reach a definition of ‘needs’ when there is no pre-existing scheme, but the existence of
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a scheme of any sort inevitably influences and often distorts the process. This is less 
problematic in simple schemes like the IC schemes, which build from a low base of 
benefits. In the Transmcd case, however, the existence of five different Plans clouded 
all consideration of the issue of needs. Those in the lower Plans wanted the benefits of 
Plan 5, and those in Plan 5 saw the closure of their option as an attack on their health. 
(High) cost was equated with (high) quality and freedom of choice (of scheme and 
provider) with democracy. Attempts to reduce the unit costs of care were regarded as 
inherently dangerous and anti-democratic, an assault on the health of the members.
The classic uncertainty of need compounded the difficulty: healthy people may be 
overtaken by accident or dread disease at any time. It was never possible to 
disentangle a discussion of health need from this tangle of emotion and history.
3. Issues for unions
If unions want to assure access to good and affordable health care for their 
members, they have to address a number of issues, which emerged in the course of the
studies.
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Worker distrust of the puhlie sector
The first of these issues is the widespread distrust of the public health sector 
amongst workers and its corollary of exaggerated respect for the private sector.1 The 
distrust of the public sector is based partly on direct experience in the apartheid era. 
Services were under-resourced, resulting in overcrowding, long queues and shortages 
of staff, equipment and supplies. The association with the apartheid stale lingers and 
has not been successfully overturned by the new government. The Transmed study in 
particular revealed a sense from workers, shared by many of their leaders, that public 
sector health care was part of the past, which they thought the ‘New South Africa’ 
had moved beyond. Interestingly, the advance envisaged was movement out of the 
public sector and into the private sector, rather than the reclaiming and strengthening 
of the public sector and redistribution of resources between groups and regions inside 
it, which was the thrust of education reform.
The impetus to move out of the public sector was strengthened in situations 
where there was a racial gradient in access to health care within a company or sector, 
so it is markedly stronger in Transmed (with its multiple Plans) than in the ('ape 
Clothing Fund (with its single scheme). Exposure to differential benefits focuses 
aspirations on achieving the most expensive benefits, short-circuiting a more 
fundamental process of examination and comparative ranking of health and other
1 This phenomenon is hy no means unique to South Africa and has been described in many 
countries, including both developed countries (Calnan et al. 199.1) and less developed countries 
(Banda and Walt 1995).
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needs. I would stress that this is independent of the question of how the costs are met: 
a decision to aim for a lower cost benefit is not a union failure, provided negotiating 
energy is directed to ensure that the putative increase is not lost but redirected to 
improvement of the cash wage or other elements of the social wage.
However, it is unrealistic to imagine that members will change their attitude 
towards the public sector on order. This will not happen unless and until there are 
visible changes in public sector services, which need to achieve a dramatic shift in 
image. The use of public sector services by high profile personalities, especially (but 
not only) from the political sphere, would assist in raising the credibility of these 
services, as would the involvement and backing of union leaders. There is a curious 
anomaly in the fact that the staff of public sector health services, some of whom are 
unionised, belong to medical schemes and use primarily private sector health care. If 
those who provide the health care in the public sector are seen to go elsewhere for 
their own health care, it is not surprising that workers would prefer to follow their 
example. Equally, it is strange that unions which are strongly opposed to privatisation, 
on political as well as economic grounds, have failed to make the link with health 
policy.
The challenge of solidarity
The design of benefits and contribution tables throws up a series of issues for 
unions, related particularly to the problem of giving practical effect to the long- 
established union principle of solidarity, the old slogan of ‘An injury to one is an injury
to all’ taking on literal force in this instance. All medical schemes are systems of social 
solidarity, the degree to which they embody this principle depending on the balance 
achieved between different groups. All contribution tables are built on the principle of 
cross-subsidisation: if all members paid exactly what was spent on their behalf for 
health care, there would be no need for a scheme. On the other hand, the degree of 
subsidisation has to be balanced by the need for reasonable consensus. Some kinds of 
cross-subsidy are more generally acceptable than others, most notably subsidy of the 
sick by the healthy, since there is a reasonable chance that sickness may strike anyone. 
Subsidies of the old(cr) by the young(er), of women by men, or of the poor(er) by the 
rich(cr), are contentious, and may well be resisted by the potentially affected group. 
Since young men (sometimes also relatively richer, by virtue of their placing in the 
skills hierarchy) are often amongst the most vocal and active of union members, union 
officials have to exert considerable moral authority to avoid their interests dominating 
(especially as they are more likely than not to be young men themselves). The broader 
the group, the more marked arc the problems of cross-subsidy: thus Transmed, with its 
very wide income range, experienced the problem in a far more acute fashion than the 
1C Funds.
The problem of gender emerges also in the design of benefits and the attitude 
towards women-only benefits. Is a gynaecological clinic a sectional benefit because 
men get no use from it? Is maternity leave an even more narrowly sectional benefit, 
because only certain women draw on it? Confronting these questions presents a
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challenge to male-dominated union leaderships, particularly at times of financial crisis, 
when the pressure to cut costs tests the firmness of commitment.
The problem of limits and controls
All medical schemes confront the problem of meeting a virtually limitless need 
with limited resources. Different schemes met the need to ration health care in 
different ways. The Cape Clothing Fund imposed no limits to consultations with 
general practitioners. Dental, optical and gynaecological benefits were rationed by 
means of an appointment system. The Leather Fund imposed consultation limits in the 
course of the project, in an attempt (only partially successful) to curb runaway use in 
certain areas. The Natal Clothing Fund imposed no limits to consultations, though the 
capitation system of payment for panel doctors had a built-in incentive to doctors to 
discourage frequent consultations (which had more impact on the doctor than on the 
Fund, whose doctor costs were fixed). Transmcd had limits in almost all benefit 
categories under the old Flan system. The new scheme removed most of these, subject 
to agreement by an intermediary (one of the managed care companies). The notable 
exception, the limit in the ‘Personal Medical Savings Account’ which had to cover all 
elective care, was the source of major dissatisfaction.
One of the problems with limits is that they easily transmute in members' minds 
into entitlements. Those who do not use a particular benefit ‘to the limit’ are often left 
with a sense that they have lost out, regardless of their objective need. This gives rise 
to the common pattern of a run on benefits (especially elective benefits such as
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dentistry and optometry) close to the end of the benefit year. The creation of a limit 
also serves to focus fearful attention on what lies beyond the limit, and much lime was 
spent during the Transmed project discussing hypothetical cases.
One of the clearest points to emerge from the studies is the difficulty of 
containing costs in systems which are located in the open private sector. Direct 
delivery of services through primary care clinics, staffed and financed by the schemes 
themselves (as in the 1C schemes), facilitates monitoring of both cost and (|ualily, 
though it does not automatically assure them.2 Care delivered via contracted panel 
doctors is less satisfactory, particularly in terms of quality of care, but does enable 
some degree of monitoring of cost. The free choice system operating in most 
commercial medical aid schemes, and in Transmed, is the most problematic of all. The 
assumption is that the quality of care is higher than from panel doctors but there is no 
necessary causal link between high fees and high quality. Transmed concentrated its 
cost containment initiative on medicine and hospitalisation in the first instance, leaving 
members to ‘manage’ their own primary care from the ‘personal medical savings 
account'. This approach failed, as many members ran through the amount available, 
and doctors began to demand cash up front, for fear that the savings accounts were 
empty and they would not be paid. Dealing with this problem is one of the many 
challenges remaining for the Transmed trustees.
The relationship between benefit design and utilisation levels on the one hand, 
and contribution tables and increases on the other, is generally obscure not only to
(Quality nf care in health is notoriously ilillictill to measure On this issue, see lor example 
Xwarenstein ( IW5).
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union members bill also to their representatives on management structures. 
Contribution increases only achieve some degree of acceptance if union 
representatives trust and understand the accounts and projections on which they are 
based and are prepared to sell them to the members. Member acceptance depends on 
the degree of trust they accord the leaders involved. In the Natal study, the 
undermining of trust resulted in resistance and resentment.
Though nobody likes contribution increases, most are accustomed to a steady 
annual increase. Unusual increases (larger or at more frequent intervals) meet with 
greater resistance. In general, people arc not prepared to pay them unless and until 
they are sure they will get their money’s worth: they want to see before they buy. This 
is manageable for a scheme with healthy reserves but hard for schemes which depend 
on the increased income to pay for the improvements. Iiardcst of all is the situation of 
a Fund (like the Natal Clothing Fund or Transmed) which needs an increase simply to 
meet a past deficit, and can offer no increase in benefit in return.
The pace of change
It is clear from all the studies that changing health care arrangements is a slow 
process and that democracy slows the pace, while greatly enhancing the potential for 
successful implementation of changes in medical schemes. There is a natural tendency 
toward conservatism around health care practices. If people are used to choosing their 
general practitioner, they will resent restrictions on choice. If accustomed to pink pills 
from the pharmacist for hypertension, they may well be suspicious of while pills from a
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clinic. Resentment is intensified if there is a perception that the changes are imposed 
and are not compensated hy obvious advances in benefit. Even when there is broad 
agreement with the direction of change, habits die hard and the transition period from 
the old benefit arrangement to the new is likely to be troubled, requiring careful 
management.
The slow development of the Cape Clothing project was definitely a factor in 
its success: members and officials had time to absorb the proposals, discuss them and 
respond to them. The issue was discussed inside the union for four years before the 
formal project began in 1992: implementation of dependant cover and the new clinics 
took two more years. Another factor was that the change in the Cape Fund was an 
advance. Members had access to the brand new benefit of dependant coverage. They 
were not being asked to make changes in their own health care arrangements. Rather, 
they were positively encouraged not to change from panel doctors to the clinics, which 
were prioritised in the first phase for dependants. The anticipated effect occurred: 
members who took their children to the Fund's clinics observed and approved, and 
began to agitate for access. As new clinics opened, members gained access. The 
panel remains, but is gradually shrinking, especially in the vicinity of clinics.
The Leather Fund did not have the luxury of time and financial resilience and 
was obliged to act more rapidly to stem losses, which it did by imposing a limit on 
consultations. This aroused strong reaction, particularly from the NIJLW, and 
diverted the broader process of addressing the problems of the scheme into crude 
demands for higher limits. Resentment of the limits showed in some areas, where
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certain members ran through their limits within the first few months of the benefit year 
and union officials reported defiant responses to the new rules. The teething problems 
of the new clinics in Pietermaritzburg, in particular, highlight the barriers to successful 
implementation, which included the attitude of the doctor employed. The Natal 
Clothing Fund tried to short-circuit the process of change, which proved to be 
distinctly problematic. The time limit on the formal project was less than six months, 
in a troubled time which severely limited the extent of contact with members.
In the Transmed project, the deadline for implementation was extended by 
three months when it became obvious that the six month deadline could not 
realistically be met. Even nine months was absurdly short for a project of this size and 
scope and the effect was obvious, especially amongst members. The Board of 
Trustees has spent the year since the new scheme was implemented in damage control, 
attempting to placate angry providers, negotiating with state health authorities and 
adjusting benefit design to accommodate member concerns, at the same time as 
overseeing the rationalisation of the problematic financial systems of the administrator. 
All of these are tasks which should ideally have been accomplished before 
implementation. The Transmed case underlines the point, which emerges in all the 
studies, that the process is never complete and that monitoring the system is at least as 
important as designing and implementing it.
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Is this a ‘model’?
Though there were similar elements to the proposals in all three Industrial 
Council eases, there is not a mechanistic model, which can be transplanted to different 
groups of workers and implemented simply and quickly. This was abundantly clear in 
the Natal Clothing project. There was a great deal of contact between SACTWU 
leaders from the different regions and sectors of the union, and developments in one 
region were scrutinised by and discussed with others. This happened both informally 
and formally: informally, around meetings for other union business; formally, in 
preparations for national wage negotiations. There was also an explicit long term plan 
to create uniform conditions in the different Sick Funds, raising others to the level of 
the Cape Clothing Fund (see Chapter 4).
There is an important distinction between an instructive example and a model. 
The specifics of the existing scheme have to be taken into account in modifying the 
elements of the proposals: for example, the different panel payment system in the Natal 
Clothing Fund meant that conversion to clinics for all members would be an added 
expense, rather than a saving. If this was a desired move, it would have to be 
implcntcd over a period, to cushion the impact on contributions. More generally, the 
negotiating environment has to be accurately assessed, identifying the indicators for 
wage bargaining and the status of other non-wage demands, as medical scheme 
demands are more likely to lose out when wages are under pressure. This links to the 
most important factor: struggle is part of the model. There will inevitably be
disagreement and dispute about solutions to health care problems. Most changes have 
cost implications and the division of the costs is the most basic site of struggle. Ihit 
the struggle does not end there, even cost-free changes or those which may indeed 
save money, may spark resistance. None of the outcomes will have universal approval 
- their success depends on answering the fell needs of a suff iciently large group, 
accommodating sectional concerns and neutralising resentment or opposition.
4. Conclusion
l;or the unions, involvement in health care is part of a broader concern for 
members’ welfare. Of the options available, the model which concentrates on primary 
care allows unions to manage the situation in which the majority of contacts between 
members and health services occur, to monitor cost and (|ualily and design the services 
for maximum convenience in terms of sites and opening hours. Primary care is the 
gateway to the other levels of care and it is an advantage to members to be referred 
into other levels with monitoring and follow up care front their own services. Public 
sector hospital care is far more affordable, whether members pay out of pocket or the 
scheme includes hospital care in the benefit package and negotiates prices with the 
public sector.
There are distinct advantages to the state in this kind of scheme. They are 
relieved of responsibility for the primary care of large groups of workers and 
sometimes their families. Referral to secondary and tertiary care is managed via
agreed protocols, as is follow-up care back at the primary level. Administration of 
fees is markedly simplified: fee levels can be negotiated with the Fund according to the 
income levels of the member groups and a consolidated account issued to the Fund. 
This is likely to be more productive than the labour intensive system of individual 
billing.
The active encouragement of links between the public and private sectors in 
schemes like these would assist in breaking down the notion that it is the fact of 
employment which marks the divide between the sectors. The political support of the 
trade union movement would strengthen the Department of Health in inter­
departmental battles over the allocation of stale funding. It is certainly arguable that 
organised workers, because they have structures for the articulation of complaints and 
problems, would constitute a more critical and vocal constituency for public services 
than the unemployed and elderly, putting pressure on services to raise quality. This 
would have a ripple effect on disadvantaged groups. The Department of Health is 
committed to increasing participation of citizens at the level of the District Health 
Authority. The trade unions in these studies tried to do something very similar in the 
health schemes to which their members belonged. Their experience has resonance for 
others who are moving in the same direction.
The final chapter draws together the themes of the thesis, looking particularly 
towards the future of union health care initiatives in the light of broader health care
developments in South Africa.
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Chapter 10. Conclusions
The narrative of this thesis follows restructuring projects in a series of medical 
schemes for workers and their families. The purpose of the thesis, as distinct from the 
projects, is to analyse the role of trade unions in these projects in the past, consider 
whether they have a role relating to health care in a changed political dispensation and, 
if so, the conditions under which that role can be sustained and expanded in the future.
Political transformation was more than the backdrop to, and framework for, 
the studies. It loomed over them, intruded into them at crucial moments and shaped 
their progress. Health policy for post-apartheid South Africa is still in the process of 
formulation and I believe that it is important that the experience of trade unions feeds 
into the project of expanding, improving and democratising the delivery of health 
services to South Africa’s people. The thesis arose out of engagement with this 
problem and its purpose was not restricted to retrospective reflection and analysis, but 
intended also to inform a renewal of that engagement. I did not so much choose a 
thesis topic, as find it emerging out of my work of the last ten years and more. The 
focus expanded along the way. Though a tightly focused study of a single scheme 
would have been neater and easier to manage, it would have been misleadingly narrow. 
Had the thesis been, as planned, a study of the Cape Clothing Sick Fund, it would have 
focused on a success. Expanding the focus to include projects which resulted in 
degrees of failure opened up far more challenging questions about the conditions for
success and the limits on replicability which are. I believe, of significance in the 
national project of health system reconstruction and development.
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The four medical schemes at the centre of the thesis each faced problems with 
the funding and delivery of medical care at affordable cost for their members, 
especially low-income members. The schemes varied in size, geographic scope, 
benefit design and financial stability and the projects varied in the degree of trade 
union involvement, the organisational form of that involvement and the expectations of 
members. They also differed in the extent and style of my involvement. I was not an 
observer, but an actor. I was not documenting and analysing processes taking place 
apart from me, but centrally involved in those processes and with strong views about 
the direction in which trade unions should be moving. This adds a dimension to the 
process of thesis writing, requiring me not only to examine the projects and their 
outcomes, but also to apply the same rigour to reflection on my own views, and my 
relations with unions and workers. To what extent had I imposed my own agenda on 
the projects? To what extent had I honestly followed the principles of democracy 
which I believed were essential within unions, in my own relations with them and in 
the processes of research and implementation? In short, I have had to reflect on my 
working life and my politics and, in the light of that reflection, decide how to direct my 
work in the future. The thesis is for me a starting point for a new involvement in 
policy formulation on health care both within the union movement and in engagement
with government.
1. The argument
The central argument of this thesis is that, under certain conditions, trade 
unions can transform existing arrangements for health care for their members, 
imprinting a trade union character on both the services and their management. I argue 
that struggle and the bargaining process are crucial to a successful outcome in projects 
which attempt to transform working class health care. The studies reveal the complex 
reasons which motivated certain unions to take up the issue of health care and to 
locate that issue in the context of collective bargaining, dealing with employers rather 
than directly with the state. Unions are faced with multiple demands on their time and 
energy, and there is a constant process of redefining their agendas and shuffling their 
priorities. The motivation for taking up a new issue is important, as it strongly 
influences the commitment and resources which will be devoted to the issue and the 
staying power of those involved. Basically, unions consider: first, whether they should 
take up a particular issue? (is it a union function or does the responsibility lie 
elsewhere, with the state, employers or members themselves?); second, whether they 
can take it up? (do they have the necessary resources and skills?); third, what the 
consequences of success or failure would be.
New issues challenge the capacity and skill of unions. Wage bargaining is a 
core union function and members grow to understand that their negotiators will have 
varying degrees of success with it, but unions taking up health care are assuming
responsibility for an urea previously outside their seope. This has the potential for 
garnering botheredit and blame. In either outeome, the union is identified with the 
scheme and this affects members’ ideas of union purpose and operation: what unions 
arc for, what they do and how they do it. Failures and shortcomings of the health care 
scheme will be blamed on the union, while successes may increase respect for the 
union but may also stimulate new demands and deflect attention from government 
failure to provide adequately in the field of health care.
Spurs to leadership action on a new issue may include strong dissatisfaction 
from members, an assessment that the issue is winnablc, personal interest and strategic 
vision. There are elements of all these in the ( ’ape Clothing study, where a new young 
leadership challenged the old leadership’s claim of caring for members, in the first 
instance by questioning the quality and value of the benefit provided, and then by 
articulating the aim of improving benefits, extending them to dependants and wresting 
control from bureaucrats and doctors. The ‘family’ benefit was of particular 
significance in establishing the responsible nature of the cadre of new young leaders 
(many of them single and childless at the time).
The project would not have caught fire had there not been a basis of member 
dissatisfaction with the scheme: union leaders generally respond to dissatisfaction, 
rather than stimulate it. In the Natal study, though there was member dissatisfaction, 
this had not caught the attention of the leadership, which did not need to reclaim the 
benefit to establish its own legitimacy, as in the Cape. The project was adopted 
second-hand in Natal, rather than conceived with enthusiasm. The leather study falls
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between the two clothing schemes in this respect. Impetus to examine the Sick Fund 
initially came from national leaders in SACTWIJ as part of their strategy for increasing 
their power in an industry in which theirs was a minority union. Unions became 
involved in the Transmcd project because they had no choice. They were reactive 
rather than pro-active. The white unions hud to engage when the representation (hey 
had demanded was offered and in the process they were associated with decisions 
unpopular with their memberships. The black unions had also responded reaclively 
(but separately) in the past. The new style of joint union bargaining inevitably drew 
them into the process, carrying a separate agenda of their own: to redress the 
inequalities of the past.
Once unions decide to lake up the issue of health care, the conditions for 
success include commitment from union leadership, membership support and 
involvement, efficient administration and financial stability within the health care 
funding mechanism. The projects are most successful when key leadership figures are 
prepared to invest time in the process of change, not merely rubber-stamping it, but 
prepared to fight for health care demands in the bargaining process against other and 
equally pressing demands. Continuity of involvement by such leaders gradually lends 
their credibility to the process of change, but the changes will not succeed if they do 
not answer member needs and attract member support. Few union leaders will involve 
themselves in issues which are unpopular with members and plans imposed from 
above, however objectively necessary or even ‘good’, will not work. At best, 
members will not understand them; at worst, they may actively subvert them. Poor
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management of schemes limits the possibility of change: poor financial and data 
management increase the area of uncertainty and consequently confirm conservative 
tendencies and unwillingness to change on the part of both members and leaders. 
Uncertainty is a good excuse for inertia, as seen repeatedly in the Transmed study 
when the unions (especially the white unions) used the unreliability and variance of the 
financial reports issuing from the administrators as a reason to defer decisions. In 
financial terms, stability is more important than size, also abundantly clear in the 
Transmed study. Despite its enormous size and financial flows, it was dangerously 
unstable, with no reserves and ongoing confusion about its actual financial status.
I believe that the thesis has demonstrated that by direct involvement, trade 
unions can improve the health care provided for their members. They do not need to 
regard this as an area to be left to the medical and planning experts who generally 
monopolise the design of health services. These experts have their place, but they 
should develop a relationship with those who will use the services they design. I Inion 
leaders bring an expertise of their own to dialogue with specialists: they are experts in 
the representation of their members’ interests and in bargaining to advance those 
interests. The devil is in the detail and union leaders can feed into the planning process 
the detail required to adapt a model to the particular circumstances of their members in 
this place at this time.
The trajectory of the studies underlines the danger of simplistic model-making. 
There were very real achievements in the projects, which have changed the nature of 
the health care accessible to members, but these were hard-won and slowly
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implemented. They were bargained, emerging gradually out of a process of extended 
struggle. This struggle is a fundamental feature of the studies and without it, the 
‘model’ is lost. The process of struggle and bargaining embeds the issue, confirming 
the union’s commitment to it as one chosen above others (which were, as a 
consequence, delayed or rejected), defended and argued for amongst leaders and 
members, and between unions in the multi-union schemes. In the multi-union schemes 
the inter-union caucus becomes a kind of rehearsal, an internal bargaining process 
before meeting the employer party in the collective bargaining process.
In the process of bargaining, commitment is tested again. Issues which have 
slid easily onto the agenda arc as easily dropped. The Natal case is indicative of this 
problem. The issue of dependant benefits was repeatedly agreed ‘in principle’, raising 
expectations and then provoking resentment and distrust from members when the 
expectations were not fulfilled. In the leather scheme, by way of contrast, though 
dependant cover was a clearly expressed need, it was not the main issue in the 
mandate for the study. The result was that expectations were kept to more realistic- 
levels, with a clear understanding that the first priority was to contain cost escalation 
as a necessary pre-condition to expansion of benefits.
The practice of bargaining assists in easing the stranglehold of the bureaucrats, 
medical professionals and medical business. Conventional medical schemes 
unilaterally raise contributions to cover utilisation of existing medical benefit 
structures, only restructuring benefits when contributions inflate to levels which 
threaten loss of members. The schemes in this thesis adopted a more radical approach.
taking account of the fact that ‘need’ is an elastic term in relation to health services 
and that demand for services grows continually. The only way to contain costs to 
affordable levels is to involve the users in a process of prioritising needs.
Bargaining around health care issues (other than employer subsidy level) takes 
place in different structures from wage bargaining. They may be sub-structures of the 
wage bargaining structures, as in the Sick Fund Management Committees of the 
Industrial Councils, or entirely separate, as in the Transmed Board of Trustees. There 
is a greater degree of common interest in health care than in wages, frequently marked 
by attempts by employers and medical administrators to ‘de-politicise’ the issue and 
divorce it from bargaining. The danger of this approach is demonstrated quite clearly 
in the Transmed study, in which health care issues were relegated to a body on which 
representation was not proportional to membership and where the employer parly 
repeatedly attempted to avoid bargaining. This was unrealistic, given the impact of 
increases in the cost of the medical scheme on wage bargaining. The major increase in 
contributions, (hough decided in a non-bargaining body, was carried to the wage 
negotiations by trade unions determined to claw back in wages at least some of the 
contribution increase which their members had suffered. Equally, the tense 
atmosphere of wage negotiations infected the atmosphere of Transmed Board of 
Control meetings and exacerbated the difficulty of reaching agreement. In the Natal 
case, this infection was powerful enough to cause (he cancellation of Sick Fund 
meetings throughout the period of the 1996 wage strike. The lesson is, I believe, that 
since it is impossible to avoid the clement of bargaining about health care, it is
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preferable to confront it directly and locate the issue in relation to bargaining 
structures. There is certainly a case to be made for separate structures for the 
management of Sick Funds: if Sick Fund management is simply one issue on the 
general agenda of the bargaining structures, there is an obvious risk that it will be 
squeezed by other urgent issues. However, the management structure should mirror 
the general bargaining structure in terms of representation, and should report to it, in 
order to maintain the link and the balance between health care demands and bargaining 
over wages and other benefits. Besides the bargaining process between employers and 
worker representatives, union-based schemes have used their experience of bargaining 
to good effect with other parties: with the state in all the eases; with managed care 
companies and suppliers, and even their own administrators, in the case of Transmed.
One of the major lessons of this thesis is that changing health care schemes is a 
very slow business. Short cuts do not work. The success of the Cape clothing project 
is in no small measure due to the slow percolation of the issue through the union and 
the deliberate pace of decision-making in Industrial Council structures. Frustrating 
though the challenges and delays are, the process of justification and cross-checking 
and further investigation tests the commitment of the parties and increases the chances 
of success. The slow pace in the Transmed project had more complex effects. While 
slowing the pace in the 1C projects meant delaying new expenditure, in Transmed it 
meant increasing the deficit (by R20 million a month at the height of the problem) and 
compounding the inequities of the past by directing company rescue funds once again 
to schemes which largely benefited white employees. This project required (and
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continues to require) a difficult balance between the (slow) pace of educating members 
about changes and the (rapid) pace needed to stem the financial collapse of the 
scheme.
The process of relating to members, gathering their responses to proposals, 
informing and educating them, is much more difficult in national schemes. The leather 
project was problematic enough but the difficulties were intensified in the Transmed 
project, in which members had to choose between options. In the end, there was 
minimal contact with scheme members, amounting to a series of meetings around the 
country after the scheme had been designed, explaining the new benefit options as a 
prelude to members making their choices.' Before this process, the views of members 
were presumed to be channelled through their representatives to the Board of 
Trustees. Equally, there was an assumption that the trustees were feeding in members’ 
views and taking back to their members the discussions and decisions taken by the 
Board. This is a somewhat idealised conception of union functioning, given the 
competitive multi-union situation, the pressure for rapid decisions, the complexity of 
the issues and the stakes. The speed made it difficult to mesh with union structures, 
truncating the normal process of reporting back and receiving mandates and some of 
the trustees expressed insecurity about reporting back accurately on the complex 
issues and choices facing the Board. Also significant was an clement of defensiveness 
especially among the white craft unions, who operated with a sense that they were
1 I had already left on sabbatical al this stage, so missed Ihc member meetings. The process was, by 
all accounts, gruelling.
defending their members’ rights against overwhelming odds. They were reluctant to 
report back to members on the compromises they felt they were being forced into.
All the projects provide a sobering lesson for state health planners. Taking the 
Cape Clothing scheme as an example, if it takes this long to create a scheme for 
5()’(XX) families from a socially homogeneous group in one industry with minimal 
income differentials in a limited geographical area, on the basis of an existing scheme, 
(hen designing, planning and gaining public acceptance for a new scheme to 
incorporate either the whole working population or even simply those currently 
without medical cover, is a task of staggering magnitude.
2. Complicated relationships
It is important to recall that these are not union-only schemes: employers also 
have an interest in the schemes, which they jointly fund. This is an important feature, 
sometimes lost in the shorthand of referring to ‘union schemes’. However, though the 
two parties share the funding, it would be wrong to view their interests as equal. The 
employers have a broad interest in the health of their workforces and an obvious 
preference for value for money via cost-efficiency within the schemes. The unions 
have an interest beyond the financial: their members use the services (along with their 
families in some cases), while employers do not. It is not surprising that interest in the 
actual services is keener on the union side, and that the process of change in the Sick 
Funds was in each case initiated by unions. Nevertheless, there were a number of
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employer figures in the 1C projects, especially in the leather study, who had a sustained 
interest in the developments and were involved in their implementation and the driving 
force in the Transmed project was a manager, who absorbed himself totally in the 
process. On the administrative side, commitment varied from the energetic 
involvement of the General Secretary of the Leather 1C to the frank lack of interest 
and carelessness of the Secretary of the Natal Clothing 1C and the incompetence and 
occasional resistance of some Transmed staff. Senior administrators tended to give 
the lead for their organisations and consequently working with NICLI was productive 
and enjoyable, despite the objective difficulties, whereas working with the NCIC was 
frustrating in the extreme, and with Transmed, a startling exposure to incompetence 
on a grand scale.
One of the more twisted threads running through the thesis is that of the 
complex relationships around health. It would be a romantic overstatement to say that 
these unions have equalised the power imbalance between workers and doctors. The 
shift of balance is slow and not accomplished once and for all. The relationships arc 
ongoing and so must the union involvement be, if the balance is not to swing back 
towards the professionals. Therein lies the danger - that union leaders lose interest or 
energy after the initial engagement and allow old habits to reassert themselves. They 
also need to engage with members, to start to challenge their views on health care, to 
open the way to a more positive attitude, which does not simply equate quality with 
quantity (of drugs, tests, consultations and interventions) and the level of luxury in 
facilities. The other strand of this theme is the relationship between union leaders and
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the new cadre of medical management appointed to give effect to the plans for 
development and to run the services on a day to day basis. The studies have proved 
how difficult it is to find and hold good medical managers and staff, and how easy it is 
to lose control. It is dangerous, but easy, to neglect the relationships with medical 
staff once they arc employed, leaving them to get on with the job of providing health 
care to members. This is not simply a technical job, the same in all situations. The 
way in which providers interact with their patients is at the core of that care and it is 
extremely difficult to judge in the abstract or to monitor in practice. Qualifications can 
be scrutinised in the selection process, but care and respect are more difficult to 
measure outside of the provider-patient interaction, which is generally private. For 
this reason, the unions need to retain and strengthen mechanisms for members to relate 
their experiences in the Funds’ health care centres, and they also need to provide a 
working environment which fosters and acknowledges good practice from health 
professionals. As employees of the Sick Funds, the medical staff have employment 
rights which should not be overlooked by trade unions when they become employers.
Joint management of health schemes is demanding, and potentially creates and 
entrenches a new group of ‘specialists’ in the management committees, distancing 
them from ordinary members. The task of transformation does not slop with the 
challenge to the old administrative bureaucracy, as a new bureaucracy, this time 
medical, is in danger of emerging. Joint management structures also tend to involve 
‘outsider experts’ more directly than wage bargaining structures. Their role is 
complex: on the one hand, they can ‘empower’ worker (and employer) representatives
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in relation to (lie bureaucrats, medical business (in the form of managed care 
operations) and professionals; on the other hand, they can substitute for those 
representatives, esjtccially between management meetings. The most powerful of the 
I ransmed subcommittees is the finance committee, which has trustee members, but in 
its first year was usually only attended by the Chair (a senior manager) and an actuarial 
consultant. The frequency of meetings is a serious barrier to the involvement ol union 
representatives, most of whom have numerous responsibilities in addition to their 
Hoard duties. The Transmed study also provided vivid evidence of the difficulty ol 
transforming relationships inside bureaucracies, especially large ones. Monitoring 
change is a difficult and continuing task, but the fact that the Cape ( 'lolhing Sick fund 
recently survived a serious problem with its second medical director without impact on 
the ongoing development programme is an encouraging example of the robustness of 
joint management.2
The role of consultants and advisers in the transformation of schemes, and their 
relationships with the other parlies, is a common thread in the four studies. In the first 
three, I carried this role alone, while in the last, I was only one player in a large cast.
In chapter 2, I reflect on my role in some depth: here I would like merely to highlight 
certain structural features of the role of consultants or ‘experts’. ITom a trade union 
point of view, the crucial issue is balancing the independence which experts need in 
order to function honestly and produce sound and useful work, and the control which 
the union needs in order to ensure that the work is directed towards ends in which the
’ III Molar, the liist medical director, who tell the fund to study further, lias liecn le appointed and 
retains to die fund in Nnvcuihrr IW(
union believes, unci at a pace and eosl appropriate to union eapaeity. Clearly the 
projects would not have developed as they did without the involvement of consultants, 
to provide information, alternative benefit designs, cost projections, detailed plans and 
so on However, information is seldom value-free: consultants come with agendas, 
sometimes fixed ideas and biases, or models drawn from previous work. They arc 
likely to align themselves more closely with one of the parties: whether this is 
problematic depends on the extent to which they manage to establish credibility with 
the others and develop a working relationship with them. Most important, in my view, 
is sensitivity to the industrial relations context. functioning in this context requires 
adaptation to the notion that expertise will sometimes have to take a back seat to the 
exigencies of bargaining. Operating in a multi union context poses a challenge to 
consultants, specially any with links to one of the unions.
In the Transmcd study, the intensity and extent of the financial crisis, the 
multipliciiy of options and the administrative chaos compounded a situation of 
dependence on the experts which was far greater than in the Sick l;unds but, even with 
the benefit of hindsight, inescapable. The Sick funds needed ongoing contact and 
support from me as their consultant, long after the formal research reports were 
submitted, but with the exception of the Natal Clothing l;und they look responsibility 
for implementation and later went on to extend the process independently.
Transmcd's dependence on consultants continues, though the joint management 
structure has developed in sophistication and confidence. At the most basic level, 
though, until the administrators prove that they have both the capacity and the will to
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implement the Board’s decisions ef ficiently, the Board will continue to depend on the 
consultants as watchdogs through the process of change.
3. Economic and political conditions
The timing of the projects was crucial and the studies present a chronology of 
changing political and economic contexts. The Cape Clothing and Leather projects 
started while the apartheid state was still in power, some years before the democratic 
elections of 1994. Though the roots of the Cape project were firmly planted in the old 
era, political change was in the air and cracks were opening in the previously 
impermeable facade of the state. The Cape clothing project, in particular, seized the 
opportunity to engage with the provincial health department to negotiate concessions 
on drug supplies. The leather project, while it successfully negotiated a concession 
with a regional health authority (in Great Brak), was unsuccessful in attempts to 
negotiate a drug and hospital deal with provincial health authorities in Natal and to gel 
a clear ruling on the scope of clinical practice allowable by law for its clinic nurses. In 
an ironic sign of the changing times, panel doctors in Natal used the new vocabulary of 
democracy to defend and preserve their position (and income) at the expense of the 
Fund and its members. In some ways, things were simpler under the old regime: a 
hostile state was not going to take action for workers' health care, so the unions had 
to.
There was considerable uncertainty about how the electoral alliance between 
COSATU and the ANC' would transmute into a new working relationship with 
government, and with the post-apartheid state. In the broad front politics which 
characterised the last period of the struggle for national liberation, class differences 
were submerged in the face of a common enemy. After the election, the ANC 
assumed power but as the senior partner in a Government of National Unity (GNU), 
sharing power (in terms of the negotiated settlement) with the National Party and 
Inkatha Freedom Party, despite its overwhelming electoral victory. This arrangement 
constrained rapid policy change, along with the fragile economy inherited from the 
National Party and pressure from business and the international community, including 
donor agencies. At an institutional level, the fact that the settlement had also 
guaranteed the jobs of civil servants slowed the transformation process within the state 
and often put a brake on progress. At the same time, the ANC was faced with high 
expectations from their alliance partners and their electoral base. ‘Delivery’ was the 
catchword of the day, formally enshrined in the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme.
The Natal clothing project, launched in the immediate run-up to the elections, 
was paralysed by a combination of heightened expectations of ‘delivery’, uncertainty 
about government policy and issue overload on the pari of unions, which were heavily 
involved in the negotiations before settlement and in the run-up to the elections. The 
Transmcd project started in late 1995, more than a year after the new government was 
elected. The euphoria had subsided and transformation was proceeding unevenly and
slowly. There was one visible effect of transformation in this project: as top 
management of Transnet changed, union access was inverted. For the first time, the 
black unions had privileged access to company and government decision-makers and 
they used it.
Economic conditions have a significant influence on the projects, firstly on 
unions’ ability to take up health care as an issue at all and then on the degree of 
mobility they have in bargaining. Health care demands are weighed against wage 
increases and improvement of other benefits, and come under particular pressure in 
adverse conditions, though responses dif fer in relation to the union's degree of 
commitment to the health issue. In the Cape, the union agreed to a delay in the 
change-over to statutory sick pay, but exacted a special contribution (the Dependants' 
Fund) in return. In the event, this Fund was crucial in establishing the financial 
stability necessary to weather the uncertainty of major change. In the subsequent 
negotiations, the union had to face the dif ficult issue of offsetting the cost of the shift 
to employers by a onee-off reduction in the wage increase. This would not have been 
possible in a bad year for the industry: workers would simply not have accepted it.
In the Natal study, tough economic conditions combined fatally with lack of 
commitment to the Sick Fund issue to ensure that it was the first demand dropped 
during bargaining. The influence of economic conditions look a particular spin in the 
Transmed project, given the knock-on effects of increases in transport costs on the 
economy as a whole. A number of stale departments have interests, sometimes 
conflicting, in developments in Transmed. The company, Transnet, falls under the
jurisdiction of two ministries, Transport anil I’ublic linterprises, an uncomfortable 
situalion compounded by the concern of the Department ol Trade and Industry and the 
Department of linance. The threat of privatisation and company break up is a major 
concern for the unions and has direct implications lor the medical scheme project. 
Medical scheme liability is a factor in the saleability ol the component companies, 
lupially, substantial loss of membership would affect the medical scheme, shrinking the 
risk pool and upsetting financial projections. It would also affect the administrators, 
whose infrastructure is premised on the current membership and would be difficult to 
scale down in proportion to loss of membership. Most intractable is the ixmsioncr 
problem. Transmed already has a very high |>ensioner load, due to downsizing in the 
past. I'urlher downsizing will exacerbate the problem, as divisions which are sold lake 
their current employees but not their pensioners. It is unlikely that all divisions will lx- 
sold, which raises the spectre of a small publicly owned remnant with an enormous 
pensioner load, to be carried in effect by the stale. The financial problem would lie 
further magnified by any action to extend Irenefils to black |xmsioncrs. This issue 
highlights the problems that the stale as employer encounters in trying to balance the 
need for fiscal discipline and the need to redress the injustices ol the past.
4. Implications for health policy
In all the extensive policy work on the issue of a new health system for South 
Africa, there has Ik-cii little involvement of ordinary users of that system. Consultation
about policy tends to take place at high levels and is dominated by specialists, with 
commercial and professional interests well represented. The Sick Funds, on the other 
hand, are examples of bottom-up construction within tight budgetary constraints, and 
a degree of popular involvement in the processes of design, negotiation and 
management of a new system which is rare not only in South Africa, but also 
internationally.
The discussion so far assumes that the Sick Funds have important lessons for 
the architects of a new health system. A more fundamental issue is whether the 
lessons are historical only. Were the Sick Fund developments an offshoot of unusual 
times, made inappropriate by a new political dispensation? Should they wither away 
or be absorbed into a unified national health system? These questions raise a series of 
difficult issues for the trade unions. I have argued that one of the motivating features 
for union action in the early studies was state failure to provide for working class 
needs. The health care projects arose out of a form of trade unionism which defined 
its sphere of activity, responsibility and engagement far more broadly than the 
workplace, relations with employers and employment issues. Few issues were 
excluded from the agenda of the independent unions in the 1980s and early 1990s, but 
not all issues resulted in extensive action in the way that health did in certain unions.
In general, health care was a fire-fighting issue in COSATU unions: union officials 
responded to demands or complaints from members when they reached a critical level, 
but few unions had comprehensive policies, strategic plans or negotiating programs on 
health care. A combination of factors combined to force health care onto I he agendas
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of certain union. These included rampant medical inflation in the private health sector, 
the decay of stale facilities, member complaints and demands, rising real wages and the 
extension of bargaining beyond union recognition and wages as the independent 
unions became increasingly established and confident. Health care was not a popular 
issue with union negotiators with members in standard medical aid schemes, who tried 
to match the desires and expectations of their members and the realities of the 
commercial medical aid scheme market. The union officials who took up the health 
care issue with enthusiasm tended to be those with members in low level schemes, like 
the Sick Funds, or members with industry-delivered services, as on the mines. These 
simpler schemes had potential for growth, development, expansion and consequently 
gain for members, while action on the elaborate and expensive schemes was generally 
in the unpopular direction of simplification and cost-containment, likely to he 
experienced by members as loss of benefit.
This background explains the vagueness of health policy at a national level in 
COSATU. The Sick Funds in this study (and others in which unions are involved), 
were not taken seriously by most other unions as alternatives to medical aid schemes.' 
Many saw them as old-fashioned and second rate, suitable for low-paid workers who 
could not afford medical aid, but unsatisfactory for workers who had progressed 
beyond this level. In my experience the problem was more complex: there was a gap 
between the wage level of clothing or leather workers and the level at which medical 
aid was reasonably affordable and the vast majority of workers fell into this category.
1 For example, the Foodworkers' Medical Benefit Fund and the South African Municipal Workers' 
Union Medical Benefit Fund, both Western Cape initiatives.
Even for workers who could technically afford medical aid, the costs were too high, 
relative to other ealls on their income. Nevertheless, medical aid had high status and 
was seen as the pinnacle of aspiration under the old regime and as such easily became 
the focus of supporters’ expectations of the new regime. Workers expected the new 
government to do something for them and this expectation all too easily translated into 
an expectation of ‘free’ care in the private sector.
The new Department of Health has made considerable advances, particularly in 
expanding access to primary health care. Its priority has been the unemployed, 
indigent and marginal, especially in the areas worst served under the old regime, and 
nobody could object to this priority. The problem is that the policy on working people 
is not sufficiently differentiated. All those in formal employment, with the exception of 
those below the tax cut-off, are lumped together without recognition of the working 
poor. I argue that the new Social Health Insurance proposal is little more than a lax 
on the poor, without significant redistribution. If introduced, it is likely to raise first 
expectations and then resentment. The proposal is for a form of Social Health 
Insurance (SHI) which would impose a ‘legal obligation for formal sector employees 
earning above the income tax threshold to be insured against the eosts of themselves 
and their dependants for care in public hospitals' (Department of Health 1997a, 
4)(cmphasis mine). The system covers only hospital care (primary care in public 
facilities is free at point of service) and is in essence simply a mechanism for increasing 
funding for the public hospital sector. The SHI legal obligation may be met either by 
direct membership of a new SHI scheme, incorporating all working people (above the
tax cut-off) who are not currently members of medical schemes, or indirect 
participation via registered medical schemes, which must reinsure for all care which
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their members receive in public hospitals. This would incorporate all current members 
of medical schemes. The cost of membership is as yet uncertain, but two possible 
contribution levels are proposed, cither 2% or 4% of earnings, split equally between 
employer and worker.
In my view, this version of SHI is problematic. From the point of view of 
trade unions, the problems may be summarised as follows. It offers little to workers 
who Jo not have a scheme at present. At present they use state hospitals and pay little 
or nothing for them. Under the new scheme, they would he paying for what they used 
free in the past. It also offers nothing to workers who Jo have a scheme at present. 
Their medical schemes would simply he required to pay the real costs of any public 
hospital care used by their members. The contributions would increase the cost of 
labour, a serious concern in marginal sectors. The system docs little in the way of 
redistribution: the richest are generally in medical aid schemes, most of which use 
public sector hospitals very little if at all. Consequently medical aid schemes would 
contribute very little to SHI, and the major income would be from non-scheme 
members, the working poor. In addition, the policy document does not recognise the 
fact that some medical schemes (especially Sick Funds and medical benefit schemes) 
have low-income members. A single hospital fee system for all schemes disadvantages 
these schemes and Will result in higher contribution increases for their members.
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5. The future for unions
ll is important that trade unions do not retreat from the issue of health eare. 
Health policy is in a crucial stage of formulation. If the SHI proposals arc 
implemented, they will undermine the basic principle of the Sick Funds, which provide 
primary care but direct their members to the public sector for hospital care, which they 
receive at subsidised rates because of their low income. The Sill proposals envisage 
free primary care but hospital care at full cost, to be funded either by the Sick Fund or 
via SHI. Either way, low paid workers will no longer be subsidised for hospital care.
If the Sick funds are to survive, they will have to negotiate a concession in this regard: 
bargaining for exemption from SHI or reduction in contributions, in return for 
relieving the state of the cost of primary care for their members. The radical 
alternative is to close down the Sick Fund primary services, re-directing members into 
the public sector for primary care. This is neither practical nor desirable. Public sector 
primary services are severely overstretched and cannot accommodate any additional 
load. Nor is there yet a mechanism for incorporating the clinics into the state health 
system. Realistically it would be difficult to hand over the clinics, not least because of 
the sense of ownership which they evoke in members and the particular sets of 
relations which have developed between workers, their union and those who work in 
the clinics. There is an uncomfortable truth in the fact that fighting to preserve these 
clinics is a sectional issue, because they arc exclusive to workers in the industries 
concerned and there is little immediate likelihood of either incorporating them into the
public sector clinic network or opening the facilities to some kind of broader access.
In response, I would argue (in part, of course, defensively) that it is inappropriate fol­
low paid workers to carry the load of subsidising even lower paid workers or the 
unemployed, who should be carried by the working population as a whole, with 
taxation ensuring that the richer carry more of the load. I am reassured by the fact that 
advances for Sick Fund members are not won at the expense of other poor groups. 
Their precedent value is significant, as examples of affordable provision, with a degree 
of democratic involvement not yet seen in any state service. As examples of the 
difficulty and slowness of fundamental change in health service delivery, they also have 
cautionary value for health planners engaged in the project of change at a national 
level.
In the process of restructuring health care for their members, the unions 
involved were strengthening a form of unionism which accepts a broad responsibility 
for the social welfare of their memberships and members' families. This breadth of 
responsibility was partly related in South Africa to historic state neglect of working 
class health and welfare, which left a vacuum for unions to fill. The change in 
government did not change this situation overnight, but opened up the potential for 
active engagement with the state at different levels, feeding union experience into the 
national project of constructing a health service to meet South Africa’s needs.
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